Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[MR. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — ENERGY

Sleipner Gas

Mr. Orme: asked the Secretary of State for Energy what progress is being made towards a decision on the proposed purchase on Sleipner gas by the British Gas Corporation; and if he will make a statement.

The Secretary of State for Energy (Mr. Peter Walker): The Government are considering the proposal by the British Gas Corporation to buy Sleipner gas. A number of gas producers and consumers have made representations about the proposal. A decision will be taken as soon as possible.

Mr. Orme: Will the Secretary of State confirm that the British Gas Corporation has made a commitment to purchase all North sea gas that becomes available, plus Sleipner gas? If so, is it not in the interests of BGC and of the British economy to go ahead with that agreement? Will he also tell us the truth about the battle between the Treasury and his Department regarding the agreement, as we do not want another huge increase in gas prices, as is apparently advocated by the Treasury, with the backing of the oil lobby?

Mr. Walker: The right hon. Gentleman, with his great interest in these matters, will be delighted and relieved to

know that there is no great battle going on between myself and the Treasury on this matter. As he knows, this is a major and fairly complicated transaction, involving a great deal of detail, and it is right that a matter of such magnitude should be considered very carefully. It is important to ensure security of supplies for the industry in a way that will not retard the development of our own North sea resources. That is the Government's object in their examination of the proposal.

Mr. Rost: Will my right hon. Friend give an assurance that he will not be bullied by the British Gas Corporation into a hasty decision before he has fully considered the implications for the offshore supply industry, loss of revenue, balance of payments and, above all, the price of gas as it will affect the consumer?

Mr. Walker: My hon. Friend's comments illustrate the importance and magnitude of the decision. Clearly it must be thoroughly examined, and that is what the Government are doing.

Mr. Barron: In relation to the estimated cost of Sleipner gas, is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that exploration of the smaller areas of gas, including those in the southern North sea, confirm that the proposal should be pursued, as the gas cannot be found in our own areas?

Mr. Walker: It is important to develop those areas and not to take any decision that would detract from or stop those developments. Bearing in mind the future requirements of this country, and with the Frigg field, for example, going out of supply, there is no reason why we should not have a transaction which will guarantee the continued development of the North sea, as the hon. Gentleman requires, as well as ensuring security of supplies.

Mr. Eggar: Will the my right hon. Friend confirm that it would be possible for the British Gas Corporation to renegotiate the contract both to extend the maturity of the final date for taking all the gas and to reduce the quantity in any one year? Will he also confirm that it would be possible to link any decision on Sleipner with a decision to allow or not to allow United Kingdom gas exports?

Mr. Walker: Anything is possible, of course, and a range of complicated considerations are involved. The Government are anxious that there should be continuing development of our North sea resources, especially in the new frontier areas into which we are now moving. There is also a great need to ensure the security of gas supplies to this country.

Power Stations (Refurbishment)

Mr. Dixon: asked the Secretary of State for Energy when he last met the chairman of the Central Electricity Generating Board to discuss the refurbishment of power stations.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy (Mr. Giles Shaw): My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and I have frequent discussions with the chairman of the Central Electricity Generating Board about various matters, but detailed questions such as this are a matter for the board.

Mr. Dixon: Will the Minister consult the chairman and bring forward the refurbishment of the power stations, since that would provide desperately needed jobs in engineering and help firms such as NEI Reyrolle, in my constituency, which is having to pay off skilled men who will be lost to the industry?

Mr. Shaw: I appreciate fully the importance of the hon. Gentleman's question, but he will recognise that the CEGB has a long-standing and effective policy of purchasing British goods and services provided that prices are right and competitive. Some 99 per cent. of the board's procurement spending is on British goods and services.

Mr. Speller: Bearing in mind my hon. Friend's comment about getting value for money, will he bear that factor in mind if he speaks to the chairman of the CEGB? Does he agree that although we all seek refurbishment and hope for many coal-fired stations, this must depend on coal being available in the future at a more economic price that at present?

Mr. Shaw: My hon. Friend is right to point out that so far the CEGB has taken no decisions on whether to convert or to reconvert any of its oil-burning capacity to coal.

Mr. Eastham: May I remind the Minister that I referred to this matter several months ago and that the hon. Gentleman in turn referred it to Sir Walter Marshall, who wrote to me explaining the constraints on capital expenditure? May I reinforce what my hon. Friend the Member for Jarrow (Mr. Dixon) mentioned? The heavy power industry is now in a desperate plight, with no new orders on the horizon. As a consequence there could be a complete collapse of the provision of power engineering in Britain, with no guarantee that it could be re-established once there was a renewed requirement for it.

Mr. Shaw: I reassure the hon. Gentleman that the CEGB has contacts with the engineering industry. Details of its repair and maintenance programmes are available to those firms which seek to take advantage of them. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will make his inquiries in that direction.

Energy Conservation Areas

Mr. Haynes: asked the Secretary of State for Energy which local authorities have expressed a firm interest in

the development of energy conservation areas; what action they are now taking; and with what involvement from his Department.

Mr. Barron: asked the Secretary of State for Energy what progress he has made in the establishment of energy conservation areas.

The Minister of State, Department of Energy (Mr. Alick Buchanan-Smith): Dudley, Newcastle and South Glamorgan have expressed a firm interest. Dudley is embarking on its project following recent approval for grant-aid under the urban programme, and Newcastle is awaiting a final decision for urban aid funding. The energy efficiency office has strongly supported both these applications. South Glamorgan is currently considering a similar project in Cardiff.

Mr. Haynes: Is the Minister aware that that is a shameful reply to my question? His Department has done nothing since April 1983. When will the Department live up to its responsibilities for energy conservation and give the local authorities the support that they need to get stuck into programmes? It will not be long before the Minister comes to the Dispatch Box in haste to talk about increases in prices, yet on energy conservation he appears to be half asleep.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: If I were the hon. Gentleman, I should be ashamed that I had not listened to the answer to the question. I said that we had supported these programmes directly. Work is well ahead on them. All the Department's various schemes on conservation are available in these areas when they get off the ground, and the Department has to do a great deal in terms of initiative in getting them under way.

Mr. Hannam: What success is being achieved in the appeal to industrialists to conserve energy?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: There has been an extremely good response. As my hon. Friend knows, we have been conducting the campaign in a number of centres throughout the country. We are now following up some of those original campaigns. We are enormously encouraged by the response and by the action being taken by industry as a result of my right hon. Friend's initiative.

Mr. Barron: The Minister says that his Department has been shoving for these energy conservation areas. Can he say how much money has been spent directly by his Department on setting them up? As I understand it, the present position about these areas involves nothing but words from the Department.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman did not listen to what I said. Money is available under the urban aid programme. In addition, when schemes are set up, there is the total availability of other energy conservation schemes. The purpose is to make better and fuller use of the available schemes in a co-ordinated manner. That is precisely what is happening.

Mr. Rowlands: After all those words, I understand that only three authorities have approached, applied or inquired in any serious fashion. Does the Minister intend to take any further initiative to arouse interest among local authorities? May it not be that, as a result of all the cuts imposed upon them, local authorities feel that the Government will not support them?

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: I am sorry to disappoint the right hon. Gentleman. Thirty-nine local authorities have expressed interest. The Labour party is not prepared to acknowledge the Government's success.

Power Stations (Coal Supplies)

Mr. Teddy Taylor: asked the Secretary of State for Energy how many days' supply of coal is currently available at power stations.

Mr. Peter Walker: Coal stocks at power stations are sufficient to meet electricity demand for many months ahead.

Mr. Taylor: Does not that information show that the miners strike is simply pointless and futile? Does my right hon. Friend agree that the only result of the continuance of the strike will be a major loss of wages for miners and, in the longer term, a loss of customers and jobs?

Mr. Walker: Yes. Obviously, the miners have lost a substantial amount of wages. The tragedy of the timing of this dispute is that we were being successful in conquering new markets. In December, 78 applications were made for grants to convert to coal, but at present no one is applying. There is no doubt that the dispute is doing considerable damage to the prospects of the industry.

Mr. Wallace: To what level will coal stocks have to fall and what consequences follow before the Government intervene in this dispute to try to find common ground between the parties and to seek a resolution of it?

Mr. Walker: The Government have already intervened in the dispute to a considerable extent. First, the Government have made available enough money to ensure that the miners have a pay offer which is better than that already accepted by the power workers and gas workers. Secondly, they have intervened to see that money is made available so that all miners will be able to remain in the mining industry if they wish to do so. Thirdly, the Government have intervened to ensure that what the coal industry has enjoyed for the last five years it will enjoy for the next three years — the biggest capital investment programme that it has ever had. All that is substantial intervention.

Mr. Terlezki: In view of the unnecessary and harmful strike that has continued for so long—one never knows when it will come to an end—may there not in the end be many more pit closures than were originally envisaged?

Mr. Walker: I very much hope that the miners will reflect upon the range of offers and opportunities available. With the chance to conquer new markets and the rewards of a massive capital investment programme, there is good potential for the industry's future. At the moment, it is being damaged and harmed. I hope that that harm will cease as quickly as possible.

Mr. Lofthouse: Is the Secretary of State aware that that answer is not satisfactory at all? With his great responsibility for energy in Britain, is it not time that he intervened in the mining industry dispute? Is he aware that there will be no winners and that it is time somebody got the parties around the table for realistic talks? Is he further aware that many miners' families are suffering great financial hardship? Has he not some responsibility for

that? Does he think that, like his boss, he can continue to sit on the fence, getting sadistic pleasure out of people being bashed into submission?

Mr. Walker: I take no pleasure at all from disputes in the coal industry. That is why I and my colleagues decided to make arrangements for a decent pay offer, to make sure that there was no need for a single redundancy and to ensure that massive investment would continue. Two of the three mining unions have been prepared to get round the table. I suggest that this coming Wednesday the NUM will have another opportunity, and I hope that it will take advantage of it.

Mr. Raffan: Has my right hon. Friend read the article in The Times today by Jimmy Reid, a leading figure in the Labour party? Does he agree with him, that the way the NUM's national delegate conference has been used to circumvent a national ballot is equivalent to the House cancelling a general election and that, if the Labour party continues to deny democratic rights to miners, it can never be considered worthy of holding office in Britain?

Mr. Walker: I have read that article. In fairness to the Leader of the Opposition, it must be said on the day that Mr. Scargill persuaded the delegate conference to change the rules on balloting, the right hon. Gentleman came out in favour of having a ballot. I notice that since then he has not repeated that request, but I hope that he will soon do so.

Mr. Wigley: Given not only the great suffering of the miners and their families, but the loss of trade, to which the Secretary of State has referred, and the long-term danger to the pits, surely the right hon. Gentleman cannot continue to stand back in this dispute? He must get stuck in, get people together, and get a solution to it.

Mr. Walker: I suggest that the hon. Gentleman should persuade miners that, with a decent pay offer, no need for a single compulsory redundancy, and the massive investment programme, there is no need for them to suffer hardship.

Mr. Bill Walker: Will my right hon. Friend confirm that, because there is hydro power and substantial oil as well as nuclear power, coal stocks at power stations in Scotland will last almost indefinitely?

Mr. Walker: There are substantial coal stocks at Scottish power stations; and coal stocks at power stations throughout the United Kingdom will last for a very long time.

Mr. Patchett: The Secretary of State refers constantly to no redundancies and jobs for all miners. Does he not realise that the dispute is about jobs for future families? Would the right hon. Gentleman not fight for a future for his child?

Mr. Walker: Yes, I do realise that. I believe it is right for the Government to declare that in the next few years they will make available another £3 billion for new capital investment to ensure the future of the industry.

Mr. Rost: Will my right hon. Friend contrast this Government's proved commitment to the future of the mining industry with what is happening under the Socialist Government in France, where the high-cost pits are being drastically closed down and miners are being made redundant, partly because the nuclear industry has proved so much more competitive?

Mr. Walker: The French Government were elected upon a promise to increase coal production by 50 per cent., but they have now decided on a programme to reduce coal production by 50 per cent. In fact, they have also decided to reduce the number of miners by 50 per cent.

Mr. Douglas: Does the Secretary of State accept that his posture is unbecoming to the high office that he holds, and that this attitude that he, on behalf of the Government, will sit it out until the power stations run out of coal is tragic for the industry and for the nation? Is it not in the national interest for him to intervene directly in this dispute and to use the powers of his office to get people round the table to seek a solution?

Mr. Walker: I used the high office that I hold to ensure enormous financial provision to guarantee a decent pay offer, no compulsory redundancies, and record investment in the coal industry. That is using my high office to the great benefit of the mining industry.

Mr. Hardy: Does the Secretary of State realise that he seems to be going rather further than the National Coal Board in saying that there will be no compulsory redundancies, certainly not within particular coalfields? Does he accept that, while he appears to be emphasising the fact that the Government have intervened, he is not doing any service to the industry, to his Department or to the community at large by flatly refusing to take part in tripartite negotiations?

Mr. Walker: I repeat that there are negotiations to be conducted by the industry, if it desires to do so. Two of the mining unions, as the hon. Gentleman knows, are willing to do so. Only one union has decided, month after month, that it will not have such talks.

Mr. Michael Morris: Is not one of the saddest aspects of the dispute that the president of the NUM, who persistently forecasts that coal stocks will run out, is consistently proved wrong, and that we are losing trade to Poland, because thousands of tons of coal are now coming in on long-term contracts, to the detriment of south Yorkshire and south Wales in particular?

Mr. Walker: I do not know of any long-term contract with the Polish Government at this stage. Therefore, I cannot comment on that. It is true that 13 weeks ago the president of the National Union of Mineworkers said that there were only eight weeks of stocks at the power stations, that two weeks ago that there were 10 weeks of stocks, that six weeks ago there were nine weeks of stocks, and that now there are eight weeks of stocks. In fact, there are many months' coal stocks available at power stations.

Mr. Mason: How long does the Secretary of State intend to stand idly by watching the mining industry, for which he has prime responsibility, gradually crumbling into disrepair? Why does he not invite the chairman of the National Coal Board and the president of the National Union of Mineworkers to his office to discuss the future of the industry? Talks might then ensue which could bring an end to the dispute.

Mr. Walker: I repeat that the Government have not stood idly by. They have poured money into capital investment and into making available a decent pay award. They have been far less idle than the Labour Government, of which the right hon. Member for Barnsley, Central (Mr. Mason) was a member, on pay, decent terms for voluntary redundancy and capital investment.

Mr. Orme: The question asked by my right hon. Friend the Member for Barnsley, Central (Mr. Mason) goes to the centre of the problem. The Secretary of State's failure to intervene is an absolute disgrace. He and the Prime Minister are hoping for a defeat of the miners instead of a defeat for the policy of Mr. MacGregor. They should get round the table for discussions, the Secretary of State could play his part, and we could work out a policy on energy that would be based on growth and expansion.

Mr. Walker: If there is any disgrace in the dispute, it is the attitude of a party that urges people to strike when the Government are investing more, paying more and looking after miners better than that party ever did.

Coal Mining Dispute

Sir William van Straubenzee: asked the Secretary of State for Energy whether he will make a statement on the current situation of the industrial dispute in the coal mining industry.

Mr. Dykes: asked the Secretary of State for Energy if he will make a statement on progress in talks to resolve the dispute in the coal mines.

Mr. Peter Walker: With permission, Mr. Speaker, I shall answer these questions together.
The main effect of the present dispute is to damage the prospects of individual pits and of the coal industry as a whole. To date, those on strike have lost over £200 million in wages, and the progress made in encouraging industry to convert to coal has been stopped.

Mr. Dormand: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I apologise for intervening now, because I know that you prefer points of order to be raised at the end of Question Time, but if I do not raise my point of order now it will be too late.
The Secretary of State has asked permission—I do not know from whom — to answer two questions together. My question No. 18 is on exactly the same topic—

Mr. Speaker: Order. If the hon. Gentleman will be patient, he may be a happier man.

Sir William van Straubenzee: I thank my right hon. Friend for his statement. Has he noted reports of intimidation of the wives and families of individual miners? Does he understand how abhorrent that practice is to the vast majority of people, and has he any evidence to suggest that intimidation or other measures are reducing the numbers who are continuing to work?

Mr. Walker: On cannot measure the effects of intimidation by the numbers going to pits on any one day. I can only say that at the end of last week we had record numbers working at the pits, and I am pleased to say that this morning more miners arrived at the pits than at the same time last week.

Mr. Dykes: My right hon. Friend has observed the dispute at close quarters in recent weeks. What percentage of the dispute does he believe is due to miners' genuine grievances and what percentage is due to the demonic and relentless ego trip of the most mischievous trade union leader in British history?

Mr. Walker: There is no way of judging the views of individual miners. All that one can say is that the majority of the fields that have had the opportunity of a ballot decided to work.

Mr. Concannon: Is the Secretary of State aware that he should take no joy from what is happening in Mansfield, because the Nottinghamshire miners are as opposed to the NCB policy as anyone else? The other dispute is an internal one within the industry.
I add my voice to the pleas that my hon. Friends have made to the Secretary of State. We have two entrenched positions. Only a middle man can help. The Secretary of State is that middle man, and he should get the parties round the table.

Mr. Walker: I do not believe the right hon. Gentleman's case that there are two entrenched positions. The programme for the coal industry, which is a good one that gives it the potential for expansion and opportunities to conquer new markets, is something that the Coal Board is happy to discuss. Two of the mining unions are prepared to discuss it, and I hope that the other mining union will think carefully and will also be prepared to discuss it.

Mr. Ray Powell: The question refers to a statement. Is the Minister aware that we have yet to have a full-scale debate in the Chamber on the dispute, which has gone on for 10 weeks? — [Interruption.] The Leader of the House is sitting next to him. Is he not aware that this dispute has lasted for 10 weeks and that not only miners' families but the whole of the nation will suffer if he does not take his head out of the sand and do something about it?

Mr. Walker: The best way to do something about it is to bring to the attention of miners the reality of what is on offer to them, which is good for their future and good for the present health of the mining industry.

Sir John Osborn: Will my right hon. Friend bear in mind that the country will have noticed that there has been no plea from the Labour Benches for Arthur Scargill to meet the Coal Board with the other two unions on Wednesday? Is he aware that many people in the coal industry, particularly where I live in Yorkshire, did not want to go on strike but were driven out by flying pickets and intimidation? I am waiting for that plea from the Labour Benches.

Mr. Walker: I should naturally welcome it if the Labour party endeavoured to persuade the NUM to come to the negotiations. Some weeks ago it urged a national ballot, but there has been no sign of its doing so recently. Perhaps it will revert to that plea.

Mr. Dormand: Does the Secretary of State realise that there is no possibility of an early end to the dispute, particularly given the feeling that many of us have come across in our constituencies at the weekend? Is he aware that the Government's attitude of pretending that this has nothing to do with them is not seen as the correct stance? Does he agree that, above all things, the economy is suffering, and he has responsibility for that, together with the Prime Minister and the rest of the Cabinet? Will he take action before it is too late?

Mr. Walker: It is because I consider that the coal industry has an important and major future in our economy that I persuaded my colleagues to provide the finance for

a decent pay offer, with no compulsory redundancies, and a massive investment programme. I hope that the hon. Gentleman and his colleagues will do more to persuade the leaders of the NUM that that is what it is about.

Mr. Burt: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the longer this dispute continues the greater the likelihood of an increase in power prices, which will be directly attributable to those who have stimulated and preserved the strike? Is he further aware that this strike could threaten the jobs of those employed in energy-intensive industries, many of whom would have given their eye teeth to have the redundancy terms that are now offered to the miners?

Mr. Walker: It is true that the voluntary redundancy and early retirement provisions, the capital investment and the pay offered in the coal industry make those in other industries jealous. They will particularly resent it if their jobs are threatened by industrial action when all this is on offer.

Mr. Pike: Why does the right hon. Gentleman not give a simple answer to a simple question, face up to the Government's responsibility and accept that the Government should intervene and call for both sides to come together? Will he take that responsibility and call an early meeting of both sides to try to resolve the dispute?

Mr. Walker: The Government's responsibility was to see that miners and the mining industry had a good future. That responsibility we carried out rather better than it was by the last Labour Government.

Mr. Hickmet: Does my right hon. Friend believe that there are any lessons for the mineworkers to learn from the strike in the steel industry in 1980? Is it not true that although the immediate problems of blast furnaces and coke ovens at various large steelworks have been resolved for the time being, the long-term problem is hanging on to markets, with over-capacity in steel in Europe? Is not the strike in the coal industry placing at risk the jobs of thousands of steel workers?

Mr. Walker: I am pleased to say that, to date, production of British steel has been maintained at a high level and I hope that this will continue. There are about 1 million tonnes of sales of coal opportunities for Durham alone, which may be put in jeopardy if this action continues.

Mr. Wrigglesworth: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that some of us feel that it is unlikely that Mr. Scargill will enter into realistic negotiations until he is under more pressure to do so from his members? With that in mind, and acknowledging the degree of commitment, in terms of investment, that the Government have given to the coal industry, will the right hon. Gentleman publish as soon as possible a comprehensive plan for energy in which the balance between nuclear generation, oil, coal and other sources of energy would be spelt out much more clearly than the Government have yet done?

Mr. Walker: The hon. Gentleman is asking for the type of publication that goes into great detail about future projections. However, developments and activities on the international scene as well as at home can bring about enormous variations. Nevertheless, I can say categorically that, in terms of energy, we are blessed with a good oil industry, a good gas industry, a nuclear industry and a major coal industry, and that it would be crazy for any


Government not to keep all the options fully open and keep all those industries active and successful. They have an international as well as a national application.

Mr. Beaumont-Dark: Are we not living in the strangest possible world, when Mr. Scargill, who is obviously an honourable man, tries to make people believe that the coal industry is being run down by a wicked and uncaring Coal Board and Government, when in fact £3 million a day of taxpayers' money is being spent on the industry? Would my right hon. Friend care to speculate on what a real rundown would look like? If the engineering industry in the midlands were given a subsidy of £3 million a day, there would be the industrial prosperity of a new age.
Does my right hon. Friend agree that—

Mr. Speaker: Order. One at a time.

Mr. Walker: I believe that this very substantial capital investment programme is in the interests not only of the miners but of the nation. The position in our economy is that we may be able, as part of a move for energy efficiency, to persuade many industries to convert to coal. We were doing that, and I am sorry that the strike action is damaging that prospect.

Mr. Strang: Is it not time that the Government abandoned the pretence that the strike is not having a serious effect on the national economy and admitted that the uneconomic use of oil in power stations, the additional police costs, and the loss of coal and other production is costing hundreds of millions of pounds?

Mr. Walker: I have never suggested that industrial action in any major industry does not damage the economy. That is why we created the conditions in which there was no need for industrial action.

Mr. Orme: If that is the case—and because of the seriousness of the situation—will the Secretary of State use his good offices to invite Mr. MacGregor and Mr. Scargill to his office this week to discuss these matters? The Secretary of State could tell them what he has just told us and could hear the arguments in the other direction.

Mr. Walker: I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman should also have a meeting with Mr. Scargill — [Interruption.] I suggest that the right hon. Gentleman should say to Mr. Scargill, "As the Government and the NCB are currently investing twice as much in the industry as we did and paying the miners much better than we did, why are you on strike?"

CEGB (Costs)

Mr. Nicholas Baker: asked the Secretary of State for Energy what discussions he has had with the Central Electricity Generating Board about cutting its costs.

Mr. Giles Shaw: My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State and I have regular meetings with the chairmen of both the Electricity Council and the Central Electricity Generating Board. The industry's progress in controlling costs is one of the subjects that we discuss.

Mr. Baker: Does my right hon. Friend agree that one way of reducing electricity price increases is for the CEGB to cut its costs and improve efficiency? What incentive can my right hon. Friend give the CEGB to do that, in the interests of the consumer?

Mr. Shaw: I must remind my hon. Friend that the CEGB is doing just as he asks. The cost of producing electricity in the United Kingdom is falling, because improved productivity has been the order of the day. The CEGB deserves credit for improving its efficiency and for reducing costs, though that is also due to the Government's success in bringing down inflation.

Mr. Foulkes: If coal stocks at power stations are as high as the Secretary of State told us in answer to question No. 4, why is the CEGB burning so much expensive imported oil?

Mr. Shaw: As the hon. Gentleman knows, the CEGB is burning more oil than it had planned to do—

Mr. Foulkes: Why?

Mr. Shaw: The hon. Gentleman will be the first to recognise the importance of doing that to ensure continuity of supply.

Alternative Energy

Mr. Chapman: asked the Secretary of State for Energy if he will report progress in reducing unnecessary waste and duplication of European Economic Community member countries' research into alternative forms of energy.

Mr. Buchannan-Smith: Information on national programmes is exchanged between member states in Community research groups, bilaterally and within the International Energy Agency. Waste and unnecessary duplication should accordingly be avoided.

Mr. Chapman: As I understand that the appropriate Council of Ministers meeting next week will consider and, for all I know, approve the next research and development programme into alternative forms of energy, will my right hon. Friend assure me that, in the light of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State's admission some weeks ago that there was unnecessary waste and duplication, the programme will be examined carefully? Although many of us welcome the fact that Government funds made available for research and development have more than tripled, they are wasted if there is unnecessary duplication.

Mr. Buchanan-Smith: Not unusually, my hon. Friend is well informed. I hope to represent the Government at the Energy Council next week. I assure my hon. Friend that if the matter comes up for discussion I shall go to it with his words ringing in my ears.

Landlords (Charges)

Mr. Greenway: asked the Secretary of State for Energy what further evidence he has received concerning the practice of some landlords in charging more for electricity than the relevant area board; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Giles Shaw: I have received no recent evidence about overcharging by landlords for electricity supplied. However, the Office of Fair Trading has recently issued a consultative document on the resale of electricity, which I am considering.

Mr. Greenway: Is not a report to my hon. Friend on this very matter long overdue? Does he not agree that it


is wrong for landlords to charge a price for electricity that is above the official price and beyond what is reasonable for administrative purposes?

Mr. Shaw: I understand my hon. Friend's question, but he will be aware that when the matter was last re-examined in 1977 it was recommended that there should be no legislative change. There is now an investigation sponsored by the Electricity Consumers Council, and comments on the consultative document have been invited until the end of June. Until we have received those comments, we cannot consider that the matter is final.

Coal Mining Dispute

Mr. Skeet: asked the Secretary of State for Energy if he will assess the effect each month that the miners' dispute continues on the number of coal mines which will be able to operate safely when the dispute ends.

Mr. Giles Shaw: Responsibility for the maintenance of safety at NCB collieries rests with the board. It is seeking to limit the deterioration in conditions at those pits that are not working, but difficulties will increase with the extension of the stoppage. If remedial action is not taken as and when safety problems appear, this could prevent some pits re-opening at the end of the dispute.

Mr. Skeet: I trust that my hon. Friend is aware that coal faces become geologically unstable if left for a period of time. As this crisis has been continuing for two and a half months, will my hon. Friend give us hard facts as to how many mines have been partially closed or are likely to be closed, and how much machinery has been lost? Is he also aware that, although Mr. Scargill is against closures, he will probably be responsible in the long run for more closures than he expected?

Mr. Shaw: My hon. Friend will be aware that Bogside in Scotland was closed for safety reasons, and that a coal face at Rossington in the Doncaster area was sealed recently, with £2 million worth of equipment on it. The face would not have been lost but for the strike. If the NUM, when asked, had been willing to help by moving the face, it would have been saved.

Oral Answers to Questions — HOUSE OF COMMONS

Office Accommodation

Mr. Dormand: asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will make a statement on the progress being made in providing additional office accommodation for hon. Members.

The Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons (Mr. John Biffen): The New Building Sub-Committee of the Services Committee has, I understand, made good progress in its examination of how the new parliamentary building should be developed and its accommodation allocated. I understand that its proposals reflect the view, expressed by many hon. Members in the debate of 22 November, that staff should, as far as possible, move out of the Palace to enable an increased number of hon. Members to have rooms near the Chamber.

Mr. Dormand: When are hon. Members likely to occupy the offices? There are rumours that the work is

already behind schedule. Will the right hon. Gentleman also confirm that there is to be no cut in the original financial allocation for the project?

Mr. Biffen: I understand that phase I of the Bridge street building should be available for occupation in early 1990. Although I can only take note of what the hon. Gentleman says about financial restraint in the project, I am certain that the Government will balance a proper sense of economy with the previous commitment.

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: I welcome the news about the new Bridge street building. Will my right hon. Friend note the growing number of American research assistants who appear to be occupying the desks and office space of Members of Parliament?

Mr. Biffen: I note what my hon. Friend has said. I only hope that completion of phase I of the Bridge street building will not, by virtue of making more accommodation available, compound the difficulties by raising expectations among research assistants.

Mr. Willie W. Hamilton: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that although this place might be an attractive museum, it is a working slum? Will he treat the matter with a great deal more urgency than he seems to be demonstrating?

Mr. Biffen: I cannot in any sense guarantee to give it greater seriousness or urgency than I have shown in my reply.

Public Accounts Commission

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg: asked the Lord Privy Seal when he will arrange for the chairman of the Public Accounts Commission to have a regular day for answering oral questions.

Mr. Biffen: Following discussions through the usual channels, I have arranged that oral questions to the Member answering for the Public Accounts Commission will start not later than 3.15 pm on every sixth Monday beginning on 25 June 1984. Questions to the House of Commons Commission will next be answered on 4 June and every sixth Monday thereafter, starting not later than 3.15 pm as at present. Questions in respect of the arts will continue to start at not later than 3.20 pm on those days.

Sir Geoffrey Finsberg: Is my right hon. Friend aware that that is a helpful beginning and will give some of us an opportunity to ask why this new body has decided that it must occupy luxury premises in central London at high cost to the taxpayer?

Mr. Biffen: I thank my hon. Friend for raising the matter. It would be helpful to put it before the Public Accounts Commission. I am sure that the whole House will await with interest the reply to the question, of which we have been given a trailer.

Mr. Campbell-Savours: Does the Public Accounts Commission deserve to be given as much time as that on the Floor of the House? I am asking that as a member of the Committee.

Mr. Biffen: Time will reveal.

Whit Monday (Sitting of the House)

Sir John Biggs-Davison: asked the Lord Privy Seal if he will propose that the House shall not sit on Whit Monday.

Mr. Biffen: No. I think it appropriate that the House should as far as possible conform to the practice of the country at large in these matters.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: Did not my right hon. Friend's predecessor, and does not he himself, regret the supersession of Whit Monday as a public holiday? Should not Parliament and people be enabled once again properly to celebrate the birthday of the Church?

Mr. Biffen: I have to point out to my hon. Friend that the decision to go for a fixed spring bank holiday was taken when my right hon. Friend the Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup (Mr. Heath) was at the Department of Trade in 1964. My hon. Friend may recall that that was introduced with the full-hearted consent of ecclesiastics. Experience since then does not suggest any great public pressure for the reversal of such a policy. I fear that my hon. Friend's anxieties may be overtaken if the modish innovators of the Church are successful in getting a fixed Easter.

Thomas Cook and Son Ltd.

Mr. Greenway: asked the Lord Privy Seal what rent is paid to the House authorities by Thomas Cook and Son Ltd. for the facilities it has within the precincts; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. Biffen: No rent is paid for the rooms occupied by the Transport Office, operated by Thomas Cook and Son Ltd. Equally, Cooks makes no charge for providing what I am sure hon. Members will recognise as an important service.

Mr. Greenway: Does my right hon. Friend accept that hon. Members on both sides of the House are thoroughly grateful for the excellent service that we receive from Thomas Cook? Will my right hon. Friend confirm that no discount is given to hon. Members for that service? Will he tell the House why Thomas Cook pays no rent, in view of the reasonable profits that it makes?

Mr. Biffen: On balance, I am sure that my hon. Friend agrees that Thomas Cook provides an extremely good service. I am sure that that is partly reflected by the terms and conditions on which it operates within the Palace of Westminster. With regard to my hon. Friend's specific question about payment of rent, I cannot answer him immediately with authority, but I shall look into the matter.

Mr. Wrigglesworth: Does the right hon. Gentleman understand that that is an unsatisfactory answer? Thomas Cook receives vast profits for this commercial operation when compared with its other branches. Should not Thomas Cook pay a rent, and should not the contract for providing those services be open to competition provided by other companies?

Mr. Biffen: I cannot confirm or deny the nature of the profits achieved by Thomas Cook in its operations here. It is true that there is a case for considering giving another agency the opportunity to bid for this business. That is currently under consideration by the Accommodation and

Administration Sub-Committee. As soon as I can comment upon its findings I shall write to the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Ward: Is my right hon. Friend aware, following his answer about competition, that many reputable travel agencies and companies would be only to pleased to put in quotations for occupying that office and handling the travel business?

Mr. Biffen: I can assure my hon. Friend that those factors will be taken into account by the Accommodation and Administration Sub-Committee in the study to which I have referred.

Mr. Williams: Since the company has the use of the office free of rent, will the Leader of the House have published in the Official Report an outline of exactly what hon. Members receive at Thomas Cook which they would not receive or would pay for at a normal office?

Mr. Biffen: I shall be happy to consider that.

Oral Answers to Questions — CIVIL SERVICE

Management and Personnel Office

Mr. Sydney Chapman: asked the Minister for the Civil Service for what areas of recruitment policy the Management and Personnel Office is responsible.

The Minister of State, Treasury (Mr. Barney Hayhoe): The Management and Personnel Office has the central responsibility for all aspects of recruitment policy for the home Civil Service. However, it is for individual Departments to determine their own recruitment needs within those wider personnel management policies. The Civil Service Commission, which forms part of the MPO, undertakes the recruitment of staff to grades at broadly executive officer level and above; Departments themselves carry out recruitment to the more junior grades.

Mr. Chapman: I thank my hon. Friend for that information. As I understand that the number of civil servants has been reduced by more than 100,000 in the past five years, with very few forced redundancies, at least among non-industrial civil servants, is my hon. Friend satisfied with recruitment policies for the service, which presumably have been diminished, and which might inhibit that noble service in getting the right people for the right job?

Mr. Hayhoe: My hon. Friend is right to say that the Government have achieved their target of reducing numbers in the Civil Service by over 100,000 since we came into office in May 1979. In the non-industrial Civil Service, that has been done with few redundancies. The number of recruits has come down from about 64,700 in 1978 to 29,300 in 1983, and the number of people leaving the Civil Service voluntarily has also decreased.

Mr. Maxton: Has the Minister's Department undertaken any research into, and comparisons between, growth in the Civil Service and that of middle management in the private sector? If there has been research, will it be published? If not, will the Minister instruct the Department to carry it out?

Mr. Hayhoe: I shall consider that and write to the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Eggar: At what grade will the new head of the Government accountancy service be appointed? What new steps are being taken to recruit properly qualified accountants to the Civil Service?

Mr. Hayhoe: I am sure that the House will share the regret and concern of the Government that no appointment has yet been made for the head of the Government accountancy service. There have been exchanges between the Select Committee on the Treasury and Civil Service and the Government about that matter, and I understand that they are being pursued. Suitable candidates are being interviewed by the permanent secretary to the Treasury and the head of the home Civil Service, who advise my right hon. Friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer on that appointment. I hope that they will be successful in getting the right candidate for that very important job.

Mr. Campbell-Savours: Have not the cuts in the Civil Service been made at a heavy cost to the state and its services? Is it not true that there are not enough Inland Revenue officers to cope with revenue arrears? Is it not the case that Customs and Excise officers cannot deal with the problems developing in our ports and in the collection of VAT, and that Department of Health and Social Security officers cannot deal with the confusion over supplementary benefit? Has not this exercise in reducing civil servant numbers damaged the interests of the state and of the British people and created greater confusion in Government Departments?

Mr. Hayhoe: The answer to all those questions is no.

Unions (Meetings)

Mr. Teddy Taylor: asked the Minister for the Civil Service when he last met representatives of the Civil Service unions; and what subjects were discussed.

Mr. Parry: asked the Minister for the Civil Service what matters were discussed at his last meeting with the Civil Service unions.

Mr. Hayhoe: There have been no further meetings since the two meetings referred to in the answer I gave to my hon. Friend on 12 March, at which the subjects discussed were Civil Service catering and GCHQ.

Mr. Taylor: Is it possible for my hon. Friend's Department to review the accuracy of the estimates regarding the manpower consequences of legislation? Will he examine the envisaged savings from the transfer of housing benefits from the Department of Health and Social Security to local authorities? The transfer was estimated to make an enormous saving in manpower and to save a great deal of work, but appears to have created additional work for both the DHSS and local authorities.

Mr. Hayhoe: The primary responsibility rests with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State, but I shall certainly consider the matter.

Mr. Winnick: What is the position of the GCHQ employees who refused to abandon their trade union membership? What is happening to them? Is it not ironic that during the year when we celebrate the 150th anniversary of the Tolpuddle martyrs a Tory Government should penalise men and women because they wish to exercise their democratic right to belong to a trade union?

Mr. Hayhoe: I repudiate the implications of the second part of the hon. Gentleman's question. Detailed questions,

such as those in the first part of his question, should be addressed to my right hon. and learned Friend the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

Mr. Farr: During discussions with the Civil Service unions, was the Scott report considered, and was progress made towards eliminating the indexing of Civil Service pensions?

Mr. Hayhoe: That was not discussed with the Civil Service unions. I refer my hon. Friend to a debate that we had during the autumn of 1982.

Mr. Wrigglesworth: Is the Minister aware of the strength of feeling which is building up in the Civil Service because the Government are unwilling to recognise how much pay has fallen behind that in the private sector? Does he agree that that is demonstrated by the figures produced by the relevant body? Will the Government respond before there is an explosion in the Civil Service similar to that in the teaching profession?

Mr. Hayhoe: The Treasury is responsible for Civil Service pay, and questions about that should not be raised at this Question Time—[Interruption.] Hon. Members may be astonished to hear that, but I answer questions about matters concerned with the Management and Personnel Office, which do not include pay and numbers. It is not for me to instruct Opposition Members about normal ministerial responsibilities. Pay negotiations are taking place. Quite apart from the procedural point, it would be wholly inappropriate for me to comment on the details of those negotiations.

Mr. Soames: When my right hon. Friend next meets the Civil Service unions, and despite disagreements with them, will he pass on to them the gratitude of many hon. Members for the courtesy, consideration and efficiency shown by civil servants in dealing with our constituency matters?

Mr. Hayhoe: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. His sentiment will be shared widely in the House.

Mr. Nellist: Following the line of previous questions to the Minister about GCHQ and the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick), is the Minister aware of the historic link between Cheltenham and Tolpuddle? Cheltenham was the first town to petition the House against the sentences of the Tolpuddle martyrs 150 years ago. Does he see the historic irony of the Government's attack on trade unions in Cheltenham today?

Mr. Hayhoe: It is totally absurd to link the historic events at Tolpuddle with recent events at GCHQ.

Dr. McDonald: How can the Government justify the forcible transfer of the 100 trade union members at GCHQ, given the Treasury Solicitor's clear commitment in a letter written on 22 March—which I hope the Minister has had an opportunity to read—to take no action against those who decide to retain their trade union membership until the court case is completed? How can the Government justify the steps that they are taking?

Mr. Hayhoe: No action is being taken compulsorily to transfer people until the results of the court action are known.

UNITA Prisoners (Release)

The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Mr. Malcolm Rifkind): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement on the Britons taken prisoner in February by UNITA in Angola.
I am pleased to confirm to the House that UNITA has released the Britons to our emissary and they are all on their way home. We are naturally very pleased that this difficult experience for both the prisoners and their families and friends is over. I should like to record the Government's thanks to the International Committee of the Red Cross for its assistance over the prisoners' welfare.

Mr. Donald Anderson: The Minister will be aware that, although we have profound differences with the Government on South African policy in general, which has been symbolised by the Prime Minister's invitation to Mr. Botha, we rejoice with him at the release of our nationals in Angola. Although I am satisfied that the International Red Cross could not deliver on its own, and although this is a dangerous precedent, there was probably no other course available to the Government. Therefore, we rejoice with the released hostages and their families.
Will the Minister assure the House that Sir John Leahy's three-hour discussion with UNITA representatives was narrowly confined to the hostages, not to broader political matters in which UNITA had hoped we would become involved? Will he confirm that there were no secret clauses or understandings with UNITA which have not been made public, and that in her talks with Mr. Botha the Prime Minister will make clear to him our view that the South African Government should stop assisting the UNITA rebels?
There must be many other British nationals working in Angola who are at risk. What advice would the Minister give to our nationals still in Angola?

Mr. Rifkind: I am grateful that the hon. Gentleman has welcomed the developments. The Government's anxiety throughout this episode has been to apply humanitarian considerations and to do what was necessary to ensure the release of the British prisoners. We have not yet had a detailed account of the discussions between Sir John Leahy and Dr. Savimbi, but I understand that there was a general exchange of views on the position in southern Africa. I assure the hon. Gentleman that no secret clauses, agreements or understanding were required during those discussions. Sir John's visit to Jamba was in accordance with the agreement whereby, as a result of his visit, the British prisoners would be released immediately. We are glad that that happened.
As to South African assistance to UNITA, we hope to see the removal of all foreign interference from Angola, both Cuban and South African, so that the people of Angola can decide their destiny.
As there is a civil war in Angola, it is impossible for anyone to guarantee the safety of British workers there. The British ambassador and other staff have always made British personnel aware of our view on security in that country. However, at the end of the day it must be for the British personnel and their employers to decide whether they should continue working there.

Mr. Peter Tapsell: May I congratulate my hon. Friend on the skilful and patient way in which he

has handled the matter, and Sir John Leahy on the way in which he has conducted a delicate and potentially personally dangerous operation on our behalf?

Mr. Rifkind: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his remarks, and I shall ensure that his congratulations are passed on to Sir John Leahy. It has been a difficult task, but I think that the House will agree that Sir John fulfilled any requirements in a most admirable way.

Dr. David Owen: Although I accept that the Government were right, on humanitarian grounds, to use this rather exceptional procedure, does not the hon. Gentleman agree that as the visit was facilitated by the South African Government it is now crucial—for the British Government's credibility in southern Africa and in the United Nations — that we should make it absolutely clear that we are still committed to achieving a solution to Namibian independence on the basis of the various United Nations resolutions?

Mr. Rifkind: The Government have already made it clear that they believe that Namibian independence can best be achieved on the basis of Security Council resolution No. 435. I assure the right hon. Gentleman that when my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister meets Mr. Botha one of the main subjects to be discussed will be the situation in Namibia, and a desire to see early independence for that country.

Sir John Biggs-Davison: Will not the House and the country wish to congratulate the Government on the success of this humanitarian effort? Did not Sir John Leahy gain the impression of quite a substantial force and organisation in UNITA? Is it not true that the Government of Angola have no basis in any elections or referendum? Will the Government see what can be done to bring about a broader-based Government in that country?

Mr. Rifkind: Sir John Leahy has not yet returned to the United Kingdom, and so we have not yet been able to have the benefit of his detailed thoughts on these matters. There is no doubt that UNITA represents a significant guerrilla force operating within Angola. It remains our desire to see a Government in Angola who are in accordance with the wishes of the people of that country. It must be for them to decide on their destiny, and not for other countries to seek to impose a solution on them.

Mr. Andrew Faulds: Particularly in view of that previous question, will the hon. Gentleman accept that some of us have strong reservations about Her Majesty's Government setting a very ill-advised precedent in yielding to such diplomatic and political blackmail, but more particularly in this case, since the arrangements apparently required South African military assistance?

Mr. Rifkind: We do not consider that any precedent has been set. In the past, when British prisoners have been taken hostage, it has always been the Government's policy to speak to those who have physical control over them in order to try to facilitate their release. What we have said in the past and what we said on this occasion is that we are not prepared to make any concessions with regard to British policy in order to facilitate the release of British prisoners, but that we remained absolutely willing to speak to those who had physical control over our citizens, and that if such conversations led to their release we would welcome it. That is what happened on this occasion.

Mr. Jim Spicer: As UNITA forces seem to be able to move about, and almost to choose targets at will, will my hon. Friend give me an assurance that the Angolan Government are fully conscious of their responsibility to protect overseas citizens in Angola and that no British firm will on any account employ its own armed security forces in such a situation?

Mr. Rifkind: My hon. Friend is right to draw attention to such matters. We have emphasised to the Angolan Government that prime responsibility for the physical protection of those working in Angola, and particularly for expatriates, must lie with the Angolan Government. We clearly have no direct control over what other means companies in Angola may choose to use to ensure their protection. However, I certainly agree with my hon. Friend that the Angolan Government must accept responsibility for protecting those within its frontiers.

Mr. David Winnick: Although I welcome the release of the hostages, is it not a fact—as shown on television screens yesterday —that the rebel forces used the event as a propaganda coup? Is it not about time that the Government told the South African Government loudly and clearly that they should not be using every means at their disposal to destabilise neighbouring states that do not happen to agree with South African policy?

Mr. Rifkind: I have no doubt—and this is the view of the Government—that the South African and Cuban presences in Angola are not assisting the process of peace in that country. A South African withdrawal from southern Angola is clearly in progress and we hope that it will not be too long before all foreign forces leave the country.

Mr. Teddy Taylor: In the inquiries that my hon. Friend made before Sir John's departure, did he gain the impression that UNITA was in effective control of a significant part of the land of Angola?

Mr. Rifkind: In the preliminary stages of our efforts towards the release of the British prisoners our main preoccupation was with the whereabouts and physical well-being of the prisoners. Clearly the fact that they could be marched from Cafunfo in the north to Jamba in the very south of the country shows the extent to which UNITA is able to operate within Angola, but a distinction must be drawn between being able to operate within a territory and actually being in control of it. We are not able to come to any firm view as to the precise total area controlled by UNITA, but I agree that clearly it operates over a very wide area.

Mr. Kenneth Carlisle: Does my hon. Friend accept that this happy conclusion shows that the

Government were right to speak directly with UNITA and to recognise the realities of the situation? Does he further accept that the family involved in my constituency will be extremely relieved at the outcome?

Mr. Rifkind: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. As I emphasised earlier, we have always taken into account the humanitarian aspect. I am sure that the whole House would agree that if speaking to the people in physical control of the prisoners would facilitate their release it would have been unreasonable and foolish for the Government to decline to do so.

Mr. Edward Leigh: Does my hon. Friend Agree that UNITA is the de facto Government of southern Angola up to and beyond the Benguala railway? As UNITA is clearly not just another terrorist movement, what arrangements are being made to maintain some informal or indirect contact with its representatives so as to avoid any repetition of the misunderstandings which led to the kidnapping?

Mr. Rifkind: UNITA itself does not claim to be the de facto Government either of southern Angola or of the country as a whole. I understand that it has expressed an aspiration to be part of a coalition Government in Angola, but clearly these are matters for the Angolan people to decide.

Police and Criminal Evidence Bill

Mr. Dave Nellist: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. As you and the House will be aware, late last week I tried to raise in the House the question of the arrest of a miner in Warwickshire who tried to go to see his cousin to pick up some leeks. Bearing in mind that you would certainly frown on any extension of Question Time, may I ask your advice as to whether today's debates on the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill will provide an opportunity to refer to the fact that in Warwickshire on Thursday a 20-month-old baby was detained for two and a half hours with his father without any opportunity for changing nappies or seeking any assistance? Will it be possible to challenge the relevant Minister about that kind of detention?

Mr. Speaker: It is not for me to advise the hon. Gentleman on parliamentary tactics, but I am sure that if he uses his ingenuity he may be able to raise the matter on some of the new clauses or amendments in the course of the rather long Report stage of that Bill.

Statutory Instruments, &c.

Mr. Speaker: With the leave of the House, I shall put together the Questions on the six motions relating to statutory instruments.

Ordered,
That the Value Added Tax (Special Provisions) (Amendment) Order 1984 (S.I., 1984, No. 606) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &amp;c.
That the Agriculture and Horticulture Grant (Variation) Scheme 1984 (S.I., 1984, No. 619) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &amp;c.
That the Agriculture and Horticulture Development (Amendment) Regulations 1984 (S.I., 1984, No. 618) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &amp;c.
That the Farm and Horticulture Development (Amendment) Regulations 1984 (S .1., 1984, No. 620) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &amp;c.
That the Meat (Sterilisation and Staining) (Amendment) Regulations 1984 (S.I., 1984, No. 604) be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &amp;c.
That the draft Employment Subsidies Act 1978 (Renewal) (Great Britain) Order 1984 be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &amp;c.—[Mr. Neubert.]

Orders of the Day — Police and Criminal Evidence Bill

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

New Clause 3

POLICE DETENTION TO COUNT TOWARDS CUSTODIAL SENTENCE

'(1) In subsection (1) of section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 (computation of custodial sentences) for the words from "period", in the first place where it occurs, to "the offender" there shall be substituted the words "relevent period, but where he".

(2) The following subsection shall be inserted after that subsection—

(1A) In subsection (1) above 'relevent period' means—

(a) any period during which the offender was in police detention in connection with the offence for which the sentence was passed; or
(b) any period during which he was in custody —

(i) by reason only of having been committed to custody by an order of a court made in connection with any proceedings relating to that sentence or the offence for which it was passed or any proceedings from which those proceedings arose; or
(ii) by reason of his having been so committed and having been concurrently detained otherwise than by order of a court.".

(3) The following subsections shall be added after subsection

(6) of that section—

"(7) A person is in police detention for the purposes of this section—
(a) at any time when he is in police detention for the purposes of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984; and
(b) at any time when he is detained under section 12 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984.

(8) No period of police detention shall be taken into account under this section unless it falls after the coming into force of section (Police detention to count towards custodial sentence) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.".'. —
[Mr. Hurd.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Minister of State, Home Office (Mr. Douglas Hurd): I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker: It will be convenient with this motion to discuss Government amendments Nos. 263 and 267.

Mr. Hurd: This is the first of a substantial number of Government new clauses and amendments, which fall into two main categories. The first meets undertakings given in Committee. As the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) reminds us from time to time, we had 59 sittings of the Committee, during which Ministers listened and responded, I hope, constructively, and I do not doubt that the Bill will be improved substantially as the result of the contributions from right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the Committee. The second category is the result of our own domestic efforts to clarify and improve drafting. Those with experience will acknowledge that, in a Bill of this size and complexity, this should be a continuous process. It has produced a large number of minor clarifications which I hope that the House will find useful.
New clause 3 amends section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 and thus carries out an undertaking and meets a


point originally raised by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence). The effect is that any time spent in police detention in connection with an offence will count towards a custodial sentence later imposed for that offence. At present, no time spent by a person under arrest at a police station before charge and before his first appearance in court counts towards a sentence passed later. We have come to the conclusion that this is not fair.
Amendment No. 263 is consequential. Amendment No. 267 amends the long title of the Bill to take account of the change that I have just mentioned—the provisions of new clause 3—and also the additional provisions for duty solicitor schemes at police stations.

Mr. Alfred Dubs: The Opposition welcome the new clause. We see it as a concession to some of the pressure on the Government in Committee. We are glad that they have acknowledged that pressure and that there is a way now in which people held in custody at police stations will have that period counted in their favour.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 4

SEIZED ARTICLES: ACCESS AND COPYING

'(1) Subject to subsection (6) below, if a request for permission to be granted access to anything which has been seized under section 19 above has been made by a person who had custody or control of it immediately before it was so seized, or by someone acting on behalf of such a person, to the officer in charge of the investigation for the purposes of which the thing was seized, the officer shall allow the person who made the request access to it under the supervision of a constable.

(2) A constable may photograph or copy, or have photographed or copied, anything which he has power to seize under section 19 above:

(3) Subject to subsection (6) below, if a request for a photograph or copy of anything which has been seized under section 19 above has been made by a person who had custody of control of it immediately before it was so seized, or by someone acting on behalf of such a person, to the officer in charge of the investigation for the purposes of which the thing was seized, the officer shall—
(a) allow the person who made the request access to it under the supervision of a constable for the purpose of photographing or copying it; or
(b) photograph or copy it, or cause it to be photographed or copied.

(4) Where anything is photographed or copied under subsection (3)(b) above, the photograph or copy shall be supplied by the person who made the request.

(5) The photograph or copy shall be so supplied within a reasonable time from the making of the request.

(6) There is no duty under this section to grant access to, or to supply a photograph or copy of, anything if the officer in charge of the investigation has reasonable grounds for believing that to do so would prejudice the investigation.'. —
[Mr. Hurd.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Hurd: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker: With this motion it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 5 — Retention of seized articles.
Government amendments Nos. 50 to 52, Government amendments Nos. 79 to 82, Government amendments

Nos. 136 to 138, Government amendment No. 145, Government amendment No. 146 and Government amendment No. 235.

Mr. Hurd: These new clauses and amendments are concerned with a number of matters relating to property, both the limits within which the police are able to retain property which they have seized and the facility of access to such property when it has been seized.
New clause 4 clarifies and standardises the rights of owners to access to and copies of seized material and responds to an undertaking that I gave in Committee. It largely replaces subsections (3) to (7) of clause 19, the purpose being to provide a new clause of general application which, although it refers specifically to articles seized under clause 19, will apply also to articles seized under clauses 29, 48 and 49 and schedule 1 as a result of consequential amendments.
The main practical point corresponds to one raised in Committee. The main difference is that we shall now, under the new clause, ensure that unless the officer in charge of the investigation has reasonable grounds for believing that it would prejudice the investigation the person who has had custody or control of a seized article must be permitted access to it on request. As at present drafted, access is provided for only if the making of a copy is impracticable. Someone whose business papers have been seized may not want a copy but may simply want to remind himself of them. The new clause introduces that flexibility.
The purpose of new clause 5 is to simplify the drafting of the Bill. It reproduces the effect of what are at present subsections (8) and (9) of clause 19, which set out the circumstances in which the police retain articles seized in the course of a search of premises. There is now to be a single code governing the retention of property as a result of the new clause and the consequential amendments.
Briefly, seized articles may be retained only so long as is necessary in the particular circumstances of the case. In particular, they may be retained for use as evidence in a trial, for forensic examination or to find out who the lawful owner is. Articles may not be retained if a photograph or copy would suffice for police purposes.
Amendments Nos. 50, 51 and 52 are essentially drafting amendments or consequential on the changes that I have already outlined. I hope that they will be acceptable to the House.
Amendment No. 79 corrects a drafting error in clause 29(8). Amendments Nos. 80, 81 and 82 are consequential on new clauses 4 and 5 which I have already moved. The amendments apply the provisions of the new clauses to articles found in the course of a search under clause 29 which are thought to be evidence of an offence. I hope that the House will find that a satisfactory simplification.
Amendment No. 136 fulfils an undertaking which we gave in Committee. It removes two subparagraphs from clause 48 which on examination are not needed.
Clause 48(7) provides that the police do not have to explain the reason for the seizure of property to a person who has been searched at a police station and who is incapable of understanding what is said to him. Through an oversight, there was not a similar saving in the case when a detained person is violent or likely to become violent, although that saving appears in the parallel situations covered in clauses 33(6) and 34(6). We do not think it sensible to require the custody officer to go through


the motions of giving an explanation to a violent or struggling person. Amendment No. 137 deals with that point.
Amendment No. 138 brings clauses 29 and 48 into line. That also meets a point which was made in Committee.
Amendment No. 145 is similar to the amendment to clause 48(6) to which I have already spoken. The purpose is to empower the custody officer to seize and retain articles found in the course of an intimate search which constitute evidence of an offence. That is all that is needed and the amendment accordingly deletes subparagraphs (i) and (ii), which serve no useful purpose.
Amendment No. 146, together with an earlier amendment to clause 48, remedies a defect inasmuch as it ensures that the powers to retain property seized as a result of a search of an arrested person are in a standard form.
Amendment No. 235 inserts a new paragraph 5A, which applies the safeguards of subsection (12) and (13) of clause 19 and new clauses 4 and 5 to material which is produced to the police as required by an order under paragraph 4, schedule 1 and retained by them. Thus the person concerned will be entitled to a record of anything retained within a reasonable time of requesting one.
The amendments may appear to be complicated, but I am sure that those hon. Members who have followed these matters will see that they are an attempt to tidy and simplify the Bill, which attracted some criticism in Committee.

Mr. Gerald Kaufman: The right hon. Gentleman has, as he pointed out, responded to some of the matters that were raised in Committee. Therefore, we find the new clauses and amendments acceptable.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: If under new clause 4(3) a request is made for a photograph or a copy, the request in the first instance would come from the person who had that material in his possession before the seizure took place,
or by someone acting on behalf of such a person.
I understand the need for that. It may well be a solicitor or somebody else. My right hon. Friend will be familiar with the argument that I have put before, that where someone else, purporting to act for the original person, wishes to make such a request, in this part, or in other parts, of the Bill, the police must have some means of identifying the propriety of that request. Generally speaking, it ought to be authorised in writing by the owner from whom the matter concerned has been seized.
I do not ask my right hon. Friend to undertake that change now. I simply put it to him that the police could be put in difficulty if any Tom, Dick or Harry came in and said that he had authority to make a request and there was no means of establishing that he was genuinely entitled to do so. Thus it may be that written consent is appropriate, or that some other wording is required. I ask my right hon. Friend to consider the matter before the Bill reaches another place.

Mr. Hurd: I should have thought that the police would have to be satisfied that the person making the request was acting on behalf of the person whose papers or property were under consideration, but let me look at it.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 5

RETENTION OF SEIZED ARTICLES

'(1) Subject to subsection (3) below, an article which has been seized under section 19 above may be retained so long as is necessary in all the circumstances.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1) above—
(a) an article may be retained, except as provided by subsection (3) below,—
(i) for use as evidence at a trial for an offence; or
(ii) for forensic examination or for other investigation in connection with an offence; and
(b) an article may be retained in order to establish its lawful owner, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that it has been obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence.

(3) An article may not be retained for either of the purposes mentioned in subsection (2)(a) above if a photograph or copy would be sufficient for that purpose.

(4) Nothing in this section affects any power of a court to make an order under section 1 of the Police (Property) Act 1897.'.—[Mr. Hurd.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 6

ABOLITION OF CERTAIN POWERS OF CONSTABLES TO SEARCH PERSONS

'There shall cease to have effect any Act (including a local Act) passed before this Act in so far as it authorizes—
(a) any search of a person by a constable at a police station; or
(b) an intimate search of a person by a constable, and any rule of common law which authorises a search such as is mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) above is abolished.'.—[Mr. Hurd.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Hurd: I beg to move, That the clause be read a
Second time.
The clause serves two purposes. It puts beyond doubt the repeal of all existing statutory powers in so far as they permit the police to carry out an intimate search. Intimate searches are now carried out in pursuance of the power of search conferred by section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. We shall come to the importance of that Act on later amendments.
As the House knows, the intention is that the only circumstances in which an intimate search may be carried out by or on behalf of the police are those set out in clause 49.
The clause abolishes the present powers of the police under common law to search persons detained at police stations other than by way of an intimate search. We shall have an opportunity later to discuss the content of clause 49, and what should or should not be in it as regards intimate body search by the police. As a result of the discussion in Committee, it was clearly necessary to remove any ambiguity on the points that I have mentioned.

Mr. Kaufman: When the Government agreed to make this concession in Committee, we regarded it as one of the most significant achievements that we had managed to obtain during the passage of the Bill. We are therefore very satisfied that the Government have brought forward this new clause. Not only do we support it, but we anticipate


that it is a precursor to the Government accepting our new clause 16 as a logical extension of what the Government are doing in this new clause.

Mr. Griffiths: I have a slight reservation on this matter. There are no problems on clause 49, and there are no problems about intimate search. However, under the clause as it stands the common law right of search at a police station would cease. That would be all right if the Bill covered all circumstances, but, alas, it does not.
The power of search that will replace the common law powers depends on "reasonable suspicion". In general, no one would quarrel with that, but my right hon. Friend the Minister is aware of the argument that I put in Committee. From time to time, the police search, on arrest, as a routine matter and do not always carry out such searches to look for a specific item that they believe that a person may be carrying.
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For example, a person who has jumped bail or been taken to a police station after being arrested for a minor offence may be searched only if an officer has reasonable suspicion that the person was carrying something that was relevant to that particular offence. However, there have been instances of people being arrested for such an offence taking out a penknife and stabbing a police officer. When the Bill removes the common law rights of search, will the police be unable to conduct a search that could reveal penknives or other articles that have no bearing on the offence for which the person has been arrested but could represent a danger for the police?
My right hon. Friend the Minister may be able to say that the search at a police station will require people to turn out their pockets. If so, I shall be content. However, we need to be sure that in abolishing for ever the powers of search under the common law—specifically at a police station—we will not be denying the police the power of a general search which could turn up items that are not related to the specific offence, but could be dangerous.

Mr. Robert Maclennan: The SDP and the Liberal party are glad that the Government have introduced new clause 6, and we support it. We take the firm view that only the powers of search set out in the Bill should be available to the police. The attempt to codify the powers of search in the Bill is wholly welcome. Of course, that does not pre-empt our position on what those powers should be. We shall return to that later.

Mr. Gerald Bermingham: The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) has merely reiterated what he said in Committee on a number of occasions. I shall merely reiterate what I said in reply to the hon. Gentleman on a number of occasions. Extreme cases make bad law, not good law.
I welcome the new clause, because it begins to codify when searches may take place, which is in the interests of society as a whole. If every person who went into a police station were searched, even if he had been arrested for only a minor offence, we should create ill will.
I think that the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds had in mind the case of a police officer who was stabbed in a taxi. There have been examples of attacks taking place at police stations, but they are only one or two cases among the hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people who

are taken to police stations each year. To legislate for the isolated rather than the generality will create poor law rather than good law.

Mr. Hurd: The answer to the anxiety of my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) is that, although he is right that the search power on arrest —under clause 29—is related to reasonable suspicion, the search power under clause 48—on arrival at a police station — is not so related. That is a pretty comprehensive power which would enable the police to deal with the problem about which my hon. Friend is worried.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend—

Mr. Speaker: Order. The hon. Gentleman has already spoken in this debate. We are on Report arid not in Committee.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 7

POWER OF CONSTABLE TO USE REASONABLE FORCE

'Where any provision of this Act—
(a) confers a power on a police officer; and
(b) does not provide that the power may only be exercised with the consent of some person, other than a police officer,

the officer may use reasonable force, if necessary, in the exercise of the power.'— [Mr. Hurd]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Hurd: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker: With this, we may take amendment (a), leave out from 'use' to end and add
'such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.'.
and Government amendments Nos. 15, 30, 42 to 45, 78 and 242.

Mr. Hurd: The new clause and the Government amendments deal with the concept of reasonable force, which is important not only in the Bill but in the law as a whole.
Various clauses give the police power to take action in the absence of a person's consent. For example, clause 54 allows fingerprints to be taken without consent in various circumstances. As a matter of common sense, it will be seen that the powers will not amount to very much if reasonable force cannot be used, if necessary, in their exercise. For example, it would obviously frustrate the fingerprinting power if the police could take no further action when a person put his hands in his pockets and refused to take them out.
There is no compulsory power in the Bill which ought not to be backed up by a provision permitting the use of reasonable force where, but only where, that is necessary in the circumstances of the individual case. The new clause avoids the need to include an identical provision in each clause that confers a compulsory power. If the House agrees to the new clause, provisions in the Bill allowing for the use of force may be removed, and we have tabled amendments to that effect. The new clause will accordingly simplify the drafting of the Bill.
The Opposition amendment would limit the use of force to cases where it is needed for the prevention of crime or the arrest of offenders or persons unlawfully at large. That formula is borrowed from section 3 of the Criminal Law Act 1967, but we do not believe that it is appropriate here. There are various contexts, other than those mentioned in the Opposition amendment, in which we believe that the use of reasonable force may be justified.
I have already mentioned fingerprinting under clause 54. Other examples involve entry to premises to execute a search warrant or the search of an arrested person when he is taken to a police station. In both those cases, the purpose of the search power may be to find evidence of crime, but in both cases there would be no direct relationship between the power and the prevention of crime at the making of an arrest. Indeed, in the case of actions under clauses 29 and 48, an arrest will, by definition, already have taken place. Therefore, the Opposition amendment would not apply and reasonable force could not be used.
For those reasons, we believe that the amendment is drawn too narrowly and would be too restrictive. It would be absurd if the police could not use force to enter premises to execute a search warrant, because the occupier had locked the door and refused to open it, or to search an arrested person whom there were reasonable grounds to believe was concealing evidence relating to an offence.
On Government amendment No. 15, subsection (8) allows the police to use reasonable force, if necessary, to carry out a search under clause 1. That would be subsumed in the new clause and, therefore, is no longer needed.
Clause 8(3) will be subsumed within the general provisions of clause 16, and amendment No. 30 therefore deletes it entirely. Amendment No. 32 is consequential on new clause 7. Amendment No. 43 deals with a slightly different point. The police will on occasions need to be accompanied by other persons when executing a warrant. For example, they may need the help of an expert to sort out exactly which of the records at which they are looking deals with the offence being investigated, or it may be sensible for a witness to accompany them to identify certain missing articles. The point is of general application and not confined to clause 8 alone, and therefore it would be sensible to apply the provision to all such warrants. Hence the deletion of clause 8(3) in favour of a general provision, contained in this amendment.
Amendment No. 43 does not give the police carte blanche to take along whoever they want when executing a warrant. The occupier's privacy must be respected and it will be for the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant to decide whether the presence of a third party is desirable in the circumstances.
Amendments Nos. 44 and 45 are consequential on new clause 7, as is amendment No. 78. Amendment No. 242 is also no longer necessary, because the new clause provides a general power to use reasonable force if necessary in exercising the powers set out in the Bill.

Mr. Bermingham: I rise to speak to amendment (a). The Minister has said that he considers that it is too narrow, because it restricts the use of force principally to those occasions when an arrest is being made, suspected persons who are at large are sought to be arrested or detained, or persons who have escaped lawful custody are

sought to be arrested. The Government's new clause and amendments are far wider. Effectively, the Government have sought to overcome the decision in Collins v. Wilcock, which was reported recently in The Times, in which the court held that the police officer had no lawful authority to use force and the justification for it lay only in pursuance of certain definitive powers. One does not deny that there are occasions in the course of arrest or in the search of premises when an extremely limited amount of force can be justified.
However, the Government seek to extend the power so that almost anything that is done by a police officer carries with it the inherent justification of the use of a limited amount of force. This changes the whole basis of the concept of our policing, which has always been that a constable is nothing more than an ordinary citizen who does his job. However, if the new clause becomes part of the Bill, the constable will no longer be in that category, but will be a citizen who is allowed to use certain force in specific cases in pursuit of his occupation. The justification is that when fingerprints are being taken, premises are being entered or people are being sought or spoken to, force may be needed.
In the case of Collins v. Wilcock somebody was stopped in the street and he refused to answer the questions put to him by the police. He started to walk away, so the police officer took hold of him. Under the law at the moment, that person was entitled to walk away and the officer was not entitled to use force. The Government are now seeking to give the police officer the power to use force if a person refuses to answer questions, which is his inherent right.
4.15 pm
The Government's new clauses and amendments increase the use of powers far too widely. The Government accuse us of being too narrow, but their approach is far too broad. At the end of the day, we must have policing by consent. Often, fingerprints may be taken before a person is charged, and there may be no justification for taking the fingerprints. No complaint has yet been made about that procedure. The fact that this occurs without any great problem should not give rise to justification for the Government's attempt to increase the power of police. The use of force should be strictly limited, and that is what is behind our amendment.
The Government may say that our amendment is too narrow. We do not mind if it is broadened a little, but we do not want the floodgates to be opened, as the Government's proposals would do.

Mr. Maclennan: The new clause appears to meet an undertaking that the Government have given to the Police Federation to provide that if a constable is permitted by the provisions of the Bill to do some act without a person's consent reasonable force may be used if necessary in the circumstances. While we are not wholly opposed to what the Government have in mind, the new clause is not satisfactorily drafted and I prefer amendment (a), tabled by the hon. Member for St. Helens, South (Mr. Bermingham) and others. If he felt disposed to force a vote on it, we would support it.
When a police officer is permitted to use reasonable force, it is our view that the permission should be specifically tied to the provision in question. A blanket provision such as that proposed by the Government is too


broadly drawn and is offensive, because it appears to give the police more general powers to use violence than is the present case.

Amendment proposed to the proposed new clause,

leave out from 'use' to end and add
'such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.'.—[Mr. Bermingham.]

Question put and negatived.

Question, That the clause be read a Second time, put and agreed to.

Clause added to the Bill.

New Clause 25

ROAD CHECKS

'(1) This section shall have effect in relation to the conduct of road checks for the purpose of ascertaining whether a vehicle is carrying—
(a) a person who has committed an offence other than a road traffic offence or a vehicles excise offence;
(b) a person who is a witness to such an offence;
(c) a person intending to commit such an offence; or
(d) a person who is unlawfully at large.

(2) For the purposes of this section a road check consists of the exercise of the power conferred by section 159 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 in such a way as to stop all vehicles or vehicles selected by any criterion.

(3) Subject to subsection (5) below, there may only be such a road check if a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above authorises it in writing.

(4) An officer may only authorise a road check under subsection (3) above—
(a) for the purpose specified in subsection (1)(a) above, if he has reasonable grounds —
(i) for believing that the offence is a serious arrestable offence; and
(ii) for suspecting that the person is, or is about to be, in the area in which vehicles would be stopped if the road check was authorised;
(b) for the purpose specified in subsection (1)(b) above, if he has reasonable grounds for believing that the offence is a serious arrestable offence;
(c) for the purpose specified in subsection (1)(c) above, if he has reasonable grounds for believing —
(i) that the offence would be a serious arrestable offence; and
(ii) that, having regard to a pattern of crime in the area in which vehicles would be stopped if the road check was authorised, the offence is likely to be committed in that area during the period during which the road check would be authorised to continue;
(d) for the purpose specified in subsection (1)(d) above, if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person is, or is about to be, in the area in which vehicles would be stopped if the road check was authorised.

(5) An officer below the rank of superintendent may authorise such a road check if it appears to him that it is required as a matter of urgency for one of the purposes specified in paragraphs (a), (b) and (d) of subsection (1) above.

(6) If an authorisation is given under subsection (5) above, it shall be the duty of the officer who gives it—
(a) to make a written record of the time at which he gives it; and
(b) to report the authorisation to an officer of the rank of superintendent or above.

(7) The duties imposed by subsection (6) above shall be performed as soon as it is practicable to do so.

(8) An officer to whom a report is made under subsection (6) above may, in writing, authorise the road check to continue.

(9) If such an officer considers that the road check should not continue, he shall record in writing—
(a) the fact that it took place; and
(b) the purpose for which it took place.

(10) An officer giving an authorisation under this section shall specify the locality in which vehicles are to be stopped.

(11) An officer giving an authorisation under this section, other than an authorisation under subsection (5) above—
(a) shall specify a period, not exceeding seven days, during which the road check may continue; and
(b) may direct that the road check —
(i) shall be continuous;
(ii) shall be conducted at specified times,
during that period.

(12) If it appears to an officer of the rank of superintendent or above that a road check ought to continue beyond the period for which it has been authorised he may, from time to time, in writing specify a further period, not exceeding seven days during which it may continue.

(13) Every written authorisation shall specify—
(a) the name of the officer giving it;
(b) the purpose of the road check; and
(c) the locality in which vehicles are to be stopped.

(14) The duties to specify the purposes of a road check imposed by subsections (9) and (13) above include duties to specify any relevant serious arrestable offence.

(15) Where a vehicle is stopped in a road check, the person in charge of the vehicle at the time when it is stopped shall be entitled to obtain a written statement of the purpose of the road check, if he. applies for such a statement not later than the end of period of twelve months from the day on which the vehicle was stopped.

(16) Nothing in this section affects the exercise by police officers of any power to stop vehicles for purposes other than those specified in subsection (1) above.'.—[Mr. Hurd.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Hurd: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker: With this it will be convenient to take
new clause 11—Road checks.
'(1) Subject to subsection (3) below, a police officer of at least the rank of Deputy Chief Constable may authorise the setting up of a road check.
(2) In this section and section 5 below "road check" means the obstruction of a road to stop—
(a) all vehicles passing along it; or
(b) vehicles passing along it selected by any criterion provided that in the case of each vehicle stopped the obstruction shall not last any longer than is required to carry out the lawful functions of police officers set out in subsection (2A) herein.
(2A) The obstruction of a road under subsection (1) above shall in the case of each vehicle stopped, last no longer than is reasonably necessary for a police officer to—
(a) ascertain whether there is reasonable suspicion that the driver or any other person has committed an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1972;
(b) ascertain whether there is reasonable suspicion that any person in the vehicle has committed a serious arrestable ofence or is unlawfully at large;
(c) search the vehicle and any persons in the vehicle, provided that such a search is in the exercise of a power conferred on him by any enactment, including an enactment contained in an Act passed after this Act.
(2B) Notwithstanding subsection 2(a) above any vehicle stopped at a road check shall be allowed to continue on its way not later than fifteen minutes after the stop, unless the police officer has arrested all the persons in it who are entitled at law to drive it along the road in question.
(3) A police officer may only authorise the setting up of a road check under subsection (1) above—
(a) if he has reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person
(i) whom the officer reasonably suspects of having committed a serious arrestable offence; or
(ii) who is unlawfully at large
is in the immediate area where the road check would be set up or
(b) if he has reasonable suspicion that an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1972 has been committed or
(c) if he has reasonable suspicion that the vehicle or persons in the vehicle are carrying offensive weapons, prohibited articles, illegal drugs or firearms.


(4) An authorisation may only be given under subsection (1) above for a period not exceeding 48 hours from the time of the authorisation but may be renewed from time to time for a further such period.
(5) A police officer below the rank of Deputy Chief Constable may authorise a road check if—
(a) the requirements of (3)(a), (b) or (c) above are satisfied; and
(b) it appears to him that a road check is required as a matter of urgency.
(6) If an authorisation is given under subsection (5) above it shall be reported as soon as is practicable to an officer of at least the rank of Deputy Chief Constable, unless it is given on the grounds set out in subsection 3(b) above when it need not be reported.
(7) Subject to subsection (8) below an officer to whom a report of a road check is made under subsection (6) above may authorise the road check to continue for the period specified in subsection (4) above if grounds for its continuation exist under subsection (3) above.
(8) An authorisation may only be given under subsection (7) above for a period not exceeding 48 hours from the time of the authorisation, but may be renewed from time to time for a further such period.
(9) An authorisation under subsections (3), (5) or (7) shall be in writing.
(10 Every written authorisation shall specify:
(a) the ground for giving it,
(b) the period for which it is given,
(c) the locality to which it relates,
(d) the name of the officer giving it and
(e) any enquiries taking place during its operation under subsection 2A above or any other enquiries and any result produced by them".
(11) A police officer may not obstruct any road or stop any vehicle except under this section of the Act. Section 159 of the Road Traffic Act 1972 and all other enactments, statutory or otherwise, authorising a police officer to stop a vehicle or obstruct a road are hereby repealed.'.
Amendment No. 26, in page 6, line 4, leave out clause 4.
Amendment No. 27, in clause 4, page 6, line 20, leave out from 'for' to end of line 24 and insert
'believing that a person who is about to commit or is in the course of committing a serious arrestable offence is in a vehicle in the area where the road check would be set up'.

Mr. Hurd: We come now to the first major subject of controversy in the Bill, that of road checks. It is important to make it clear from the outset that the ability of the police to impose road checks is unrestricted. As the law stands, checks may be set up by an officer of any rank for any purpose for an unlimited period. We are therefore talking not of a new power being created or of an existing power being enlarged, but of the regulation and reduction, to some extent, of an existing power. That is a familiar point that I may have to make again on other clauses. It is necessary to repeat it, because of the main distortion of the opponents of the Bill outside the House that we are creating and bestowing new police powers when we are doing nothing of the kind.
New clause 25 replaces clause 4 of the Bill as printed. It results from further thought on our part but particularly from discussions in Committee. There are two provisions to which I should draw attention. The first is contained in subsections (1)(b) and (4)(b) of new clause 25. These ensure that, subject to safeguards, a road check may be established to find witnesses to a serious arrestable offence. In Committee my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mr. Hawksley) drew attention to the fact that road checks were set up in Brighton last summer with a view to tracing witnesses to a horrifying sexual assualt on

a young boy. I am glad to see that the hon. Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bell) is here. He will remember that he volunteered his support for the inclusion of this provision in the road check powers. I hope that no one will argue against it. The new clause will ensure that the police retain the ability to set up road checks in such circumstances, with a view to tracing witnesses. It would be wrong to take away that power.
The second main change relates to a point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths). He pointed out in Committee that clause 4 appeared to limit the ability of the police to set up road checks for road traffic or vehicle excise purposes. The idea was always to regulate the discretion of the police to use their powers to stop vehicles under the Road Traffic Act 1972 for non-traffic purposes. The Royal Commission made it clear that the ability of the police to stop vehicles at random for regulatory purposes or to enforce the road traffic legislation should remain intact. The new restrictions recommended by the Royal Commission and embodied in the Bill were intended to apply to the enforcement of the general criminal law. The new clause makes that distinction clear by excluding road traffic and vehicle excise offences from the scope of the legislation.
Subsection (2) of the new clause puts it beyond doubt that the power to stop vehicles is conferred not by the Bill but by section 159 of the 1972 Act. That section confers the power only on constables in uniform, and it follows that only constables in uniform may stop vehicles at a road check. The new clause clears up a doubt expressed in Committee.
A number of other points which were raised in Committee are also dealt with in the new clause. Subsection (16) makes it clear that the provisions of the clause are without prejudice to the ability of the police to stop vehicles for purposes other than the arrest of wanted persons or the tracing of witnesses to crime. There is a wide range of circumstances in which the police may need to obstruct roads, and therefore to stop vehicles, for which the restrictions and the safeguards set out in clause 4 and new clause 25 are not appropriate. For instance, if a road is made impassable by floods, the police may obstruct it. That is only one example.
There will be an opportunity on clause 16 to consider the use of common law powers by the police to prevent or deal with public disorder. For the present, I simply point out that the Royal Commission did not intend that the restrictions which it recommended should apply to the public order powers of the police any more than to their road traffic duties. The public order powers are clearly necessary, but they are not easy to define in statute. They cannot be brought within the framework of the Bill, if only because the whole basis of clause 4 and new clause 25 is the restriction of road checks to the prevention or detection of serious arrestable offences, whereas breach of the peace as such is not an offence under the general criminal law.
The replacement for clause 4 suggested by the Opposition is unsatisfactory. New clause 11 would have the effect, through the repeal of section 159 of the 1972 Act, of preventing a police officer from stopping any vehicle, unless the matter was urgent, without the authority of a deputy chief constable. That is manifestly unrealistic. Under the terms of the Opposition's new clause, a police officer who saw a vehicle which had defective lights or which was going through red traffic lights would have to get his deputy chief constable's


permission before he could stop it. If he simply suspected that it had been stolen, he would probably not be able to stop it at all.
The main defect of the Opposition's new clause is that it tries to encompass in a single clause the wide range of circumstances in which the police may need to stop vehicles. The road check provision in the Bill has as its underlying purpose the reinforcement of the criterion of reasonable suspicion which is embodied in the powers of stop and search. A power to stop a vehicle to check its roadworthiness has never required the reasonable suspicion test, and there are good reasons for that.
A number of other criticisms can be made of new clause 11. It requires road checks to be authorised by a deputy chief constable. In Committee, the Opposition favoured the rank of assistant chief constable. The Government believe that a superintendent has the right level of authority.

Mr. Kaufman: Why do the Government take that view?

Mr. Hurd: It is a matter of judgment. If the right hon. Gentleman considers that before a policeman can stop a car which he believes to be stolen, or which has shot through a red traffic light, he should be required to telephone the deputy chief constable, he should explain the logic behind that peculiar argument. We are talking about the ordinary authorisation of a road check. In other parts of the Bill a superintendent is entrusted with serious and important decisions— for example, taking body samples or holding people temporarily incommunicado. We think that the superintendent has the right degree of authority in this case too, given that at present any police officer—a constable or a sergeant—can authorise a road check.

Mr. Kaufman: The right hon. Gentleman cites references to a superintendent in other parts of the Bill as justification for choosing that rank in this case. However, he never justified choosing the rank of superintendent in those other parts of the Bill. I am reminded of a question that 1 had to answer for the school certificate. I was asked what was wrong with the following sentence: "A pig is rightly so called because it is such a dirty animal." The right hon. Gentleman's argument is equally circular. We want to know what it is about the rank of superintendent —in this or in other parts of the Bill—which makes it appropriate for that officer to carry out this duty.

Mr. Hurd: A superintendent is a person of experience and judgment. If he were not, he would not be in that position. The House must use its judgment and decide on the right level of authority. Under existing law, any constable or sergeant may authorise a road check. We propose to make a restriction. We state that in normal circumstances—special cases will be provided for—only a superintendent may do so.
The Opposition's argument has a gradual inflationary tendency. They will soon be moving an amendment to the effect that every decision, on a road check or anything else, must be taken by the deputy chief constable in person. I am sorry that the right hon. Gentleman is moving further along that path.

Mr. Kaufman: The right hon. Gentleman is fantasising. The view that I have expressed is—as so often — that of the Royal Commission on criminal procedure. We agree that the superintendent is an officer

who has experience and knowledge. How does it happen, however, that he has exactly the amount of experience and knowledge which makes it appropriate for him to exercise this extremely important power?

Mr. Hurd: If, as I know he does, the right hon. Gentleman considers the range of decisions that normally and naturally fall to a superintendent without controversy and compares it with the type of decision that we are discussing, I think that, on sober reflection, he will agree that superintendent is about the right level. It can be argued that the decision should be taken higher, and at the moment it is taken much lower, but in terms of practical policing and the type of decision that we are discussing our proposal as set out in the Bill is about right.
Amendment No. 27, which has been tabled by alliance Members, removes the concept of the pattern of crime from the test. They want to insert a reference to intelligence and be assured that the police officer concerned believes
that a person who is about to commit or is in the course of committing a serious arrestable offence is in a vehicle in the area where the road check would be set up".
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The amendment requires too much certainty on the part of the police. If, for example, there had been a series of sexual assaults or a series of robberies at building society or bank branches, the police might not know who was responsible but might be able to discern a pattern. There are therefore reasonable grounds for supposing that another assault or robbery will take place in accordance with the pattern. If a road check were established, the offender might be found but the police could not say in advance that they thought that the offender was in a vehicle in the area and about to commit the offence.
The expression "pattern of crime" is drawn from the Royal Commission report and is not the Government's invention. We believe that it takes account of the points made in Committee and that the Bill's phraseology and the concept of a pattern of crime is right and should be retained.

Mr. Stuart Bell: I am grateful to the Minister for referring to our discussions in Committee and to my support of the extension of road checks to cover the search for witnesses to possible crimes. The Committee had a lengthy discussion about the essence and elements of road checks in relation to police powers and rights of the citizen. There is a fundamental dilemma in regard to those powers and rights.
The Minister has said, as he did in Committee, that the Government are simply putting into the statute book what exists in common law. It has been pointed out that, although road checks have been a feature of British society, they have related to criminals at large. The Minister mentioned the case of a young boy who was assaulted in Brighton last year. Shortly afterwards, a Hartlepool man was sought by the police. In both cases, there was substantial public co-operation with road blocks. New clause 25 extends that power and relates it to the Road Traffic Act 1972, which provides for the stopping of vehicles for any reason in relation to the possible infringement of that Act. The extension covers a person who is a witness to a possible offence, the offender and a person who intends to commit an offence. It is,


therefore, a substantial extension. The Opposition argue that such police rights have not existed in common law, as the Minister has suggested.
The imbalance that new clause 25 creates will be reflected by public dissatisfaction when they begin to understand what can happen to them. Moreover, the new clause introduces the concept of interchangeability. Subsection (4)(c)(ii) says:
that, having regard to a pattern of crime in the area in which vehicles would be stopped if the road check was authorised, the offence is likely to be committed in that area during the period during which the road check would be authorised to continue".
We can all envisage the establishment of a road check in an area where there has been a pattern of burglaries on a Saturday night. The road check and the power to set it up would be useful, but we would not wish the check to be used for random fishing expeditions when the person caught is not a potential or actual burglar but will, nevertheless, be stopped and inconvenienced.
The Opposition are also worried about new clause 25 in action. Road checks have been set up during the miners' dispute. Road checks were set up in the Dartford tunnel to prevent Kent miners going north. It appears that the Minister has distanced himself from the consequences of that. He said that the checks had been set up on the basis of public order and not this legislation. That is an interesting and useful explanation, because hitherto we have been told that the checks were set up on the basis of common law. Public order has not come into it at all. The Attorney-General tried to clarify the imposition of road checks and said:
if a constable reasonably comes to the conclusion that persons are travelling for the purpose of taking part in a picket in circumstances where there is likely to be a breach of the peace, he has the power at common law to call upon them not to continue their journey … Any person who fails to comply … will be committing the offence of obstructing the police officer in the course of his duty".—[Official Report, 16 March 1984; Vol. 56, c.279–80.
The Court of Appeal sees the matter in a rather different light. In 1981 it said:
We entertain no doubt that a constable has a power of arrest where there is reasonable apprehension of imminent danger of a breach of the peace".
There is, therefore, a slight difference between the common law as expressed by the Attorney-General and the common law as expressed by the Court of Appeal.
New clause 25 makes it clear that the stopping of pickets on their way to another coalfield should not be covered by it. If such miners were stopped, they would have the benefit of subsection (15), which says:
Where a vehicle is stopped in a road check, the person in charge of the vehicle at the time when it is stopped shall be entitled to obtain a written statement of the purpose of the road check, if he applies for such a statement not later than the end of a period of twelve months from the day on which the vehicle was stopped".
It is fair to ask what would happen to people whose cars were stopped if they wrote to the local police station asking for a written statement. Would they be told that they fell within the purview of public order legislation or within a common law stop in the form of a road check?
We see once again the Government's ambivalence about these matters. They are clarifying the law in the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill, and are seeking to redefine the law and embody the common law. Yet this is an inherent contradiction in terms. We are discussing road

checks that may be of two sorts: first, those used in relation to new clause 25 and, secondly, those related to the Public Order Act. That inherent contradiction in the Government's ambivalence will not be resolved and, the law will not be clear. The public will not know, when they are stopped, whether it is being done under the powers of new clause 25 or of the Public Order Act. That confusion has not been clarified on Report, as we had hoped.

Mr. Bermingham: Does my hon. Friend agree that the effect of new clause 25 will be to make it permissible to block off every exit from a motorway if industrial conflicts caused pickets to move from one part of the land to another? It would be possible for the police to stop any person who sought to leave the motorway for any reason. In other words, the law is drafted so widely that it justifies almost anything.

Mr. Bell: I am most grateful to my hon. Friend for his intervention. He has reminded me of a case last week, involving a coach coming from Middlesbrough. A coachload of infants was on its way to the continent for the weekend. They were stopped and the police came on board to ask whether any of them were going to the Nottinghamshire coal mines and whether any coal miners were aboard. That case was brought to my attention last Friday. I do not know whether the miners were in disguise or whether any disguised priests were on the bus.
I should like to deal with the point raised by the Opposition in Committee, which has been repeated on the Floor of the House by my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman), with reference to the rank of superintendent. An officer below the rank of superintendent may authorise a road check. We say that that is wrong and that road checks are a fundamental infringement of the liberty of an individual who goes about his lawful business in our land. A minute percentage of those who are stopped at road checks are about to become involved in crime, so there must be serious inconvenience for ordinary citizens who are going about their business. If they are to be inconvenienced, it should be as a result of a chief constable's intervention. We see no reason why that should not be possible. Nothing in new clause 25 would be of such urgency that the decision of a chief constable could not be invoked. The new clause refers to
a person who has committed an offence other than a road traffic offence or a vehicle excise offence; … a person who is a witness to such an offence; … a person intending to commit such an offence; or … a person who is unlawfully at large.
Communications in Britain are good, so there is no reason why a chief constable cannot be contacted or why his authority cannot be given. In this way citizens' rights would be held in balance.
The Home Secretary has introduced certain safeguards in the clause. There must be a written record of the authorisation and the time at which it is given. Authorisation may be given by an officer of the rank of superintendent or above. That is a spurious safeguard and would simply be an addition to the bureaucratic machinery of written records and reports of authorisation. It is not a real safeguard for citizens of the realm. We are concerned for the balance of citizens' rights, which we believe will be infringed by new clause 25.

Mr. James Wallace: The Government are trying to formulate and put in concrete terms something that up to now had been left to the discretion of police officers under the common law.
Many people have heard of reports such as that related by the hon. Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bell). People are stopped en route to picket lines, many of whom have nothing to do with the miners' strike. They are concerned about the power of the police to stop them. They are concerned about interference with their freedom to go along the highways without let or hindrance. Alliance Members welcome, for that reason, some form of codification of the circumstances in which such interference can take place.
On behalf of my Liberal-Social Democratic colleagues, I must say that new clause 11 is more acceptable than new clause 25. Perhaps there is room to quibble on one or two points, such as whether 15 minutes is enough time for police officers to make a proper search before crossing the Rubicon of arrest, but clause 11 is more tightly drawn.
The aspect of new clause 25 to which we would have exception has already been referred to by the Minister. We object to subparagraph (ii) which says that:
having regard to a pattern of crime in the area in which vehicles would be stopped if the road check was authorised, the offence is likely to be committed in that area during the period during which the road check would be authorised to continue".
We fear that if the provision were drawn that widely, police officers would be able lawfully to set up random and permanent road checks in certain areas. It is undeniable, if regrettable, that some regions suffer greatly from serious crime. Our reasonable interpretation of the provision is that it may cause road blocks to be set up permanently in those areas.

Mr. Hurd: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will agree that the power we are discussing exists already. He is really complaining that the Government are not removing it. As the power already exists, does the hon. Gentleman find that its exercise causes the mischief that he describes?

Mr. Wallace: I welcome codification of the power. One often finds, however, that when a power is codified using words that have not existed before, new interpretations are given to them. Powers that have been written down tend to be used by people who would not otherwise know of them. That may well be the case in areas of social or racial tension. Alliance Members do not believe that that would help to improve relations between the police and the community.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I admire the ingenuity with which the hon. Member is trying to slip around the Minister's question. The hon. Gentleman is suggesting that the police will suddenly realise that they have a power that is general at present. I hope that the hon. Gentleman is not suggesting that against the police service, because it would mean simply that their intelligence and information about the law was much less than it is.

Mr. Wallace: The point that I was seeking to make is that when laws are codified words are added that can be used and interpreted in court. Lawyers know that often they cover situations that would not have been countenanced otherwise. Indeed, that has happened on

several occasions. I read the report of the proceedings on the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill that passed through the House in 1979–80, although I was not an hon. Member at that time. The then Solicitor-General for Scotland gave the reason that I have just mentioned for not incorporating safeguards in that Bill.
The term "serious arrestable offence" is defined in clause 105. It is the commission of an offence likely to lead to any of the consequences set out in subsection (6), which include
serious harm to the security of the State".
If the Government were truly alarmed about the number of leaks from Whitehall, one wonders whether they would have road blocks set up at the top and bottom of Whitehall so that the police could search briefcases to see whether civil servants were taking away unauthorised documents. However, perhaps that is taking things to an extreme.
The Minister said that he wanted to cover cases when the police had reason to believe that a crime was being committed in a certain area. We believe that our amendment No. 27 would cover that. It would cover the situation that is meant to be covered and that the Minister wishes to be covered. It would not allow a wider interpretation, which would be undesirable.

Mr. Kevin Barron: I should like to speak against new clause 25, particularly in regard to what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bell) on subsection (1)(c).
It is true that these powers are already within the law. However, the powers already within the law are at odds with new clause 25. The new clause does nothing to clarify the situation. At present, within the criminal law the police have the power to stop, check and make an assessment—

Mr. Bermingham: Does my hon. Friend agree that the position is as follows? It is said that the police have the power to stop people, as shown in the Dartford tunnel case. However, that point has not yet been tested in the courts. It would be interesting to see not only what the English courts said, but what the European Court of Human Rights said about that point.

Mr. Barron: I thank my hon. Friend for his intervention. Later, I shall read a comment by a member of the South Yorkshire Police Federation, which is related exactly to that point.
There is confusion, especially in relation to the current mining dispute, and the matter goes wide of new clause 25. I refer the Minister to two answers given by the Attorney-General in the House on 19 February 1980, when he was clarifying the law on picketing. In answer to my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Warley, West (Mr. Archer), he said:
It is the duty of chief constables to administer the law. The man on the spot is best able to judge what action he must take.
The road checks in the midlands coalfield have nothing to do with a chief constable on the spot making an assessment whether people should be stopped or whether they are likely to cause a breach of the peace if they pass the road checks. In the same debate, the Attorney-General said:
That is a problem to be dealt with by the police at the site." —[Official Report, 19 February, 1980; Vol. 979, c. 240–42.] That is creating confusion in the present coal dispute, not only for those taking part in the dispute, but within the law. If new clause 25 is passed, it will do nothing to clarify that confusion.
I wonder whether the Minister is aware of what questions members of the public are asked when they are stopped at road blocks under the so-called "law". Perhaps he can comment on that. I assume that he is aware of the bad feeling created by the road checks, especially in my constituency. Although there are few road checks there, the feeling against the police is high because they are operating miles away from the picket lines.
As a result of the road checks, people are being held in custody—in one case, someone was remanded in custody for 12 days in Lincoln prison. As the Attorney-General said, the decision whether it is likely that someone will cause a breach of the peace should be taken by someone on the spot, not by someone miles away at a road block.
In an article in today's edition of the Yorkshire Post there are comments by Inspector Lax, a spokesman for the South Yorkshire Police Federation. I ask for the Minister's comments on it. I notice that the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) is present. He is a representative of the Police Federation. If he speaks later, perhaps he will address himself to the article as well. Inspector Lax said:
The difficulty is that you have to try to prove someone's state of mind in advance, and anticipate their intentions.
That is true, and it is causing great problems at the road blocks. Inspector Lax feels that many of his members are not capable of making that assessment. The article states:
The use of police roadblocks to stop miners reaching picket lines could be illegal, a police federation spokesman admitted yesterday.
My hon. Friend the Member for St. Helens, South (Mr. Bermingham) was correct in what he said. We must confirm whether the law is being used or abused in the present road blocks in and around the midlands coalfield. However, it might take years for that decision to be made, and the case could end up in another place. That would not be much good to the members of the National Union of Mineworkers participating in the dispute. Members of the police, who are acting under orders at the road blocks, are also confused. That confusion should be cleared up. I hope that the Minister will try to clear up the situation and tell us why he feels that new clause 25 is necessary if, as he said, those powers are already provided for under the law.

Mr. Bermingham: New clause 24 is an absolute disgrace—[HON. MEMBERS: "New clause 25.'] Many of the new clauses are an absolute disgrace, but I should not digress.
The Attorney-General has advised—I would not say ruled because Attorneys-General do not rule—that at present there is a right to stop vehicles, as my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley (Mr. Barron) said, many miles away from the scene of an industrial incident. The Dartford tunnel stoppages have been debated at length. If new clause 25 is passed, the argument will run as follows. Under the Bill, a "serious arrestable offence" entails a conspiracy. Any group of people who put their heads together and perhaps propose to go on an illegal picket are committing a conspiracy. Two, three or four people might decide, for example, in Faversham in Kent, to go to Sellafield in the north to demonstrate against the dumping of nuclear waste, during which they might commit a public order offence. They would have no intention of committing an offence, as they wanted to hold a peaceful

demonstration, but the fact that they were intending to demonstrate would be a justification for their being stopped at a road block on any of the major roads such as the A1, the M1, the M62 or the M6. Demonstrators may travel the length and breadth of the country to exercise the right to protest, which we have exercised for a considerable time. The argument is that because they put their heads together many hundreds of miles away and decide to protest, it is a conspiracy and a serious arrestable offence.

Mr. Bell: Has it ever been suggested that the would-be pickets who were stopped at the Dartford tunnel were going to commit a serious arrestable offence?

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Mr. Bermingham: The suggestion was never made publicly, but it was implied. No one has had the courage to suggest that publicly. The serious arrestable offence would be the conspiracy to picket. That is the kernel of the issue. The present law does not cover that matter and does not justify it. The Government seek to use new clause 25 to justify what they are already doing. I used the example of the stoppage of pickets at the Dartford tunnel. Examples could equally well include people who protest about nuclear disarmament, the dumping of nuclear waste, or animal liberation causes. We have many protest groups because we are supposed to be a democracy and so allow them. A group of people who decide to demonstrate their view in another part of the country will lay themselves open to being stopped by road checks under new clause 25.
If that were the only ground on which to object to new clause 25 it would be enough, but there are wider and deeper grounds. We have often been told that criminal law is a balance between the needs and the protection of citizens. In a short intervention this afternoon I said that a police officer was nothing more than a citizen with a particular job to do. Regrettably, the Bill is steadily changing his position, from being just a citizen to having special rights, protections, rules and regulations. It is setting him apart. That is bad and unhealthy. As I said on Second Reading, it is causing a division in society, and new clause 25 will take it one more step along that road.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: The hon. Gentleman will recall that the House has just agreed to a new clause that abolishes for the first time the common law powers of arrest and brings them into the specific framework of the Bill. That is surely a restraining power on the police and not an increase in power.

Mr. Bermingham: I listened to the hon. Gentleman's intervention about abolishing common law powers of arrest and replacing them within the Bill's framework. He said that we had just agreed to that. Although we are not voting on every issue, my silence should not be deemed to be my acquiescence. It may be my resolution to arrange for objections to be raised in another place.
If people are set up as a race apart, more harm than good will be done. The new clause is so broad that the justification for a road block is almost whimsical and simplistic. It is felt that there might be a higher incidence of crime or that there might be a person in a vehicle who is a witness to an offence. How wide can we draw the clause? The new clause means that if a chief constable wants to set up a road block, he does so. I dread to think


what that will do to police-public relations. I know from personal experience how angry and annoyed people become when they are stopped for no apparent reason.

Mr. Barron: In view of what is happening in the midlands coalfields—that will be covered by new clause 25 if it becomes part of the Bill—is my hon. Friend as worried as I am that the Police Federation is using printed forms at road checks? Today in the Sheffield Morning Telegraph part of the form is quoted. It reads:
'I know, from briefings whilst performing my duties in connection with the National Union of Mineworkers' dispute, unlawful demonstrations have occurred at local collieries and it is my belief that to allow persons to visit local collieries, to unlawfully picket or demonstrate in large numbers, would intimidate local workers.
I consider this conduct is likely to cause a breach of the peace' …
The officer completes the statement by adding details of the particular arrest.
Is my hon. Friend worried about the implications of having such statements on forms? People can picket collieries in the Nottinghamshire coalfields and yet be within the law.

Mr. Bermingham: I more than welcome an intervention the contains such an important point. It exemplifies the point that I seek to make. We have almost reached the Zola-like equation of: "I accuse=you are guilty ." All hon. Members who believe in a community of individuals must regard that with absolute horror. My hon. Friend is right to present us with the pro forma, typewritten statements of evidence that officers sign before disappearing into anonymity, and to which may be added the briefest of additional, personally witnessed facts. Such statements prejudge the issue and corrupt the evidence. They so corrupt the evidence as to make the business of policing a mockery. I hope that the courts in Nottinghamshire and in other areas that come across such pro forma statements will treat them with the contempt that they rightly deserve and reject them as evidence. They cannot have a powerful basis in our judicial system because officers are being told in advance the line that their evidence should take. The basis of our evidential system is simple: a man should report what he personally has or has not seen, and not what he has been told should be happening.

Mr. Robin Corbett: Does my hon. Friend agree that in such circumstances the law lays a clear duty on the officer to make an individual judgment and not one from a police take-away?

Mr. Bermingham: My hon. Friend makes a valid point. The basis of our law is that an officer should report what he has or has not seen. He must decide whether what he has seen in a particular set of circumstances is likely to lead to a breach of the peace. It is not right to adopt a pro forma statement. This is not the first time that that has happened. The same practice was used on a more limited scale in another industrial strike, and it was frowned upon. To adopt a pro forma statement is almost to coach a witness in advance about what he should or should not say.

Mr. David Ashby: The hon. Gentleman will appreciate that, although one deplores the use of pro formas because they produce such bad evidence, they can assist police officers in marshalling their thoughts. For many years pro formas have been used successfully in drink and drive cases to get over the difficulty of treading a path through the various Acts that must be cited.

Mr. Bermingham: I agree that pro formas have been used for several years in drink-driving cases, but they simply set out a series of logical steps, required by law, including asking the motorist to take a second breath test and offering him the alternative of blood or urine tests. There is nothing wrong with using a pro forma that sets out the process, but the difference between that and the pro forma mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Rother Valley (Mr. Barron) is that in the latter case the police officer is being told how to set the scene in describing an alleged offence. I see the hon. Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby) nodding in agreement.
I apologise for having digressed in response to interventions. New clause 25 will authorise a police officer to organise a series of ad hoc road checks for the flimsiest of reasons. The result will be that people will be stopped at those road blocks for no apparent reason, having committed no offence and being unconnected with crime. That can only harm police-public relations.
I was about to cite two examples of ad hoc road checks that have annoyed some members of the public. A couple of weeks ago when I left the MI to join the A52, which is the turning for Derby, I, together with four lorries carrying scrap metal, a red van and a tanker carrying milk, was stopped on the slip road. Every vehicle leaving the motorway at that point was stopped and their occupants asked to state their destinations. It does not need much intelligence to know that if I wanted to go to the nearest Nottinghamshire pit, I would have turned off at the A610, which goes straight there. The A52 also goes to Nottingham but is a longer route. However, perhaps I am more intelligent than those who were operating the road block. Unless my eyes deceived me, the little blue notice saying, "Police Slow", was again stuck on the slip road of the A52 as I drove past it this morning coming south. Indeed, it will probably be there tomorrow and the day after. The result will be that many ordinary motorists who have not been involved in offences will be annoyed at being stopped.
The second example occurred late at night going through Chesterfield, where, near a certain night club, the police tend to stop motorists for no apparent reason. They do so usually by walking into the middle of the road and waving their torches, which might not be the wisest way of stopping cars at night.
That is what happens under the law at present. If new clause 25 is passed, how much wider will police powers become and how much greater will public annoyance be?

Mr. Hurd: It pains me to have to repeat a point that I have already made. Nothing is wider under new clause 25. What we are doing is narrowing an existing power for the purposes of criminal law.

Mr. Bermingham: The Minister and I have argued this point before, and we must agree to disagree on it. I say that the Government are trying to legitimise what has happened on odd occasions and to codify a completely new power to set up road checks and blocks.
No one in his right mind would object to road checks or blocks in the pursuit of a known criminal in a motor vehicle who is a danger to the public, or where the police suspect that stolen property is being carried in a vehicle. However, new clause 25 and clause 4 of the Bill are far


too wide, and authorise road checks where they are not always necessary. I urge the House to reject new clause 25. Every hon. Member who puts his or her mind to it could find 1,001 reasons why road blocks and checks and the widening of the powers can only be counter-productive in the long run.
If the police stop vehicles to gain information or apprehend criminals, they should do so carefully and within the terms of new clause 11. I prefer new clause 11 to new clause 25, but I abhor the negation and withdrawal of liberties that are steadily happening in our society, and of which both new clauses are examples.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I welcome the clarification that new clause 25 introduces. My right hon. Friend the Minister of State was good enough to consider in Committee a point that I made about the confusion that could have arisen in relation to road traffic law. New clause 25 puts that right beyond question.
In response to the representations of my hon. Friend the Member for The Wrekin (Mr. Hawksley), my right hon. Friend took account of the problems that can arise with grave sexual offences. It must be right for the police to be able to erect road blocks for the purpose of apprehending those who might have committed not one, but a series or pattern of sexual assaults. The House should not ignore what the Government have rightly sought to do here.
Perhaps I could give the House the example of a current case, which is regrettably not sub judice because no one has been arrested. Only this week in Barnet Lane, Elstree, an 11-year-old boy was attacked by two men wearing stocking masks and training shoes. He was grabbed and dragged into bushes, where he was stripped, verbally abused, threatened with a flick knife and indecently assaulted. That incident could be part of a pattern. If the police, responding to the anxieties of parents of children in that area who might also be subjected to such assaults, receive a tip-off that leads them to believe that the attackers might be making their getaway in a motor car, they must have the power quickly to erect road blocks. I am sure that the House will not disagree with that proposition, although from some of the remarks made by the hon. Member for St. Helens, South (Mr. Bermingham) I gained the impression that street blocks were such an infringement of liberty that he did not want them at all.

Mr. Corbett: Will the hon. Gentleman accept that there is no disagreement between us in the circumstances that he has described? My hon. Friend the Member for St. Helens, South (Mr. Bermingham) sought to point out that during the mining dispute the police have gone on fishing trips round the clock, or at least regularly for long periods, every day of the week. That is what we object to, and it is not on all fours with the example that the hon. Gentleman has just given.

Mr. Griffiths: The hon. Gentleman will not be surprised to know from his experience in Committee that I intend shortly to deal with the mining dispute. However, in fairness to my right hon. Friend the Minister, I should point out that he has responded to two specific matters: first, the traffic point and, secondly, sexual assaults. To that extent, the Government have honoured the commitments given in Committee.

Mr. Bermingham: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that I said that one could understand and accept a road block when it was put up in order to apprehend a criminal? I said that quite clearly, just as I said it in Committee. Does the hon. Gentleman also agree that setting up a road block arbitrarily, because it is felt that there might be an increase in criminality in the area, is likely to annoy just as many innocent people as criminals? Indeed, the vast majority of those stopped would probably be innocent.

Mr. Griffiths: Of course there is that risk. That is why the task of the police is exceedingly difficult. However, amendment No. 27 would get rid of the term "a pattern of crime". However, I believe that a pattern of crime can be established for sexual assaults and be a material consideration in deciding to put up road blocks. However, that is a difference between us.
There has been much debate over whether the rank of the officer who authorises road blocks is right. I believe that the rank of superintendent can be too high. From time to time, and particularly after a terrorist incident or incidents such as those I have described, there may well be an urgent need to put up a road block at once. Fortunately, the new clause and the Bill provide for that, in so far as that in an emergency a less senior officer can, and undoubtedly would, authorise a road block at once. The fact that he must record it represents the very proper protection of civil liberties and good police practice. That record is available. I understand—my right hon. Friend the Minister will perhaps confirm this—that it will be the duty of each police authority or chief officer to record such events in his annual report so that everyone knows how many road blocks have been erected, who authorised them, on what grounds and why.
Nevertheless, I believe that it is going rather far to provide for a superintendent in all circumstances. A chief inspector in charge of a sub-division has to take some extremely important decisions in operational policing. His decisions touch on race relations, industrial relations, terrorist incidents and the social harmony of our big cities, but henceforth he may not decide on road blocks. The Opposition may believe that there is a case for going to the rank of deputy chief constable, but he may not be available because, for example, he has gone to a conference, gone abroad, or taken a holiday. Therefore, we should not go beyond the rank of superintendent, and I believe that that is, if anything, slightly too high a rank.
I turn to the contentious issue of the road checks that have taken place in recent weeks, during the mining dispute, in many parts of the country. I do not want to say anything provocative or inflammatory about them. However, I should like to remind the House of one or two facts. My right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General, a Law Officer of the Crown—and the police must take that into account—gave the House his ruling, and did so before the chief constable of Nottinghamshire called for outside help. My right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General said:
there is no doubt that if a constable reasonably comes to the conclusion that persons are travelling for the purpose of taking part in a picket in circumstances where there is likely to be a breach of the peace, he has the power at common law to call upon them not to continue their journey and to call upon their driver to take them no further."—[Official Report, 16 March 1984; Vol. 56, c. 279–80.]
That is the end of my right hon. and learned Friend's advice to the House. I believe that it was largely on the


basis of that advice that the incidents at the Dartford tunnel followed. There was great concern about what happened there, and an attempt was made to obtain an injunction against the Kent chief officer. But that injunction did not succeed. To that extent the issue has been only half tested in the courts. I hope that it will be fully tested in the courts. If the NUM or anyone else believes that the police have acted outwith their powers, it is up to the NUM or that person to go to court. It may take a long time—and I accept that that is a problem—but the Police Federation most certainly does not stand in the way of having the matter tested in the courts so that everyone knows where they stand.

Mr. Barron: In February 1980, the Attorney-General talked about people taking that decision on site. However, in March 1984 he seems to have spoken in much broader terms and given police constables a licence to discover whether someone miles away from a picket line is likely to cause a breach of the peace.

Mr. Griffiths: I am sure that you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, would object if I sought to interpret the reasoning behind the statement of my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General. As a Law Officer of the Crown, he does not act as a political Minister in any sense in such matters. It is his task to interpret the law. I think that his statement stands by itself. I remind hon. Members that it was offered well before there was any question of mutual aid being called into the Nottinghamshire area. That is the first objective fact.

Mr. Geoffrey Lofthouse: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the Attorney-General's interpretation is not shared by all senior police officers? For example, the chief constable of Manchester said on television that he would not have interpreted the law to mean that he should stop coaches at the Dartford tunnel.

Mr. Griffiths: I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has referred to the chief constable of Manchester, because, much as I admire many of the things that Mr. Anderton does, I must say that I thought it most unwise of him to appear on television and disagree with the chief officer of another force who was dealing with a situation of which he —not Mr. Anderton—had full knowledge. At the time, I said that the chief constable of Manchester was ill-advised to do that, and I say that again.
The short answer to the hon. Gentleman's very sensible intervention, however, is that the police have to take account of the advice of the Attorney-General. They are not required or obliged to do so, but in the circumstances—

Mr. Bermingham: rose—

Mr. Griffiths: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will allow me to continue, as I know that others wish to speak, and there may be a Division a little later. I merely remind the House that the Attorney-General made that statement, that the police have to take account of it and that they do so.
I could not agree more with the hon. Member for Rother Valley (Mr. Barron) that the pro forma dreamt up by someone in the Nottinghamshire force in relation to statements by police officers before the courts was an error. I am pleased to quote the Police Federation on that. The hon. Gentleman quoted a newspaper article, but I

shall give the precise words of the Police Federation. Having quoted the proposed pro forma in full, the Police Federation states:
Just what the courts might make of a succession of such identical statements, all giving the sworn views of picketing of the testifying officer, is best left to the imagination of the lawyers who, instructed by the NUM, would have a field day.
How right that is. I ask the House to accept it as a measure of the good sense of the police service of this country that the Police Federation then continues:
Fortunately, some members of visiting PSUs"—
the support units—
have refused to go along with this highly politicised verbiage, and have insisted on making their witness statements in their own way. After all, they are professional police officers".
That is exactly how it should be. The pro forma may well have been produced partly to save court time. Nevertheless, I believe that it was a mistake, and it is to the credit of the Police Federation that it has recognised it as a mistake and said so.
Finally, as my right hon. Friend the Minister has said, the particular matter with which we are dealing is not strictly a public order issue. The question of stopping people on motorways is somewhat tangential to both the new clause and the amendments, but, as it has arisen, it is proper that something should be said about it. I know of no police officer who enjoys setting up road blocks. All the many officers with whom I discussed the matter had serious reservations about setting up road blocks in Kent, Surrey or Suffolk in connection with events several hundred miles away.
No extension of existing police powers is involved. Whether the powers have been used in the past is a matter for debate, but such actions are certainly well within existing powers. In fact, the new clause clarifies, constrains and limits what the police may do. Therefore, it seems extraordinary that it should be the subject of a full-scale frontal attack on the Government. The police have been doing what they believe to be their duty. The matter can, and no doubt eventually will be, tested in the courts, but when such action is taken to prevent the obstruction or intimidation of men seeking to vote or to work, it seems to me that the police are doing no less than their duty.

Mr. Dubs: Any limitation on freedom of movement within a country must be a serious matter and it is absolutely right that the House today and the country in recent weeks should have expressed concern about any limitation on the right of citizens to travel freely within this country. Many of us have criticised totalitarian regimes for not allowing their citizens to travel freely. We should therefore examine extremely carefully any move by any Government to apply such limitations here.
The Government's new clause 25 gives the police clear and explicit powers systematically to prevent or control the flow of all traffic and thus of people into an area. The Minister said that there was nothing new in the new clause, that the powers had existed for a long time and that, if anything, the new clause limited the powers of the police compared with the existing situation. Even if that is true in theory, I wonder whether it is true in practice.
Many of us have asked parliamentary questions about the use of powers to stop and search, to establish road blocks and to search vehicles, but unfortunately replies to questions about the London area have given us no idea of how frequently the existing powers are used. My last parliamentary question clearly sought that information but


the reply merely gave a global figure for the number of stops in the Metropolitan police district in 1983. We do not know how often the existing powers are used, but we understand that they have been used rather sparingly—at least until the dispute in the coalfields began a few weeks ago.
I understand that at present vehicles are stopped on the basis of powers in the Road Traffic Acts. People seeking to join picket lines several hundred miles away were stopped under the Road Traffic Acts, but the police then used their common law powers relating to a possible breach of the peace to tell the occupants of the vehicles that they could go no further. Until that dispute began, my impression was that road checks were used sparingly by the police. New clause 25, however, will give the police every incentive to use the powers more widely even if, in theory, there is no extension of the present powers.
The basis of a great deal of the Bill and the powers for road checks derives from the Royal Commission on criminal procedure. The Minister referred earlier to the phrase in the new clause,
having regard to a pattern of crime in the area".
If I heard him aright, he suggested that the phrase came from the Royal Commission report. Paragraph 3.32 of the report, however, refers to
a defined area over a specified period".
The Minister's comment was thus not entirely accurate. One of our concerns here is that the word "area" as used in new clause 25 is nowhere defined, whereas the Royal Commission clearly referred to "a defined area". There must therefore be serious doubts as to how wide an area can be embraced by the provisions of new clause 25 as at present worded.
The new clause also contains very wide powers in terms of the number of days. The police can use the powers for a period of seven days and then renew them for further periods of seven days. I question whether there are real circumstances in which the police would want to use their powers in that way. A road check lasting seven days is pretty onerous and coercive. What is more, it will not be very effective if it is in place for seven days at a time. Most of the local villains that it is expected to catch will come to know of its existence and will find ways around it.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I remind the hon. Gentleman that there has been a road check on all the roads entering St. James's square. It has been renewed for some time. It was necessary.

Mr. Dubs: I suggest that the circumstances were highly exceptional. I was saying that I doubted whether in the normal run of events there should be road checks lasting as long as seven days, with the power to renew them. I agree that St. James's square was exceptional, although I go on to question whether some of the powers used by the police there—although we do not dispute their use—had full legal backing. However, that is a subject for an argument on another occasion.
Subsection (16) of the Government's new clause says:
Nothing in this section affects the exercise by police officers of any power to stop vehicles for purposes other than those specified in subsection (1) above.
I appreciate that subsection (1) does not include the powers contained in subsection (2) relating to the Road Traffic Act. However, the effect of subsection (16) also is to

continue to give the police powers to stop vehicles under other legislation, and it may also bring them close to using common law powers for this purpose—a matter about which I have serious misgivings. It is one of the reasons why new clause 11 is drafted in the way that it is.
When we are dealing with police powers which are as wide-ranging and as potentially destructive of the liberties of the individual, we ought to be careful about how they are used.
There are certain safeguards—I argue that they are not enough—about the way in which the police can now apply road checks. But it is even worse in subsection (16), because that means in effect that the other powers of the police to stop vehicles are not subject to the safeguards in new clause 25. Despite the Government's argument that it is important to recognise that there are these safeguards, they go on to say in subsection (16) that there are other police powers and that those safeguards will not apply. That is why we seek to exclude those other powers. In our new clause we seek to ensure that the safeguards will apply to all circumstances in which road checks are set up.
Subsection (1)(b) of the Government's new clause says that the police may stop vehicles if they think that a vehicle is carrying
a person who is a witness
to an offence. In Committee, we spent some time discussing the tragic case of the offences connected with a young boy in the Brighton area. My hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bell) supported the Government's view about the need to give the police powers in such circumstances. I agree that that is an example where it is right for the police to have such powers. My fear about subsection (1)(b) is that it is a very wide power. It goes much wider than any power envisaged during our debates in Committee. It gives the police a sweeping power to look for individuals who may have been present when an offence was committed.
I question whether such wide powers should be given without safeguards. I can envisage circumstances where the individual may have been on the scene of a crime and the police set up a road block not to catch the criminal, who may already be in custody, but to catch someone who may have been in the area. That begins to take on the dimensions of a fishing expedition. It gives the police very wide powers.
Although I support the use of such powers to deal with circumstances such as the tragic case in Brighton, I question whether we should go this far. The powers could be used in a sweeping manner, and I doubt whether that is right. The Opposition do not dispute that there are circumstances in which there is a need for road checks. Our argument is that their use should be limited and that there should be more safeguards than we have now underlying the ability of the police to make use of such powers.
New clause 11 seeks to replace all the current grounds for stopping vehicles. It also omits the phrase to which we have taken exception throughout our debates—
having regard to the pattern of crime in an area.
We do it because that phrase gives the police powers to impose road checks in virtually any inner city area. The police can say that they want a road check in any inner city area, and they can have one. That is too wide, and it is one of the reasons for the wording in new clause 11.
5.45 pm
I am also worried about the time that people may be stopped under new clause 25. In new clause 11 there is an attempt to limit the time to 15 minutes, which surely is sufficient for the purposes that the Government have described. We also seek to limit the length of time for which a road check may be imposed. Instead of seven days we say that there should be a limit of 48 hours.
There has been some argument about the seniority of the police officer most appropriate to authorise a road check. The Minister talked about an officer who was senior enough and had the necessary judgment. Our new clause suggests a deputy chief constable. The Minister said that he would prefer a chief superintendent. However, a deputy chief constable is more senior, has more experience and therefore has better powers of judgment than a chief superintendent. That is one reason why we have argued for that change. The second reason is that we have looked again at the report of the Royal Commission, which says in paragraph 3.32:
We therefore propose that a police officer of rank not less than assistant chief constable should be empowered to authorise in writing the setting up of road checks for a limited and specified period in the following circumstances.
As I understand it, the rankings in the police have changed somewhat, and that deputy chief constable in our new clause is equivalent to assistant chief constable as described in the Royal Commission's report. We have two reasons for suggesting that that would be the appropriate seniority of police officer necessary to authorise road checks of the type envisaged in the new clauses.
The Minister also said that if there was a matter of urgency, new clause 11 would not allow the police to act with haste. To say that is to misread our new clause. I remind the Minister of subsection (5):
A police officer below the rank of Deputy Chief Constable may authorise a road check if … it appears to him that a road check is required as a matter of urgency.
We do not say that if the circumstances are urgent it is necessary to await the authorisation of a deputy chief constable. We say that a more junior officer may also authorise a road check if the matter is sufficiently urgent.
I refer again to the report of the Royal Commission, which also defines the circumstances in which a road check may be established. These are much more limited than those envisaged by the Government in new clause 25.
I repeat what I said at the outset of my remarks. Setting up a road check is not to be done lightly. It should not be allowed easily to the police. It is seen by citizens as a coercive or potentially coercive use of police powers. As I told the Committee, on two occasions I was driving home from Labour party meetings and was stopped by road checks several years ago before becoming a Member of Parliament. On one occasion they merely looked at me and waved me by. On the second occasion they asked where I had been and where I was going before waving me on. There is something rather threatening about being stopped by a police road block when driving home between 10.30 and 11 in the evening. I did not like it, although I understood the reason for that road check at the time. The police did not tell me, but I guessed that it was connected with a terrorist incident somewhere else in London. It is a menacing thing to happen. I can understand why the average citizen would not like it and would prefer such road checks to be kept to a minimum. That is why Labour Members much prefer new clause 11 and intend to vote against new clause 25.

Mr. Hurd: The hon. Member for Battersea (Mr. Dubs) has made his usual thoughtful and thorough speech. If I may protect my reputation for a second, he virtually accused me of inventing the phrase "a pattern of serious crime". It is in the Royal Commission's report at paragraph 3.31. It says:
We understand and acknowledge the potential value of such a procedure to the police when a clear pattern of serious crime is observable. But we do not think that in these instances the consequent infringement of the liberty of the subject can usually be justified by applying the 'reasonable suspicion' criterion. If such checks are to be allowed, they should be confined to particular types of serious crime and should be regularised by the introduction of a measure of supervisory control. Similar considerations apply when a wanted criminal is at large.
Precisely. Those sentences are the origin of new clause 25 and of the words "pattern of serious crime" which the hon. Gentleman seems to think I have invented.

Mr. Kaufman: The right hon. Gentleman has not invented it; he has simply wrenched the phrase out of the context of the Royal Commission's report. The Royal Commission is specific. It says:
it sometimes happens that there is a spate of crime, such as housebreaking, in a specific area, which is regularly committed over weekends or at other identifiable times. In order to detect such crimes the police find it necessary to check the occupants and contents of vehicles passing in and out of the area at particular periods. We understand and acknowledge the potential value of such a procedure to the police when a clear pattern of serious crime is observable.
Therefore, the Royal Commission does not allow the licence that the Government are taking in the new clause. It limits it stringently and the Government are overriding the Royal Commission's recommendation.

Mr. Hurd: I am not sure whether the right hon. Gentleman was here earlier. The hon. Member for Battersea said that the phrase in the Bill "pattern of serious crime" was not in the Royal Commission's report and that I had been inaccurate in claiming that it was. I have been trying—mildly—to demonstrate that I was right and the hon. Gentleman was wrong. With characteristic adroitness, the right hon. Gentleman is shifting the accusation in saying that I am drawing different conclusions from himself as to the actual provisions that would flow from the Royal Commission's report. I am perfectly prepared to defend our provisions. Indeed, if the right hon. Gentleman will allow me, that is what I propose to do. They are a better interpretation of the Royal Commission's report than is the Opposition's new clause.

Mr. Kaufman: The right hon. Gentleman talks about my characteristic adroitness, but that does me no good. The right hon. Gentleman is misquoting. The Royal Commission's report talks about
a clear pattern of serious crime".
There are two limiting adjectives, even within the limiting context. If the right hon. Gentleman wishes to withdraw it all and put in the words "clear and serious" it might make it a touch better.

Mr. Hurd: The word "serious" is in the Bill. New clause 25 talks about serious arrestable offences. Clarity is the essence of the matter, as the right hon. Gentleman and I would agree. "Clear and serious" is certainly there.
In my opening remarks, I did not complete the critique of the Opposition's new clause because it did not seem to be necessary. However, the hon. Member for Battersea has spoken in some detail. The two limits that he proposes of 15 minutes for the search and two days for the


authorisation would cause more trouble than they would be worth. Fifteen minutes is too long in most cases but too short in others, perhaps where it was necessary to search a heavily laden van. The Opposition's new clause brings within its scope all the road traffic offences. Fifteen minutes might not be long enough for vehicle examiners to test and weigh a heavy goods vehicle. Similarly, if one is thinking of the possibility of a pattern of offences repeating itself, it is a little difficult to ask the police to pinpoint that occurrence within the next two days. Therefore, seven days is about right.
It is clear to everyone, except perhaps the hon. Member for St. Helens, South (Mr. Bermingham), that new clause 25 does not deal with powers under the common law. Neither new clause 25, nor any other clause, deals with action taken by the police under common law powers to prevent possible breaches of the peace. We have made that clear—perhaps clearer than it was before—in subsection (16), on which the hon. Member for Battersea rightly focused.
The Opposition's new clause would tackle the problem in a different way. They would abolish the common law powers and would, as my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) said, thus have made it impossible for the police to take the action which was necessary in St. James's square. The hon. Gentleman said that that was exceptional. Most tragic things are exceptional, thank heavens. Surely that is not a reason for not providing for them. That is not a reason for taking away from the police common law powers which they need, exceptionally, to deal with particularly dramatic or tragic situations. The hon. Gentleman's retreat on that was rather lame. He was retreating from the criticism rightly made by my hon. Friend.

Ms. Clare Short: Will the right hon. Gentleman admit that he has misled the House on this point? He started by saying that the purpose of the clause was to narrow existing powers under the common law. He now admits that, under subsection (16), the existing powers under the common law are being maintained. Therefore, surely it is wrong to suggest that in some way the clause narrows existing powers.

Mr. Hurd: Perhaps the hon. Lady will pay me the compliment of reading what I said in my opening remarks. I tried to deal carefully and specifically with that point. We are dealing here with a wide power.

Mr. Robert Kilroy-Silk: The right hon. Gentleman cannot remember what he said.

Mr. Hurd: I remember exactly what I said. If the hon. Gentleman is not careful, I shall repeat it.
We are dealing here with a wide and unlimited power under the Road Traffic Act to stop vehicles. Without touching in any way the common law powers of the police, the Bill restricts the use that the police can make of this Road Traffic Act power when they are dealing with a search for offenders and, in particular, attempting to bring to justice those who have committed serious arrestable offences. That is perfectly clear in the new clause. We are restricting and regulating in a specific area covered by the Bill a wide and unrestricted power. For the hon. Member for St. Helens, South to argue that, in some way, by

restricting a power we are extending it, is the best example of the black is white argument that I have heard in the House for a long time. If he looks at subsection (4) and the limits which it imposes, I hope that he will see that his argument is based on sand.
The hon. Member for Rother Valley (Mr. Barron), perfectly legitimately, used this debate on new clause 25 to criticise the action that the police are taking under common law powers. My right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General dealt with the legal basis of that in the answer of 16 March which my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds has already quoted. The hon. Member is entitled to his view. There are procedures open to those who feel that the police have gone too far. There is the complaints procedure under the existing legislation, and there is the possibility of challenge in the courts. Both those procedures are possible. The complaints procedure is certainly being used, and that is perfectly legitimate. The legal procedure—the challenge in the courts—could also be used. That is not relevant to this clause. The hon. Member for St. Helens, South, in his effort to make a connection between the two by talking of conspiracy, was ranging far into fantasy.
6 pm
On the substance of the point, we would be interested to know whether the Opposition as a whole are saying to the police that at this time, in dealing with the difficult situation created by the National Union of Mineworkers and its tactics, they should allow the unlimited accumulation of pickets at the entry to coal mines without taking any steps in advance to avert the violence that might result. They would be entitled to that view, but, if they were to state it, I think that it would be rightly rejected.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:

The House divided: Ayes 213, Noes 141.

Division No. 295]
[6 pm


AYES


Adley, Robert
Butterfill, John


Alexander, Richard
Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)


Amess, David
Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (W'ton S)


Ancram, Michael
Cash, William


Ashby, David
Chapman, Sydney


Aspinwall, Jack
Chope, Christopher


Atkins, Rt Hon Sir H.
Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th S'n)


Atkins, Robert (South Ribble)
Clark, Dr Michael (Rochford)


Atkinson, David (B'm'th E)
Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)


Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)
Clarke, Rt Hon K. (Rushcliffe)


Baldry, Anthony
Cockeram, Eric


Batiste, Spencer
Colvin, Michael


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Coombs, Simon


Bellingham, Henry
Cope, John


Bendall, Vivian
Cranborne, Viscount


Benyon, William
Crouch, David


Berry, Sir Anthony
Currie, Mrs Edwina


Best, Keith
Dorrell, Stephen


Bevan, David Gilroy
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Dover, Den


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Dunn, Robert


Bottomley, Mrs Virginia
Durant, Tony


Bowden, Gerald (Dulwich)
Dykes, Hugh


Braine, Sir Bernard
Eggar, Tim


Brandon-Bravo, Martin
Emery, Sir Peter


Brinton, Tim
Eyre, Sir Reginald


Brittan, Rt Hon Leon
Favell, Anthony


Brooke, Hon Peter
Finsberg, Sir Geoffrey


Brown, M. (Brigg &amp; Cl'thpes)
Forman, Nigel


Browne, John
Freeman, Roger


Bruinvels, Peter
Gale, Roger


Buck, Sir Antony
Gardiner, George (Reigate)


Budgen, Nick
Glyn, Dr Alan


Burt, Alistair
Goodlad, Alastair






Gower, Sir Raymond
Powell, William (Corby)


Greenway, Harry
Powley, John


Griffiths, E. (B'y St Edm'ds)
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg


Grylls, Michael
Price, Sir David


Hargreaves, Kenneth
Proctor, K. Harvey


Haselhurst, Alan
Pym, Rt Hon Francis


Hayward, Robert
Raffan, Keith


Heathcoat-Amory, David
Renton, Tim


Hickmet, Richard
Rhodes James, Robert


Hind, Kenneth
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)
Ridley, Rt Hon Nicholas


Holland, Sir Philip (Gedling)
Ridsdale, Sir Julian


Holt, Richard
Rifkind, Malcolm


Hordern, Peter
Robinson, Mark (N'port W)


Howard, Michael
Roe, Mrs Marion


Howarth, Gerald (Cannock)
Rossi, Sir Hugh


Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas
Rost, Peter


Jones, Robert (W Herts)
Rowe, Andrew


Knight, Gregory (Derby N)
Rumbold, Mrs Angela


Knight, Mrs Jill (Edgbaston)
Ryder, Richard


Knowles, Michael
Sackville, Hon Thomas


Knox, David
Sainsbury, Hon Timothy


Lamont, Norman
St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon N.


Lang, Ian
Sayeed, Jonathan


Lawler, Geoffrey
Scott, Nicholas


Lawrence, Ivan
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Leigh, Edward (Gainsbor'gh)
Shelton, William (Streatham)


Lester, Jim
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Lewis, Sir Kenneth (Stamf'd)
Sims, Roger


Lightbown, David
Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)


Lilley, Peter
Soames, Hon Nicholas


Lloyd, Peter, (Fareham)
Speller, Tony


Lord, Michael
Spencer, Derek


Luce, Richard
Squire, Robin


Lyell, Nicholas
Stanbrook, Ivor


McCurley, Mrs Anna
Stern, Michael


MacKay, Andrew (Berkshire)
Stevens, Lewis (Nuneaton)


Maclean, David John
Stevens, Martin (Fulham)


Major, John
Stewart, Allan (Eastwood)


Malone, Gerald
Stewart, Andrew (Sherwood)


Marlow, Antony
Stradling Thomas, J.


Mates, Michael
Sumberg, David


Mather, Carol
Tapsell, Peter


Maude, Hon Francis
Taylor, John (Solihull)


Mayhew, Sir Patrick
Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)


Mellor, David
Temple-Morris, Peter


Merchant, Piers
Terlezki, Stefan


Meyer, Sir Anthony
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Miller, Hal (B'grove)
Thompson, Patrick (N'ich N)


Mills, Sir Peter (West Devon)
Thorne, Neil (Ilford S)


Mitchell, David (NW Hants)
Thornton, Malcolm


Moate, Roger
Tracey, Richard


Molyneaux, Rt Hon James
Trotter, Neville


Montgomery, Fergus
Twinn, Dr Ian


Morris, M. (N'hampton, S)
Vaughan, Sir Gerard


Morrison, Hon C. (Devizes)
Viggers, Peter


Morrison, Hon P. (Chester)
Wakeham, Rt Hon John


Moynihan, Hon C.
Walden, George


Mudd, David
Waller, Gary


Neale, Gerrard
Ward, John


Neubert, Michael
Wardle, C. (Bexhill)


Newton, Tony
Watson, John


Nicholls, Patrick
Watts, John


Norris, Steven
Wells, Bowen (Hertford)


Onslow, Cranley
Wells, John (Maidstono)


Oppenheim, Philip
Wiggin, Jerry


Osborn, Sir John
Wolfson, Mark


Page, John (Harrow W)
Wood, Timothy


Page, Richard (Herts SW)
Woodcock, Michael


Parris, Matthew
Yeo, Tim


Pawsey, James
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Peacock, Mrs Elizabeth



Percival, Rt Hon Sir Ian
Tellers for the Ayes:


Pollock, Alexander
Mr. Archie Hamilton and


Powell, Rt Hon J. E. (S Down)
Mr. Tristan Garel-Jones.




NOES


Alton, David
Atkinson, N. (Tottenham)


Anderson, Donald
Banks, Tony (Newham NW)


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Barnett, Guy





Barron, Kevin
Kirkwood, Archibald


Beckett, Mrs Margaret
Lambie, David


Beith, A. J.
Leighton, Ronald


Bell, Stuart
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)


Bennett, A. (Dent'n &amp; Red'sh)
Lewis, Terence (Worsley)


Bermingham, Gerald
Litherland, Robert


Bidwell, Sydney
Lloyd, Tony (Stretford)


Blair, Anthony
Lofthouse, Geoffrey


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Loyden, Edward


Brown, N. (N'c'tle-u-Tyne E)
McDonald, Dr Oonagh


Buchan, Norman
McKay, Allen (Penistone)


Caborn, Richard
Mackenzie, Rt Hon Gregor


Callaghan, Jim (Heyw'd &amp; M)
Maclennan, Robert


Campbell-Savours, Dale
McNamara, Kevin


Carter-Jones, Lewis
McTaggart, Robert


Clark, Dr David (S Shields)
Marek, Dr John


Clarke, Thomas
Mason, Rt Hon Roy


Cocks, Rt Hon M. (Bristol S.)
Maxton, John


Coleman, Donald
Maynard, Miss Joan


Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.
Mikardo, Ian


Corbett, Robin
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce


Cowans, Harry
Mitchell, Austin (G't Grimsby)


Cox, Thomas (Tooting)
Morris, Rt Hon A. (W'shawe)


Craigen, J. M.
Morris, Rt Hon J. (Aberavon)


Crowther, Stan
Nellist, David


Cunningham, Dr John
Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon


Davies, Ronald (Caerphilly)
O'Brien, William


Davis, Terry (B'ham, H'ge H'l)
O'Neill, Martin


Deakins, Eric
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley


Dewar, Donald
Park, George


Dixon, Donald
Parry, Robert


Dobson, Frank
Patchett, Terry


Dormand, Jack
Pavitt, Laurie


Douglas, Dick
Pike, Peter


Dubs, Alfred
Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)


Dunwoody, Hon Mrs G.
Prescott, John


Eadie, Alex
Radice, Giles


Eastham, Ken
Redmond, M.


Evans, John (St. Helens N)
Richardson, Ms Jo


Fatchett, Derek
Roberts, Allan (Bootle)


Faulds, Andrew
Robertson, George


Field, Frank (Birkenhead)
Rooker, J. W.


Fisher, Mark
Ross, Ernest (Dundee W)


Foot, Rt Hon Michael
Sheldon, Rt Hon R.


Forrester, John
Shore, Rt Hon Peter


Foster, Derek
Short, Ms Clare (Ladywood)


Foulkes, George
Short, Mrs H.(W'hampt'n NE)


Fraser, J. (Norwood)
Skinner, Dennis


Garrett, W. E.
Smith, C.(Isl'ton S &amp; F'bury)


George, Bruce
Smith, Rt Hon J. (M'kl'ds E)


Golding, John
Soley, Clive


Gould, Bryan
Spearing, Nigel


Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)
Stott, Roger


Hardy, Peter
Strang, Gavin


Harman, Ms Harriet
Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)


Harrison, Rt Hon Walter
Thomas, Dr R. (Carmarthen)


Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith
Thompson, J. (Wansbeck)


Heffer, Eric S.
Torney, Tom


Hogg, N. (C'nauld &amp; Kilsyth)
Wainwright, R.


Holland, Stuart (Vauxhall)
Wallace, James


Howell, Rt Hon D. (S'heath)
Wardell, Gareth (Gower)


Howells, Geraint
Wareing, Robert


Hughes, Roy (Newport East)
Welsh, Michael


Hughes, Sean (Knowsley S)
Wigley, Dafydd


Janner, Hon Greville
Winnick, David


John, Brynmor



Jones, Barry (Alyn &amp; Deeside)
Tellers for the Noes:


Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Mr. Frank Haynes and


Kennedy, Charles
Mr. James Hamilton.


Kilroy-Silk, Robert

Question accordindly agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 26

REPRESENTATION AT DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

'(1) On the hearing of a disciplinary charge against a police officer of the rank of chief superintendent or below the punishment of dismissal, requirement to resign or reduction in rank may not be awarded unless he has been given an opportunity to elect to be legally represented at the hearing.
(2) Where such an officer so elects, he may be represented at the hearing, at his option, either by counsel or by a solicitor.
(3) Except in a case where such an officer has been given an opportunity to elect to be legally represented and has so elected, he may only be represented at the hearing of a disciplinary charge by another member of a police force.
(4) Regulations under section 33(2)(e) of the Police Act 1964 shall specify—
(a) a procedure for notifying an officer of the effect of subsections (1) to (3) above;
(b) when he is to be so notified and when he is to give notice whether or not he wishes to be legally represented at the hearing.
(5) If an officer—
(a) fails without reasonable cause to give notice in accordance with the regulations that he wishes to be legally represented; or
(b) gives notice in accordance with the regulations that he does not wish to be legally represented,

any such punishment as is mentioned in subsection (1) above may be awarded without his being legally represented.

(6) If an officer has given notice in accordance with the regulations that he wishes to be legally represented, the case against him may be presented by counsel or a solicitor whether or not he is actually so represented.'.—[Mr. Brittan.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Leon Brittan): I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Ernest Armstrong): With this we may take Government amendment No. 206.

Mr. Brittan: The purpose and effect of the new clause is, I believe, fairly obvious and I hope that it will receive a general welcome from the House. It implements the undertaking given in March, subsequently amplified in Committee, that accused police officers should have the right to be represented by a lawyer at first instance disciplinary hearings at which they are liable to be punished by loss of job or rank.
Subsection (1) embodies the principle in a straightforward way. It provides that if the officer has not been given the opportunity to be legally represented it will not be possible for him to be punished by way of dismissal, requirement to resign or reduction in rank. The formula differs slightly in form, but not in effect, from that which was described to the Committee and embodied in an earlier version of the clause. This is a simpler and clearer version.
Subsection (2) makes it clear that when an accused officer elects to be legally represented he may choose whether that representation is to be by a barrister or a solicitor. Subsection (3) provides the corollary to the preceding subsections; if an officer has been offered a lawyer, the heavier penalties will be available, but if he has not been offered a lawyer those penalties will not be available, but he may be represented only by a serving police officer.
Subsection (4) requires me to make regulations under the Police Act 1964 to specify the procedure for notifying an accused officer whether he may be legally represented, and the timing both of the notification and of his reply to it.
The right that we are giving is a right not to lose job or rank without having had the opportunity of legal representation. Obviously, if the officer decides not to take up the offer of a lawyer, those punishments must still be available. Accordingly, subsection (5) provides that if the officer has had the opportunity of being represented by a lawyer and either fails without good reason to give notice of his decision or gives notice that he does not wish to have a lawyer he will still be liable to be punished by loss of job or rank.
Subsection (6) provides that when an officer has given notice that he wishes to be legally represented the case against him may also be presented by a lawyer.

Mr. Dubs: We support the new clause, as we did in Committee. We believe that a police officer who faces disciplinary charges that are liable to have serious consequences for him should be legally represented. That is a basic right of police officers.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: I congratulate my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary and my right hon. Friend the Minister of State, who bore the burden of the debates in Committee, on the extraordinary patience that they have shown in dealing with this complex matter.
I know that it was not easy for the Government to arrive at this conclusion. They had to consider the other parts of the Home Office firmament who might have argued that what is sauce for the police goose must be sauce for other ganders. I recognise that the Government had a difficult task.
Secondly, Ministers had to consider other implications within the Government machine and Whitehall generally and they also had to face the reservations that I understand, though I do not share, of the Association of Chief Police Officers. In overcoming those difficulties, the Home Secretary and the Minister of State have shown a great understanding of the importance of the matter to the police service.
The issue under discussion has nagged away for a long time. I will not say that it has poisoned relationships within the service, but it has not helped relationships between the ranks. I hope that the new clause will relieve the service of many of the problems—particularly the anticipated problems—that have clogged up the machinery from time to time. The new clause will bring about an improvement in the relationships between ranks and, therefore, an improvement in police morale.
I trust that the Home Secretary will be able to make the regulations speedily and will consider who is to pay for the legal representation. The Police Federation would like the public purse to bear the cost, but I think that it is inconceivable that that could be done in all circumstances.
However, it is worth noting that when an accused officer avails himself of the new right to be legally represented the chief officer bringing the charges will be represented. It is fair to remind the House that the chief officer will have his QC paid for by the taxpayer, but the accused police officer will not receive such help. It may be that this is, in all the circumstances, the best that can be achieved, but I am entitled to draw attention to that. The Police Federation from time to time is approached by its members and asked whether it will bear the cost of legal representation, and I should like my right hon. and learned Friend's confirmation that nothing will stand in the way


of its doing that. I believe that it already virtually has the power to do so, but perhaps the regulations would make that explicit.
This is an important step forward towards giving to the police the rights that they should enjoy within a responsible service at a time when they are much stretched in many ways, whether through picketing, terrorism, crime or whatever. I think that they will thank my right hon. and learned Friend as a Home Secretary who has given ordinary members of the police service a long sought after right, and they will credit him for doing so.

Mr. Brittan: I give my thanks for what has been said both by the hon. Member for Battersea (Mr. Dubs) and my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths). I appreciate my hon. Friend's remarks about the way in which this has been handled by my right hon. Friend the Minister of State and myself. I shall consider my hon. Friend's point when making the regulations and, subject to any correction, which I do not think will be necessary, I believe that the Police Federation already has the right to pay for representation and will continue to have that right.
Subsection (6) does not require there to be representation on the part of those presenting the case against the police officer if he is represented. It does not necessarily follow that there will always be representation on both sides, although obviously in the nature of things, if the case is considered sufficiently serious for the person charged to be entitled to be represented because of the risk of the punishment, it is probable that the case will be presented by counsel or a solicitor.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 9

POWERS OF ARREST FOR OFFENCES CONTRARY TO SECTION 32 OF THE SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 1956

'(1) Where a constable, with reasonable cause, suspects a person of committing or having committed an offence contrary to section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956, he shall exercise the powers of arrest conferred in Part III of this Act only if he is in uniform.

(2) The evidence of the arresting policer office shall not be receivable at the trial of any person for an offence contrary to section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act unless corroborated by evidence that some other person (other than a police officer)—
(a) was offended by the conduct of the accused; and
(b) did not incite, encourage or consent to the commission of the offence.'—[Mr. Wallace.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Wallace: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause relates to offences contrary to section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956. Subsection (1) would allow a constable having reasonable grounds to suspect a person of having committed an offence under that section to exercise the powers of arrest conferred by part III of this Bill only if he was in uniform. Subsection (2) ensures that the evidence of the arresting police officer will not be receivable at a trial unless it is corroborated by a person other than a police officer who shows both that he was offended by the conduct of the accused and that he did not incite, encourage or consent to the commission of the offence.
Section 32 of the 1956 Act makes it an offence persistently to solicit or importune in a public place for

immoral purposes. My understanding of the law on soliciting is that it dates back to the 19th century and was primarily directed in those days to acts of a heterosexual nature and particularly to prostitution, but latterly it has been used in particular against homosexuals. Since the 1967 Act, which made legitimate sexual acts between consenting adults in private, the number of prosecutions has almost doubled and the number of convictions under subsection (2) of the 1956 Act has trebled.
I think that it would have been hoped by those who sponsored the 1967 Act that its effect would be to foster and encourage a more tolerant and understanding attitude towards homosexually-oriented people. Perhaps one could argue that the climate has changed in the 17 years since the passage of that Act, but there is widespread fear and concern in the homosexual community that the operations of the police, particularly in bringing prosecutions under section 32 of the 1956 Act, have increased and become more oppressive.
If one takes strictly the terms of the Act the maximum penalty, if the case is dealt with summarily, is six months imprisonment and on indictment two years imprisonment, but very often sucessful prosecutions result in fines of no more than double figures. However, although that is the penalty imposed by the courts, all too often the social consequences that follow from prosecution are more dire and have a greater impact on the individual than any penalty imposed by the courts. There are consequences for employment and the disruption of family life and in some reported cases there have even been suicides.
Very often, in such cases there are no victims of the crime, but at the end of the day the victim is the accused. The increasing number of prosecutions has had a serious effect on relations between police and the gay community. There have been debates in the House and in the country on the importance of the damaging effects of police behaviour in times past on their relations with certain racial communities. That has received widespread public attention, but what has not been so much discussed is the serious feeling within the gay community against what its members feel has been a number of years of police oppression. They feel that the law has been used against them and that has undoubtedly led in many cases to an unwillingness on the part of gay men and women to cooperate with the police on matters relating to sexual offences and equally, and perhaps more importantly, to a fear felt by many victims of crimes about going to the police. They may have been mugged or have been the victim of some other crime, but they are reluctant to complain to the police because of the unsatisfactory relationship between the gay community and the police. It is to tackling some of these problems that the new clause is directed.
Subsection (1) deals with the requirement for the police officer to be in uniform. That has been prompted by the fact that it would appear that in many cases arrests made under section 32 of the 1956 Act have resulted from covert operations in which plain clothes policemen have acted as spies—for example, there are examples of them hiding in false compartments or behind grilles in public lavatories—or acting as agents provocateurs. Often the accused alleges in court that he has been approached by someone pretending to be gay, but when he has responded an arrest followed.
It is the view of our party that entrapment or allurement of such people should be viewed with great concern and


suspicion. The role of the police is to prevent or detect crime, not to incite it. I understand that this tactic is officially disapproved of by the Home Office, but it appears to be frequently used.
There is indeed a report in the press today in which the manager of a gay club in London is quoted as saying:
The police act as agent provocateurs … They come in in plain clothes as customers paying their £5, go downstairs and attract attention to themselves, and when they get the response they are seeking they make an arrest.
6.30 pm
It is indicative of the attitude which is developing towards such police behaviour that there is an editorial in The Scotsman today commenting on the
agent provocateur tactics employed by the police in London to entrap homosexuals and charge them with offences such as importuning or indecent behaviour in public places.
The editorial states:
Liberalisation of the law against homosexual acts in private has been followed by a rise in the number of men charged with homosexual behaviour in public. Just as in the era before homosexual law reform the blackmailer was generally regarded with greater detestation than his homosexual victim, in today's different moral climate the police agent provocateur might be more generally disliked than the homosexual whom he arrests.
Whatever official denials may be made, there is a widespread belief that such tactics are adopted. In one instance, following the replacement of one police officer by another in Stockport, convictions rose by some 700 per cent. It is believed that on one occasion in Bournemouth police officers staked out a certain public convenience on four nights a week over several months in an attempt to make arrests under section 32. Bearing in mind the small fines which often follow successful prosecution, one may feel that police resources are being misused.
New clause 9 is not designed to repeal section 32. We believe that, if public complaints are made, the police have a role to play in following them up making the necessary inquiries and arrests, and letting the law take its course. There could be much greater scope for a uniformed police patrol using warnings rather than apprehension and conviction. For first-time offenders, cautions are used more frequently for offences under this section than for any other sexual offences other than incest and rape.
If a public nuisance is committed and public complaints are made, there is nothing in new clause 9 to prevent the police from instituting a prosecution. Subsection (2) of the new clause specifies that there should be a public element to the offence. In many cases, offences such as these have no victims. We suggest that, before the possibility arises of a successful prosecution under section 32, there must be a genuine public nuisance.
Under the present law, there is no need for the police to prove any public complaints or nuisance. Very often there is a direct conflict of evidence between the accused and the police about exactly what happened. That cannot help to promote good relations between the police and the gay community. There are inevitably suspicions that evidence has been either exaggerated or fabricated. Direct conflicts of evidence are not helpful, and the problem could be overcome if there were a requirement for collaboration by a member of the public. Cases in which the only other parties to the incident are members of the police force could then not arise.
At a time when there is so much public concern about the increasing number of muggings, burglaries and other

crimes, it is worrying that so many of the resources of the police are devoted to actions under section 32. The effort is wholly out of proportion to the public nuisance caused—in many instances, there is no public nuisance—and to the size of the fine that may follow a successful prosecution.
The new clause is not a charter that will permit public lavatories freely to become meeting places for gay people. We wish to see the police act responsibly to enforce the law in response to public complaints. We wish to improve relations between the gay community and the police, and to relieve members of the gay community of the oppression from which they believe themselves to have suffered since 1967.

Mr. Matthew Parris: Section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 is far too widely drawn. Interpreted literally, it would catch behaviours that no hon. Member would seriously consider to be an occasion for prosecution. It is therefore important that until section 32 is changed—and I hope that, after the Criminal Law Revision Committee makes its report, it will be changed — it should be policed intelligently and sensitively. There are some signs that it is not being policed intelligently and sensitively at the moment.
I should like to ask my right hon. Friend a technical question about the operation of the Bill in this area. I understand that powers of arrest under section 32 would be conferred under part III of the Bill, because the offences would, or might, be offences against public decency. However, it is not clear to me that every solicitation within the definition of section 32 would be an offence against public decency. Solicitations which take place in a public place more than twice may nevertheless take place out of earshot of anybody, except the person solicited. They may give that person no offence and, indeed, may not be discernible to anyone else. If so, I am not sure whether the incident could be called an offence aginst public decency, or whether in that case the legislation would confer powers of arrest. That is a technical question. I am not a lawyer, and I may be wrong.
The offence under section 32 is
persistently to … importune in a public place for immoral purposes.
The courts have interpreted "persistently" as meaning twice or more. A public place is not what the public would imagine it to be. It can include a public house or a deserted part of the country. The phrase "for immoral purposes" has never been defined. The definition is left to the jury.
When the 1956 Act was passed, all forms of homosexual behaviour, even in private, were proscribed by law. It would not have been hard for a jury to reach the conclusion that such behaviour must therefore be immoral and that the purpose of inviting somebody to indulge in it would be for an immoral purpose. Since 1956, some kinds of homosexual behaviour in private have been made legal. The jury is free to decide that to invite somebody to take part in such behaviour in private is not immoral, although in fact no jury has yet so decided.
I make that point to illustrate the fact that the operation of section 32 is too wide and uncertain, and should be reconsidered. Indeed, it is being considered, although the provisional recommendations of the Criminal Law Revision Committee give every sign of having been written on the back of an envelope. I hope that members of the committee will give the matter more thought before they produce their final recommendations.
I have some reservations about whether the new clause could be carried into law in practice. To take away from policemen the common law right of citizen's arrest, which is available to anybody, whether or not he is in uniform, would be a novelty. I am not entirely sure that there are no circumstances in which a policeman who was not in uniform would be entitled to arrest somebody for an offence under section 32, although we would probably wish that in most cases the policeman should be in uniform. The statutory element of public complaint is another novelty, and I am not sure how it would operate. Therefore, I have some doubts about carrying the new clause, as drafted, into law.
However, the policing of section 32 is not right at the moment. One can argue about whether the police are acting as agents provocateurs, which they deny, or as decoys, which I believe they do not deny. Nobody thinks that there are no circumstances in which the police might not rightly act as decoys, but most people think that a great many policemen acting as decoys in an offence as slight as, in many cases, this one is is an improper use of police resources. There have recently been several cases in London in which the jury has chosen to believe the accused's evidence rather than that of the police. There is some doubt about the type of evidence being presented by the police, which is utterly uncorroborated by witnesses who are members of the public.
I should therefore be much reassured if my right hon. and learned Friend will say that new clause 9 deals with a problem area that urgently needs Government attention and, if it is not the right means by which to cure the problem, the Government will give some sign that they will come forward with proposals of their own in due course.

Mr. Chris Smith: I support new clause 9 because I have been extremely anxious for some time about the apparent practice of entrapment in the Metropolitan police, especially in the Earls court area of London.
My first worry concerns the enticement of an offence. The police rightly deny that they are acting as agents provocateurs, but the line between the entrapment techniques that appear to have been used and the use of police officers as agents provocateurs is thin and depends on an extremely nice definition of what provocation is involved. I have been deeply worried that there might be cases of police officers enticing an offence. The House must be extremely worried about that.
My second anxiety is that there have been several successful defences against prosecution brought by the police on the basis of evidence gained in the way that I have described. The hon. Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Parris) mentioned defendants pleading not guilty, going to court, challenging a police officer's uncorroborated evidence and winning. It cannot be good for the police to be involved in such prosecutions.
My third major anxiety is that there seems to have been a concerted policy on the part of the Metropolitan police to focus on the gay community and facilities used by it, and taking action against such places rather than all other forms of entertainment used by other parts of our community. I am worried that that might be something to do with the Metropolitan police's policy decisions.
6.45 pm
Some time ago I raised the issue of entrapment with the Metropolitan police and the Home Secretary. it is interesting that each made the same point in their respective replies. I shall quote what the Metropolitan police wrote from New Scotland Yard. The letter said:
The attention of officers to be deployed is drawn to the requirement that in general a person should not be arrested for a Section 32 offence solely on account of behaviour towards the officers themselves".
So far, so good. The letter continued:
although it is acknowledged that if the offence is flagrant, arrest may be necessary to put a stop to it.
The phrase
if the offence is flagrant
was also used in the Home Secretary's reply. I am grateful to him for the detailed but still disappointing reply that he gave.
The crucial point is, who on earth is to define "flagrant"? There is no doubt that, when the courts have been called upon to decide when the uncorroborated evidence of a police officer has been involved, they have decided that the defendant is innocent. The width of interpretation that present legislation gives the police cannot be justified or good.
I support new clause 9 because it clarifies the circumstances in which an offence can be identified by the police and upon which action can be taken. It will clarify matters for the police and for the general public who may fear that what appear to be the police's present practices may be used against them. I accept some of the doubts that the hon. Member for Derbyshire, West expressed-about the wording of new clause 9, but it can be clarified and polished by the Government if they accept its principles.
I said earlier that Metropolitan police policy seems to be harassment. I hate to call it that, but that is what many people in the gay community feel it to be. We have only to consider the case of Mr. Jimi Christmas who was arrested by the police some time ago, the case, which my hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson) referred to on Friday, of 50 or 60 police officers descending on The Bell public house on Pentonville road in an utterly unwarranted show of strength, and the way in which the Inland Revenue behaved in regard to the Gay's the Word bookshop in Marchmont street to realise that there is tremendous worry among much of the gay community about the Metropolitan police. The use of entrapment techniques in the Earls court area is just one of those major worries.
I hope that, in his winding-up speech, the Home Secretary will concentrate on the specific matter to which new clause 9 relates because there are valid anxieties to be put at rest and will address himself to the more general fears experienced by members of the gay community in London. I also hope that he will give an assurance that it is not deliberate policy on the part of the Metropolitan police to identify the gay community for the harassment which they fear and suffer.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: Everyone will welcome the sober and reasonable tone of the debate. I welcome it because, just as some years ago I played some part in bringing the Police Federation into discussions with ethnic minority communities long before the problem started to hit the headlines, so recently I was able to bring about a sensible and useful meeting between the Campaign for Homosexual Equality and the chairman of the Police


Federation. Meeting and discussing matters rationally and soberly is a far better method to proceed than using some of the hyperbole that is slung back and forth.
I hope that the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Wallace) will allow me to say that there is no police officer that I know — I know a few — who regards hanging around in public lavatories to entrap some wretched person under sexual offences legislation with anything but the greatest distaste. Nobody wants to do it. It is clear that my right hon. and learned Friend will be able to speak with more authority on behalf of the Metropolitan police, but one is entitled to say that there is not a considered policy of harassment of the gay community in London. I should like to say as a preliminary that the majority of police officers in London and other cities greatly resent some of the more extreme language that is thrown at them occasionally.
A document from one of the many gay liberation groups in London says of the Bill, especially that part of the Bill that we seek to amend, that the police are
racialist, sexist, drunken and bullying".
That description of the Metropolitan police was in the PSI report. The document continues — I ask the House to remember what it feels like to be a police officer trying to do one's duty while being called
racialist, sexist, drunken and bullying
—to say that the Bill will leave those wretched policemen with powers to
forcibly strip and intimately search you. This means looking inside your anus or vagina, to search your home even if you are not suspected of any offence, and this means letters from your mother or the names and addresses of members of a gay group or a gay club will be seized by the police, that the police will be able to arrest you for any affront to public decency and you can guess how it will be used and to whom it will apply—two women greeting each other with a kiss, two men holding hands, someone wearing a gay badge.
That sort of literature is being pushed out widely. I suggest that, unlike the rational argument of the Campaign for Homosexual Equality, which I respect and with which I shall deal, such scaremongering language about the Bill or the police service does no service to the cause of trying to arrive at a more rational approach to this very sensitive and difficult matter. I should have thought that I would carry the whole House with me in saying that.
I turn to the specific complaints of the Campaign for Homosexual Equality. As I have told the House, I have had the benefit of discussing in great detail its anxieties about the Bill. I recognise the group's concern about the definition of the affront to public decency, the provisions in respect of intimate body searches, as well as in relation to the general powers of search and entry. I have debated that with the CHE and the police service.
It is only right for me to set out the views of the Police Federation, which were arrived at after much thought, based on experience. The affront to public decency in clause 22 is only one of the many arrest conditions that need to be satisfied before an arrest is made. The clause does not create a new offence as such. A good deal of unnecessary alarm has been created by suggesting that that is so.
We shall be dealing with intimate body searches later, so it would be out of order for me to deal with them now. Once again, in broad terms, far more unnecessary alarm has been generated than the Bill can possibly justify.
I share the Minister's reservation about the practicability of enforcing the amendment as it stands. The amendment stands on two legs: only a uniformed officer can make an arrest, and there must be corroboration by some other person of the police officer's testimony.

Mr. Corbett: Does the hon. Gentleman acknowledge that the new clause does not interfere with the common law power of arrest by the citizen?

Mr. Griffiths: I am obliged to the hon. Gentleman for raising that matter. Perhaps the Minister's reply will deal with it. One of my anxieties about our abolishing the general powers of arrest under the common law, which is done in an earlier clause, is that I am not sure whether this aspect is covered. I shall leave that for the Minister to deal with, rather than replying myself.
The amendment requires, first, that the officers shall be in uniform — I understand the reason for that — and, secondly, that there should be corrobation. I put it to the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland, who moved the new clause in a reasonable way, that a police officer is under discipline and has no choice but to enforce the law because Parliament has placed that duty upon him, whether he is off duty, a CID officer or a uniformed officer going home in plain clothes. If he has reasonable grounds for believing that an offence is being committed or is about to be committed, he has a duty under the law, under his oath of office and his code of discipline, to prevent that offence or to arrest anyone who is involved in it. If we were to confine the position whereto only a uniformed officer could act in that way, we would be removing from the police their general, 24-hour-a-day responsibilities under discipline and under the law. That is a difficult path to go along.
I am reminded of Committee debates in which it was claimed that only a police officer in uniform should be able to stop a vehicle on the road. I understand the reason for that. A motorist who is stopped by a policeman in plain clothes may be greatly concerned that that person means him no good. None the less, a police officer who is off duty, in the CID or the special branch must be able to deal with an offence if he comes across one. The amendment is rather difficult to carry on that ground, although that does not mean that I object to the principle of it.

Mr. Kaufman: Can the hon. Gentleman explain to me how an officer who is off duty and going home comes upon an offence in a gay club?

Mr. Griffiths: Yes, I can. There is nothing to prevent a police officer, if he is so minded, from going to any club that he likes on his way home. He is a free citizen. Whatever his purpose in going there, if when he gets there an offence occurs, such as a fight, a theft or a sexual offence—it matters not—that officer has a duty to deal with the matter. I am dealing with the leg of the amendment that requires an officer to be in uniform.
A further point should be considered. I received a letter from the Police Federation saying:
The restriction is patently aimed at preventing plain clothes officers from doing the task which at present the law requires of them and the argument is apparently"—
I am not putting words into the hon. Gentleman's mouth; I am quoting the Police Federation's assumptions—
that uniformed patrols prevent the offences from taking place and therefore would obviate the need for their subsequent detection.


In other words, the presence of more uniformed officers on patrol would mean less need for entrapment, allurement or plain clothes spying, as the hon. Gentleman put it. I can see that argument but, unfortunately, as the federation goes on to say, that is an ideal proposition for an ideal world:
Unfortunately, if uniformed patrols of regular meeting places were to be set up for the purpose of preventing offences, our experience is that it would only cause a relocation of those places of meeting.
That practical observation comes from practical police officers.
The second leg of the amendment concerns the point of corroboration. I do not think that anybody in the House —certainly not a police officer—would enjoy the one-on-one situation that may arise where, on the evidence of a single police officer and the counter evidence of the arrested person, a court must decide the case. That is a difficult position, especially when dealing with a matter of such sensitivity. The hon. Gentleman rightly drew attention to the fact that a number of cases brought by the Metropolitan police have failed; they have been thrown out. The police did not enjoy that. It is up to the House to ensure that they are not put in that position too often.
7 pm
I am afraid that, as a matter of practicality, the advice that I had from the Police Federation is that it would be well nigh impossible for the police, in a large number of cases, to prove the offence of soliciting by males if, in every case, they had to establish a third witness. It is not—

Mr. Kaufman: —proved.

Mr. Griffiths: Exactly. It must be proved, otherwise the case should not be brought. The federation's conclusion is that the new clause is an effort to change the law without recognising the consequences. Therefore, the federation makes a suggestion that I hope the House will find more welcome. It believes that the Sexual Offences Act 1956, particularly the relevant section to which my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Parris) referred, may be uncertain and unclear. The federation states:
If the Campaign for Homosexual Equality consider that public or Parliament should now regard male soliciting as being a less obnoxious act or should be placed in some different category, then they should seek an amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 1956 itself.
I agree with that to a great extent. That is the place to make the change. The matter needs clearing up. This is not a proper use for the Bill. For the various practical reasons that I have given, I hope that the Government will not support the amendment.

Ms. Clare Short: I wish to speak strongly in favour of new clause 9 and draw to the attention of the House the present disgraceful and offensive situation. Serving police officers throughout the country get dressed up in ways that they think will make them attractive to gay men, go to places where gay men are known to meet and put themselves around so that they are approached, and then arrest people. We are talking about policemen deliberately going not just to public lavatories, but to pubs and clubs where gay men are known to meet. Such behaviour can be explained only by saying that homosexual relations between consenting males used to be illegal.
However, that law has been changed, so it cannot be against the law for gay men to meet each other and to

decide to have a relationship. It is as permissible as, it is for a man and a woman to meet. Yet today, when there is an enormously low crime detection rate in areas such as my own, where people's houses are burgled and there are not enough police officers to attend to constituents' complaints, policemen are indulging in this unnecessary activity.
It is important that the House understands that entrapment is part of the exercise. The police dress up deliberately so that it is more likely that an approach will be made to them. I should like to read the account of an individual recently found not guilty in London. He refers to the way in which the policeman involved in his case was dressed. He came out of a pub that is well known to be used by gay men. The young man said:
Leaning against the railings of private premises"—
in a street nearby—
was a young blond man dressed provocatively in tight jeans with a split round the upper thigh of one leg revealing his buttocks, and otherwise wearing only a tee shirt. As I approached he looked at me and smiled slightly. I stopped just past him and looked round. He looked at me again, acknowledging me with the look, so that I was left in no doubt that he wished to communicate with me. By this time I had walked past him again, this time more slowly, and stopped next to him.
It is all very well for a policeman to dress up in his uniform, go to court and say that he was approached improperly by a gay man, but the truth is that British policemen are going around dressed in that way, and deliberately setting out to get convictions of gay men, which is the job that they have been given to do.
We are talking not about streets outside pubs or public toilets where gay men are known to go to meet each other. Policemen even go into gay clubs where gay people meet each other, as they are legally entitled to do.
It would be a disgrace for the House to allow this situation to continue. The proposal made by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths), that we should delay taking action on the matter, is unacceptable. It is surprising that under the present law it should be thought necessary to have a power against soliciting by gay men, but that there should be no equivalent provision for men who might approach women. It is exactly the same problem. It is legitimate for gay men to meet each other and form friendships and to have a relationship in private. It is legitimate for men and women to meet each other. That meeting might be acceptable to both parties or it might be offensive. In the long term, we should have a law that provides equally for both situations. I do not see why we need a special provision for dealing with gay men.
In the meantime, new clause 9 would massively improve the situation. If anyone is irritated by the behaviour of a gay man, he is still able to complain. If there were a problem in certain public toilets, a uniformed police constable could be asked to keep an eye on the area and walk up and down regularly, so that anyone who had had an objectionable experience could complain to the policeman.
I appeal to everyone in the House to support this extremely reasonable amendment to bring to an end this disgraceful situation of British policemen deliberately dressing in ways that make them attractive to gay men, even going into gay clubs and arresting people who respond to them. That will not do.

Mr. Ashby: I want to speak on the new clause to show to my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of


State that this is a matter of deep concern and that there are many problems in this area. Many of us are very concerned about this area of the law.
The law of entrapment—the agent provocateur—is a very difficult area. It has been a problem for some time. Not long ago, there was a major case dealing with major crime. However, we are talking not about major crime, but about the tawdry, shabby, small and minuscule end of crime. I cannot help likening this matter to the sus laws, with regard to a suspected person liotering with intent.
The House has done away with the sus law, and it might wish to consider section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 in its entirety. The amendment does not deal with that side; it deals with the evidential side. Often one has evidence from a police officer, who was looking through a grille in the roof of a public lavatory, that he was offended and that he saw someone else who appeared to be offended. No attempt is made to ask that person whether he was offended or to show that any real offence or harm was done to the public. It is grubby not only to the person who committed the offence, but to society and the courts. I have been involved as a lawyer in such cases, but in all my 20 years at the Bar I have never come across a case where real harm was done to anyone except the person who was charged. Such offences are socially disastrous to the person charged, but harmful to no one else.
The new clause is good. It would tighten up the evidential side of the law. It demands that the evidence of the arresting officer should be supported by evidence from another person—a member of the public—who
was offended by the conduct of the accused".
We cannot ask for more than that. It means that the solid evidence that somebody was offended is required.
Until such time as we can consider the full impact of section 32 and do something about it, we can tighten up and improve the evidential side by the use of this clause. I support the clause and hope that my right hon. and learned Friend the Home Secretary will undertake to consider the matter carefully. I hope that we shall not have to vote on this matter, and that the Home Office will consider it to be an area of deep anxiety which must be dealt with immediately.

Mr. Bell: It is a great pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby), having listened to his eloquent comments about evidence drawn from his 20 years' experience at the Bar. He described the matter as grubby to society and to the courts. He mentioned the effect that this matter has on the reputations of those who are charged. Some people are never charged, and the impact on their reputations is as great as it is on the reputations of those who are charged.
This matter concerns human and civil rights. We are debating the rights of minorities to go about their lawful business as they think fit. The words "entrapment", "decoy" and "agent provocateur" were used during the debate, but they have no place in a free society. The amendment refers to the powers of arrest in part III of the Bill, only if the person who effects the arrest is in uniform.
I am a barrister, and I know of many cases on Teesside of people having been arrested by a police officer not in uniform. The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) touched on that point. He said that it was

desirable for a police officer to be in uniform, so that citizens know with whom they are dealing. I referred to that in Committee. When I was in Paris, I was stopped at 2 am by three French police officers, all of whom were in plain clothes. I did not believe that they were officers and promptly tried to flee the scene. It is wrong that police officers are entitled to arrest citizens when they are not in uniform.
The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds seemed to suggest that the citizen's power of arrest—the common law power, as opposed to statutory powers—was being abrogated, and that an officer could not arrest a citizen in the course of his own lawful business. We are discussing officers who are on duty, but not in uniform, who, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Ms. Short) said, are used as decoys to entrap citizens who may be going about their lawful business.
7.15 pm
The new clause touches on a sensitive point for all those who are worried about the rights and freedoms which form the basis of our democracy. It is designed to deal with the serious problems that arise in enforcing the laws against soliciting in public. The hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Wallace) said that the law was first introduced in 1898 and has since been applied exclusively against male homosexual soliciting. In 1966, the Divisional Court, in the case of Crook v. Edmondson—reported in 1966 2 Queen's Bench Division, page 81—ruled that the offence did not apply to a man who accosted a woman for sexual intercourse. That is a clear case of discrimination, which runs at odds with other Acts—notably the 1957 legislation. According to the Campaign for Homosexual Equality, that law has been used only once for heterosexual soliciting involving under-age girls. The new clause would not prevent its use where there was corroborative evidence. It calls for corroboration of evidence by a person, other than a police officer, who
was offended by the conduct of the accused; and
(b) did not incite, encourage or consent to the commission of the offence.
At present the onus rests on the court, because, if such evidence is brought before a jury, there may be an acquittal. Last summer six gay men were arrested in Earls court. They contested the charges before a jury. In five of those cases, it was concluded that the police evidence was highly unreliable, and they were acquitted. The individual who finds himself in that invidious position must show that he is innocent and call upon a jury to give a verdict of innocence. Given the nature of the crime and the legal penalties — apart from the social penalties — that is wrong.
The new clause is serious and would add greatly to the Bill. The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds, who put Police Federation views, felt that there was a case for such a new clause, but that it should be in the Sexual Offences Act 1956. However, we are not discussing that tonight. It would be fitting and proper for the Government to consider the new clause and incorporate it in the Bill.
The Campaign for Homosexual Equality, on the concept of entrapment, says:
Police evidence itself shows that plain clothes officers go to considerable lengths to position themselves and behave in ways that can only be seen as inviting an approach from gay men in the area. They cannot be said to be merely keeping observation. The law should not permit this form of entrapment to be used, least of all for such a trivial offence.


Those points were made by the hon. Member for Leicestershire, North-West. It serves no social or useful purpose if police officers behave in that way. It leads only to the harassment of individuals. In 1981 only 40 out of 919 cases were dealt with by police cautions. Those cases do not originate with the public, but we said in Committee that the public were worried about the sort of behaviour that the police have sought to limit.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: It is the experience of the police that women, especially mothers, become alarmed about what they imagine to be the risks to their children in some places, so they telephone the police and put pressure on them. As often as not, the police act in this way in response to public pressure. The idea might not always start with them.

Mr. Bell: Rarely is specific evidence produced in such cases to show that the police were acting after complaints from the public.

Mr. Kaufman: Would my hon. Friend care to speculate upon the possibility of complaints from the "League of Soho Mothers" against entrapment in Soho gay clubs?

Mr. Bell: I am grateful to my right hon. Friend. The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds referred specifically to lavatories, toilets and public places, but, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) said, this goes far beyond that. As my hon. Friend the Member for Ladywood said, police officers get themselves into guises so that they can enter premises for the purposes of entrapment. The citizen who is entrapped must face serious consequences.

Ms. Clare Short: Does my hon. Friend agree that the new clause would take account of what the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) said about mothers being worried for their children, in that it would be possible for a policeman in uniform to patrol those areas and thus reassure mothers?

Mr. Bell: Yes, indeed; and the new clause would also provide appropriate corroborative evidence from the person who was offended by the conduct of the accused. It seems that the police believe that they must justify their conduct in such matters by reference to the public.
In Committee, and elsewhere, the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds said that the police do not wish to be involved in such investigations. Although, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Gorton said, there are fewer cases in the north-east of England than there are in other parts of the country, the point is that this is a waste of police time, effort and money. It would be in taxpayers' interests if that money could be saved, and more policemen could then be used to weed out and prevent serious crime.
The new clause should be part of the Bill. The Government should give us an assurance that they are prepared to consider this matter seriously, in the interests of equality of all our people, of human and civil rights, and of common dignity. The new clause would also prevent prejudice, because we believe that much of what happens is based on prejudice and on the principle that all men are not entirely equal.

Mr. Peter Bruinvels: I had not intended to speak in the debate, but I believe that we must protect the public and we must never offend public

decency. One is tempted to believe that, by supporting the new clause, one might encourage activities that are completely unacceptable to most people. However, we must consider such offences, which might be witnessed, and ask ourselves whether such activities are acceptable in this day and age. Since the weekend several hon. Members might have changed their views slightly. What I say is that a policeman who deliberately creates such an offence is not doing his job. However, at the same time we must deter people from carrying out such activities. Will this new clause deter them?
Most hon. Members will believe that such activities are unlawful, but how will the evidence be corroborated? In Scotland two policemen must always give evidence, but here only one policeman is needed. The problem is that some voyeurs might enjoy watching such activities and might even be stupid enough to give evidence in support of any later charge.
The police must be certain whether the act has taken place, but how can they be certain if they are in uniform? Policemen in uniform will neither encourage nor witness such acts.

Mr. Michael Brown: My hon. Friend talked about the need to prevent offences from being committed under the Sexual Offences Act 1956. He must agree that if the policeman is in uniform and no offence has been committed, the purpose has been served.

Mr. Bruinvels: I accept that, but the problem is that the person then goes down the road to another site. However, the police must be certain. A non-uniformed police officer might go into such a club, but in effect he will be in uniform because he is a detective constable and is there to investigate a club or to see what is happening there. Nevertheless, agents provocateurs are not the way to solve the problem.
I believe strongly that the new clause is the best way of handling the matter. However, the Sexual Offences Act 1956 must also be amended, otherwise this new clause need not have been brought forward. I believe also that all our children must be protected and the last thing we want in public lavatories, which I fear we must talk about today, is interference with young children. In such cases the police must be entitled to move in, arrest the person committing the offence and take him to the station to be charged.
The clause is acceptable to many of my hon. Friends, and I shall support it, if only to warn some policemen that they must be most careful when charging someone. Genuine cases will always occur and if the police can show that they exercised greater discretion than on some occasions, this will be a better place in which to live. For that reason, I shall, if necessary, vote for the new clause.

Sir Anthony Meyer: With my hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Bruinvels), and for the same reasons as my hon. Friend the Member for Brigg and Cleethorpes (Mr. Brown), I support the clause.
My anxiety about the activities of policemen in plain clothes was aroused because of an incident in my constituency four or five years ago. A young lady cycling home late at night was pounced upon by four men in plain clothes and thrown to the ground. She was convinced that she was about to be subjected to a gang rape. However, they were policemen in plain clothes carrying out a drugs


search. She had just returned from visiting her boy friend, who was suspected of having cannabis. I was extremely unhappy about that, and ever since I have had a natural prejudice against the police carrying out activities in plain clothes unless they cannot possibly avoid it.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: Did my hon. Friend cause a formal complaint to be made about that police behaviour and, if so, what was the result?

Sir Anthony Meyer: I try to avoid dealing with such things formally. However, I had extensive correspondence with the chief constable. I would rather not go into the matter any further — [Interruption.] There is no allegation of improper conduct, but I was very unhappy about the whole incident, and I was not altogether happy about the chief constable's reaction. However, I do not want to pursue the matter further.
I was much impressed by the speech made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths). He pointed out that if the police were in uniform, such offences would tend to relocate elsewhere. That is rather a curious argument. I have always thought that it was considered valuable to have policemen in uniform to deter people from committing offences. That is the argument that is always used in relation to motorways. It is said that the police are not there to catch people but to discourage them from breaking the law. Surely, therefore, it should be the aim of policing to discourage offensive conduct. That can best be done by the police being present in uniform. The police cannot achieve the same effect by going about in plain clothes and pursuing policies of entrapment.
None of us could say that all use of agents provocateurs must be forbidden. Apart from anything else, they are probably the most effective means of catching, for example, terrorists or the pushers of hard drugs. Hon. Members have repeatedly pointed out that the person who suffers most is the accused in every case. In a great many cases he is acquitted by the court, but his life is nevertheless ruined. The conduct of the police—if it has been correctly reported—in deliberately enticing people to commit a very minor offence for which their names will be dragged into the newspapers and their lives will be wrecked is inexcusable.
I do not know whether the House intends to divide on the new clause, but I hope that the Minister will make it plain that it is not justifiable for the police to use methods of entrapment to secure the conviction of someone who is committing an offence that cannot possibly do any harm to persons innocent of all evil intent. Those who are in such clubs and pubs know perfectly well what is going on. No offence is given to the general public and it is not justifiable for the police to use such techniques in those cases.

Mr. Michael Brown: I apologise to the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Wallace) for being unable to listen to his opening speech. However, I have listened to most of the debate and I agree with most of what has been said. I simply wish to add my voice to the view of the House, which is that, even if the new clause is technically deficient, its meaning is clear and is accepted by us.
I look to my hon. Friend the Minister to give a clear statement to the House that the Government recognise that there is a grey area in this sphere of the law, and that as long as that grey area exists the law and the activities of the police should err on the side of the individual. As my hon. Friend the Member for Clwyd, North-West (Sir A. Meyer) said, during the past few years it has been drawn to our attention that a disquieting number of people have been unsuccessfully prosecuted amidst great press publicity, and their lives have often been ruined. The House should be concerned about that. I cannot understand why the police should not, in such circumstances, be carrying out their duties in uniform. As my hon. Friend said, if it is the job of the police to prevent the law from being broken, they can best do that, in the circumstances, by being in uniform.
I sincerely hope that my hon. Friend the Minister will recognise that the House has spoken with a virtually united voice on this issue. If he is not prepared to accept that, or to recognise the great disquiet that we all feel, I for one will find myself able to vote for the new clause, even if it is technically deficient.

Mr. Kaufman: It is notable that with the exception of the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths), every hon. Member who has spoken in the debate—on both sides of the House—has been of one mind. In this context, I hope that I am not misunderstood when I say that over the months I have come to be very fond of the hon. Gentleman—this is a public place—in that one comes to anticipate his arguments and the picture that he paints of the policing world. He paints us a picture of a world of a kind of policeman's Camelot, in which a golden rosy haze surrounds the work of the Metropolitan police and the other police forces as the hon. Gentleman fulfils his acknowledged function in speaking up on behalf of the Police Federation. This evening he provided us with a touching picture, in its way, of a policeman who just happens, on his way home, to slip into a gay club—as so many policemen do. It turns out that he has slipped into this gay club to stop a fight that has broken out. To his horror, while he is separating the combatants, he receives an approach that offends his tender susceptibilities. In those circumstances, the police officer has no alternative but to uphold the traditions of the force and to arrest some unoffending person.
Of course, that is not what happens. The debate has made it clear that no hon. Member wishes to encourage crime; far from it. As the hon. Member for Clwyd, North-West (Sir A. Meyer) said, if the police wish to carry out the function that we all want them to perform and to prevent crime, they can best do that, in the circumstances, by wearing their uniforms. There can be no greater certainty in this context that if the police are in uniform, no offence will be committed. In that way, the object of preventive policing will be fulfilled.
When we look at such alleged offences, what are we talking about? As my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Ladywood (Ms. Short) pointed out, we are now looking at something that has been built around the Sexual Offences Act and not at a context in which homosexual relationships are regarded, in and of themselves, as criminal offences. Yet the assumption and consequences of such arrests is to punish them as such.
The disposition to have a homosexual relationship is turned into a criminal tendency. That is not what the law requires or what Parliament has asked the police to do.
In a pub, club or bookshop where homosexuals almost uniquely gather because they know that other homosexuals will be present, how can an alleged or technical offence carried out in those circumstances be regarded as offensive? To whom is it offensive? It will not be offensive to an innocent bystander because no innocent bystander will be present. It will not be offensive to a susceptible child because by definition a susceptible child will not be present. It will not be offensive to a worried parent because a worried parent has no business to be there and almost certainly will not be there. Who, then, is offended?
When we discussed these matters in Committee, clause 22 referred to an "affront to public decency". The Government now wish to refer to an "offence against public decency". But what kind of affront to or offence against public decency—I stress the word "public"—is committed by one homosexual towards another in a place where homosexual people gather to meet one another? In that context an offence against public decency cannot in logic, as distinct from what is technically within the law, be taking place.
As hon. Members on both sides have graphically pointed out, entrapment by deliberate provocation takes place in these matters. The Minister of State strongly condemned such methods. He said in the Standing Committee:
The phrase 'an affront to public decency' means exactly that.
On guidance to the police, he said:
The most relevant principle in that guidance is that no member of a police force shall counsel, incite or procure the commission of a crime, and that is reflected in the orders issued to the Metropolitan police.
He further stated:
It is essential that the police operate within the law and that they avoid provocative or unsavoury tactics." — [Official Report, Standing Committee E, 31 January 1984; c. 804–20.]
The best way to achieve that is to accept the new clause because the new clause rules out provocative and unsavoury tactics and it rules out the counselling, incitement or procurement of a crime because no person in such circumstances would respond to a uniformed police officer. The Minister's aim as stated in Committee can thus be assisted by the inclusion of the new clause.

Mr. Tony Favell: The offence is to importune. There is no guarantee that homosexuals will importune only fellow homosexuals. The person importuned might not be a homosexual.

Mr. Kaufman: If the person importuned is not a homosexual he is unlikely to respond, so I cannot see what harm is being done. If a man who does not wish to be solicited cannot make that clear without the assistance of a plain clothes policeman he must be in some difficulty in his personal life.
I find the police preoccupation with these particular activities and this particular aspect of life somewhat odd. Since my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition asked me to accept the responsibility of being Front Bench spokesman on these matters I have received a considerable amount of correspondence from people who are extremely concerned about the raids being carried out on gay clubs or raids such as those on public houses or the "Gay's the

Word" bookshop to which my hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson) and others have referred. What on earth are the police up to in frequenting these places and carrying out these raids? How can they spare the manpower? We are constantly told that they are short of people.

Mr. Chris Smith: Is my hon. Friend aware that the raid on The Bell public house to which my hon. Friend the Member for Holborn abd St. Pancras (Mr. Dobson) referred last Friday involved 50 or 60 police officers, whereas on the same night on the other side of Pentonville road in my constituency it took the police an hour and a quarter to arrive when they were called to a brawl in a public house involving the destruction of a good deal of furniture and several windows'? The distinction between the two incidents is so manifest that I have still to receive a satisfactory response from the Metropolitan police.

Mr. Kaufman: Indeed. When a registered blind constituent of mine telephoned the police because he feared that his house was being broken into, it took them two hours and five minutes to respond. The House can imagine the anxiety and fear experienced by my constituent.
In those circumstances how can the police spare the manpower to concern themselves with these matters?

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: Without getting into any rosy hues, quite often it happens like this. The parents in a neighbourhood become extremely worried, for instance, about a series of sexual offences against children. Police in uniform may not succeed in deterring them, but: the public nevertheless demand that something be done, so the police use these other methods, which the right hon. Gentleman and many others, including myself, find objectionable. What else can they do?

Mr. Kaufman: On that basis, to deal with the problem that the hon. Gentleman mentions would require the recruitment of child police officers to masquerade as civilian children.
Last Friday the House debated the problem of crime in London. I have no misgivings about repeating the statistics that I gave last Friday about crime in London. Over the past five years the overall total of 659,180 notifiable offences in London is up by 16 per cent. Crimes of violence against the person increased from 14,727 to 17,707, a rise of 20 per cent. Burglary, one of the most widespread of crimes, increased from 121,127 to 152,620, a 27 per cent. increase. Yet the number of arrests has declined by 8 per cent. and the percentage of crimes cleared up is down from 21 per cent. to only 17 per cent. The clear-up rate of crimes in London has fallen by 24 per cent. The clear-up rate per policeman of crimes in the metropolis is worse and often substantially worse than in any other police area, with the single exception of the City of London. In 1982 each London policeman on average cleared up precisely four crimes.
Our constituents want these crimes dealt with. They want these crimes prevented. They want the burglaries prevented. They want the assaults prevented. They want the rapes prevented. My hon. Friend the Member for Holborn and St. Pancras gave statistics on Friday to show that in London today there are 94 murders that have not been cleared up. Our constituents want to be safe in their


homes. They want to be safe in the streets. They want the police to be dealing with serious crimes against individuals and their families. The record of the police in dealing with those crimes is poor. Last year there was a 17 per cent. clear-up of crimes. Each police officer, on a budget of £750 million, cleared up four crimes per year. Our constituents want the clear-up rate to be better. They want genuine crime to be dealt with and not these offences. Here we are discussing victimless crimes and those are not the crimes about which our constituents are most anxious.
Let us be clear about what we are discussing. The hon. Member for Brigg and Cleethorpes (Mr. Brown) talked about the damage that could be done to someone who was unsucessfully prosecuted. The problem is that with these tactics the damage is not done only to someone who is unsuccessfully prosecuted. He does not even have to be charged. He merely has to be arrested and to have his name published in a newspaper. That is all that is required for the damage to be done. An arrest, let alone a conviction, can cause appalling permanent damage, and it is damage not to the person who has had the alleged crime committed against him but to the person who is alleged to have committed the offence.

Mr. Tony Marlow: May I return to the matter raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths)? It is a serious one, which worries a lot of people because it concerns children. If the new clause were agreed to, is the right hon. Gentleman satisfied that children in public lavatories would be sufficiently protected from being importuned? Would the police have the ability to provide proper protection in those circumstances? How could it be provided?

Mr. Kaufman: The hon. Gentleman has raised a point that I want to deal with, and I shall do so towards the end of my remarks. Although I replied flippantly to the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths), it is of paramount importance to us all that children be protected. No one will take any different view about that.
Right hon. and hon. Members who support the new clause—with one exception, every contributor to this debate so far—want to see police resources used against the kind of crime that our constituents fear. If the Under-Secretary of State has the statistics, I should like him to say how many policemen in London find themselves diverted from fighting real crime to these unsavoury duties of going into gay clubs and hanging round public lavatories, surely one of the most unattactivee duties that any policeman can be called upon to carry out. Our constituents want the bobby on the beat protecting them in their homes and in their neighbourhoods. They do not want the bobby in the basement club or in the public urinal.
The hon. Member for Northampton, North (Mr. Marlow) asked me whether I was satisfied that the new clause would deal with the protection of children. I am not 100 per cent. sure that it does. But that is not at issue. No Opposition can be relied upon or can be asked to draft technically perfect legislation. After all, the Government have tabled 300 amendments for this Report stage, so it is not easy for the Government, with unlimited access to

parliamentary counsel, to draft legislation. What is more, I remind the House that this is the Government's fourth go at the Bill.
We are not saying that the new clause is technically immaculate. It does not have to be. The House can force the Government to act on this issue by voting the new clause into the Bill. Then they can amend it in the House of Lords to make sure that it deals with all these issues.
The Under-Secretary of State is a powerful and attractive advocate. I advise the House not to be beguiled by him. The House has an opportunity to put the new clause into the Bill. If it does that, the Government will have to amend the clause in the House of Lords to meet the preoccupations of the hon. Member for Northampton, North.
The official Opposition will be voting for the new clause. It is clear that other Opposition parties will do so as well. I trust that enough Government supporters will vote for it, too, so that we can deal with an abuse which I believe the nation will no longer tolerate.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. David Mellor): My hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) said that this had been a sober and reasonable debate. So it has been. We must be grateful for the way in which the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Wallace) moved his motion, which he did with considerable clarity and cogency. I believe that our time has been well spent debating these important matters.
In replying to the debate and, I hope, not breaking the spell of sobriety and reasonableness which has been passed across the Chamber and which perhaps is not always the case, I hope that I shall be able to separate out some of the strands in the debate. If I have any criticism to make, it may be that the debate became a little entangled. I believe that we need to be especially clear that we are able to distinguish in our minds between whether we need a law such as that contained in section 32 of the 1956 Act and, if we do, how that can be properly enforced for the benefit of the public, and the techniques that have been described by a number of hon. Members as entrapment or the use of an agent provocateur.
My one criticism of the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland is that he talked about spies and agents provocateurs as though keeping observation and acting as an agent provocateur were the same. They are not, and I hope that by the end of my contribution, which was attractively trailed by the right hon. Member for Manchester, Gorton (Mr. Kaufman) and by which I was properly beguiled, if I have not made any other point clear, I have at least made that one clear. There is no reason to believe that we cannot have on the statute book in an unamended form section 32 of the Sexual Offences Act without leading to the kind of allegations of entrapment about which we have heard a great deal today.
8 pm
It is important to recognise that the new clause seeks to amend only one part of the 1956 Act—section 32—which provides:
It is an offence for a man persistently to solicit or importune in a public place for immoral purposes.
It does not touch upon a number of other offences involving homosexuality — acts of gross indecency, indecent assault and the rest — which also find their place in that Act.
It was not the Government's intention in bringing forward the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill to make changes in the Sexual Offences Act. That was a perfectly right and proper decision for us to take and to which we adhere. As my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds rightly said, that was not the purpose of the Royal Commission either.
However, it is clear that there is a good deal that needs to be looked at in the tangled web of the law on sexual offences. That is being done by the Criminal Law Revision Committee and, plainly, there will come a time when the House will have to look with great care not just at section 32 but at many other parts of the 1956 Act. I cannot properly commend to the House that we should take a piecemeal approach to that difficult matter tonight.
It is important that I make clear the one material change that is made by the Bill to the 1956 Act and the effect that it has on section 32. The power of arrest under section 41 of the Sexual Offences Act so far as it relates to police officers is abolished and clause 22 is substituted. Therefore, the Bill narrows the power of arrest because under clause 22 the police may arrest only if it is impracticable or inappropriate to proceed by way of summons whereas they may exercise their present powers under section 41 whether or not an immediate arrest is necessary. An ordinary citizen's power of arrest remains as already provided for in section 41.
It is crucial to appreciate that in clause 22 and section 32 we are concerned with a public place. I must make it clear from the outset that a private club where homosexuals may gather together is not a public place either for the purpose of section 32 or for the power of arrest under clause 22. Indeed, clause 22(8) makes that perfectly clear. We are dealing with importuning in a public place which often, but not exclusively, means outside public lavatories. We are not dealing with what goes on in private clubs where people who enter know full well that they are going into places to which homosexuals have recourse where an ordinary member of the public who merely feels the need to pass water before he gets home is unlikely to venture.

Mr. Ashby: Is not a public place simply defined as a place to which the public have access? Is it not as simple as that? Most clubs, whether they be termed private or otherwise, are places to which the public generally have access and that means that they are.

Mr. Mellor: The line is drawn at whether any member of the public may enter or whether it is a private club. A private club is unlikely to be a public place. As my hon. Friend knows only too well, just as I do, what is or is not a public place is a question of fact for the court to determine in any case.
We must not be under any illusions in dealing with the narrow point — although the debate has perfectly properly ranged much wider—of whether we need to attach to one section and one section only of the 1956 Act, that relating to importuning in a public place, various rather unusual restrictions on the ability of the police to enforce the law. We have to ask ourselves whether it is appropriate or not to do so in the context that, for the most part, the offence that we are talking about is committed outside public lavatories.

Mr. Kaufman: The hon. Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby) has made an important point which is supported by the Bill. If the hon. Gentleman looks at clause 1(9) he will see that
'public place' means any place to which the public or any section of the public has access, on payment or otherwise".

Mr. Mellor: The right hon. Gentleman will find that later in our proceedings that will be changed, if the House wills, in a way consistent 'with what I have just said.

Mr. Kaufman: I apologise for intervening again. In fact, if we look at the amendments to which the hon. Gentleman refers—I have studied them because we had long debates on them in Committee—they come after that part and are intended, as the hon. Gentleman knows, though not very successfully, to deal with the problem of whether a private garden is a public place. What they do not do is interfere in any way with those two and a bit lines that I have just quoted. They remain as they stand in the Bill.

Mr. Mellor: I said that a private members' club is not a public place, and I adhere to that.
The central part of this debate is the question which the hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland addressed at the outset. He recognised, in a way that subsequent hon. Members have not always done, that there is a need for section 32 and that if members of the public complain about incidents in places of public recourse it is the duty of the police to go in and investigate those complaints and to enforce the law. We must ask ourselves whether, if the new clause were to be enacted, the law could be enforced. It is not necessary for us to go into great detail on whether the law can be enforced only by constables in uniform or only by plain clothes officers. I should have thought that we were better off doing what is the constitutional position and leaving that for the determination of the chief officer of police. That is, after all, part of his day-to-day duties. Part of his job is to determine how the law should be enforced in his district and what officers he should place on which duties. We should be taking a brave step indeed if we were to say that only officers in uniform could enforce this part of the Act. What would be the effect of it? It would not be practicable to enforce the law in that way. I am sorry that I do not have the attention of the principal actors in this drama because it is intended to assist in answering the debate that I make these points.
It is not a practical means of enforcing section 32 of the 1956 Act merely to have it enforced by constables in uniform. As the hon. Gentleman and others have recognised, the effect of a constable in uniform positioning himself outside of a public lavatory which it is alleged is being used for acts of importuning and gross indecency would be to move the problem from one area to another. That may be the right thing to do in some cases, but it may be necessary in others for an arrest to be made and for people to be brought before the courts.
I cannot agree with the right hon. Member for Gorton that the public is not troubled by the matters that we are discussing. A police chief, faced with a great crime wave and serious crime, should not allow half, a quarter, or 20 per cent. of his force to be permanently deployed in one public lavatory. It is certainly no part of my task to suggest that that is a proper way for any chief police officer to police his area.
We have to bear in mind that some people go to public lavatories to use them for the purposes for which the


munificent municipality provided them. If it is impossible for people to do that without being accosted, or seeing acts of gross indecency going on in one corner, I do not believe that it is any part of the public's wish that we should make it impossible for the police to clear that up. I hope that I carry with me a number of hon. Members in making that point.

Sir Anthony Meyer: I am sure that my hon. Friend carries the House with him in what he says about public lavatories, but would he say a little more about clubs, those rather loosely defined institutions, which must be in the minds of many hon. Members today?

Mr. Mellor: No. I shall stick to the venues where section 52 of the 1956 Act is most commonly applied, because that is the subject of the debate.
If we were to say that a chief police officer could enforce this part of the 1956 Act only by stationing a uniformed police officer outside the place about which complaints had been made, I think that he would be unduly handicapped in enforcing the law. In some circumstances only a non-uniformed officer, properly stationed, can properly see and indentify what is going on.
While nobody wants disproportionate amounts of police time to be spent on matters of this kind, if it is necessary, to end a public nuisance about which the public is rightly exercised, for a police officer not in uniform to keep observation in order to make arrests, I believe that that is the price that we are entitled to expect to extract so that the law may be properly enforced, and the public may have confidence that they can use a particular facility, or that their children can use it without the danger of their children being molested. That has nothing to do with homosexual acts in private, but it has everything to do with the fact that I believe that people would want to know whether it was homosexual or heterosexual acts that were going on inside.
Prohibiting in an arbitary way, as the clause proposes, the use of CID officers— and I hope that I carry the House with me on this — I cannot think would be helpful. Indeed, it would undermine the hon. Gentleman's stated intention that, where there is a legitimate public complaint, the law should be enforced.

Ms. Clare Short: The Minister raises the important question of children. Clearly there is no more likelihood that a homosexual man will approach children than there is that a heterosexual man will approach children. Will the Minister help us on this point by saying what other provisions there are in the law to prevent adults from approaching children sexually? It seems wrong, and a smear on homosexuals, to suggest that they have a greater proclivity to approach children than do other adults.

Mr. Mellor: I am sure that the hon. Lady wishes to be fair. I have never suggested that. Indeed, I introduced gratuitously into the debate my recognition of the fact, as any Home Office Minister dealing with such a case is bound to do, that the problem of molestation of children is a homosexual and heterosexual matter. I draw no distinction between the two. They are both serious problems. We must not fall into the temptation of getting so worked up about one or two of the allegations about

entrapment as to be utterly convinced that all the public wants us to do is to make the task of the police impossible in enforcing this part of the 1956 Act. I believe that we would be making a fundamental mistake if we were to do that. I do not take my stand on that.
My only other criticism of what the hon. Gentleman said concerns the proposal that there should be corroboration or, in effect, a move almost to redraft the constituents of the offence by requiring that there had to be a complainant in the matter other than a police officer. I am not sure that the hon. Gentleman would not make it impossible for this part of the law to be enforced. In the nature of things, as long ago as the Wolfenden committee—nearly 30 years ago—it was recognised that persons who are accosted often will not attend court to give evidence. Wherever possible, I hope that the police will ensure that, where a member of the public is approached, or is plainly upset about what he saw, he will be brought before the court to give evidence.
To make it a requirement that in every case that has to happen is not just a suggestion with which I am not prepared to agree — that one cannot rely on police evidence unless it is backed up by somebody else, which I think is an unnecessary slur on our police force, to put it no higher than that—but it also means that there can be no guarantee that the law would be enforced. In the nature of things, the victim of male importuning may well be reluctant to go to court to give evidence, since he puts himself in line with its being suggested by counsel or solicitors that he led the poor innocent defendant on, and he will be subjected to a great deal of rigorous examination about why he felt it necessary to visit that public lavatory at that time.
My hon. Friend the Member for Leicester, East (Mr. Bruinvels), having made a speech against the new clause, told the House that he would vote for it. In saying what I have said, I hope that I have persuaded him that, while there are issues about the quality of policing in this part of the law, it would not be prudent for the House to pass the new clause. This should be done only by those who believe that there is no place on the statute book for section 32. It would hobble section 32, and make it impossible to enforce.

Mr. Parris: My hon. Friend has put forward one possible reason why unsuspecting members of the public who have been importuned by homosexuals may be unwilling to come before the courts to give evidence. May I put forward the suggested alternative reason that such people do not exist in any large number?

Mr. Mellor: My hon. Friend can put it forward, but I do not think that he can seriously expect me to agree with it, and I do not.

Mr. Wallace: On the point raised by the hon. Member for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Paths), is one of the other reasons why it would be difficult to get witnesses to corroborate that, in many cases, people do not consider that they have been victims of a crime? In many of these cases, there are no victims of the crime.

Mr. Mellor: That may be the case, but it is not simply a question of whether somebody is present when a specific incident where A accosts B takes place. It is the fact that there is a general imputation that, in a particular location in a particular area, something is going on that makes


people nervous about using it, and makes them feel that their children are vulnerable. This is particularly so when, as it is often the case, these locations are in parks, recreation grounds and areas to which children go, but a a little away from the highways and byways and therefore suitable for purposes other than those for which the local authority thought it right to provide the facilities in the first place.
It is crucial that one should recognise that there are limits, to which the House has properly drawn attention. It is hoped that chief officers of police will study with great care, as I shall, what has been said in the debate. There is plainly concern on both sides of the House about some of the ways in which it is said the law is being enforced. I stress that that, to my mind, is a separate question to whether we need the law to be effective. If chief officers of police believe that the problem is too bad merely to have a uniformed police officer to go along to frighten people away, and that it requires someone out of uniform passively to observe what is going on and to gather evidence, it seems perfectly proper that he should do so, and a perfectly legitimate tactic for a plain clothes officer to be used in that context, just as in any other.
I deal next with the serious point about entrapment, to which I wish to devote the rest of my speech, in the hope that even those hon. Members to whom my observations so far have brought not much cheer may feel encouraged by what I say. First, we need to define our terms. What do we mean by entrapment, and by agent provocateur? The best possible definition of an agent provocateur was probably given in the Royal Commission on the police report in 1928. In that report, an agent provocateur was defined as a person who entices another to commit an express breach of the law which he would not otherwise have committed, and then proceeds to inform against him in respect of such an offence.
We are dealing with a serious matter because, as is well recognised, there is no defence in English law to a case of entrapment, unlike the situation in some other jurisdictions. Therefore, it is all the more necessary that we ensure, as far as possible, that the police do not employ tactics that could properly be called entrapment or the use of agents provocateurs.
It may be helpful if I rehearse my understanding of the law of entrapment. There is no defence of entrapment known to English law. The fact that a person would not have committed an offence but for the activities of an agent provocateur is no defence in law. A British court will not refuse to admit evidence of an offence on the ground of entrapment and nor will the evidence be refused on a vaguer ground of discretion. If someone has been entrapped. it is the offence—not the evidence of it—which has been unfairly obtained.
However, the crucial point is that, to avoid the injustices that would follow from that, the police must follow the guidelines drawn up by the Home Office. If they fail to do so, they risk censure by the court and criminal liability, as was made clear by Lord Diplock in the leading case of Sang in the House of Lords in 1979, as accessories or for incitement.
I wish to deal with the rules governing the activities of the police. The Home Office guidelines to police forces make it absolutely clear that we have no truck with entrapment and the use of agents provocateurs. They say:
No member of a police force and no public informant should counsel, incite or procure the commission of a crime.

Mr. Martin Stevens: I apologise for not being here for the earlier part of the debate. My hon. Friend's comments are reassuring, but I understand that the rules on entrapment are not observed in every police station in the land. Can my hon. Friend tell us that his rules are uniformly obeyed?

Mr. Mellor: I do not suppose that I could say that of these rules any more than I could say it of others. I am as disturbed as anyone else at the suggestion that the rules are not observed. However, it is clear what we believe the rules should be and we expect chief officers and the police to adhere to them. I shall mention later further arrangements that have been entered into with the Metropolitan police to try to ensure that the rules are adhered to.
My hon. Friend the Member for Fulham (Mr. Stevens) knows that, as so often in this place, merely passing a law or issuing a circular does not solve a problem. It becomes a matter for good management. We do what we can, as do chief officers of police, to ensure that rules are adhered to.

Mr. Ashby: What happens if the rules are not followed? A person is still arrested and goes through the heartbreak of publicity and all the rest that follows, culminating possibly in a trial.

Mr. Mellor: I know that my hon. Friend would not wish to intervene gratuitously, and I thought that I had just dealt with that point by saying that there is no defence of entrapment in English law. That is why it is crucial that we do as much as we can, as we do, to ensure that police forces adhere to the rules that are clearly set out in the Home Office circular. Secondly, careful consideration must be given to the decision to prosecute, which is why I believe that the proposal that we shall shortly be bringing to the House for an independent prosecution system, in which the decision whether to prosecute will be separate from the investigation of offences, will allow certain cases to be weeded out at a crucial point if a prosecutor believes that police tactics have contributed more than they should to an individual's downfall 
However, I stress that that is a matter on which no Minister would want to go further. The enforcement of the law and the decision whether to prosecute are rightly divorced from politics. Long may that be the case.

Mr. Alex Carlile: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that usually it emerges only halfway through a trial that there has been or may have been entrapment? By that point it is much too late, because entrapment is not a defence. The person who has been entrapped stands to be convicted and often is. Are not the cases that cause trouble those in which the police steadfastly deny that there has been entrapment until evidence of it is revealed?

Mr. Mellor: But I am sure that the hon. and learned Gentleman would not want to suggest that every time that entrapment is alleged it has taken place. We all know what people sometimes say when faced with a charge. In certain circumstances, virtually the only course open to someone who wants to deny a charge is to make an allegation against a police officer. The crucial point is that, as far as possible, proper arrangements should be followed so that entrapment does not take place. In the end, there can be no absolute guarantees in this area, any more than in other areas. It is a mistake to think that the problems of


entrapment and the agent provocateur arise only in the context of this sexual offence. To the extent that it is a problem, it covers the system as a whole and only by good management in the police force can one ensure that it is kept to a minimum.

Mr. Kaufman: The hon. Gentleman is doing his best to make the best of a case in which I suspect he does not believe—and that is to his credit. He spoke about what happens when a prosecution takes place, but the problem is that the damage can be done without or before a prosecution and even without a charge. A simple arrest can bring about the sort of destruction that we are discussing.

Mr. Mellor: I fully appreciate that, but the dilemma that I thought that I had put before the House is that there is no way, short of removing this part of the law from the statute book or preventing it from being enforced, that the problem can be prevented. I do not believe that the public feel that would be proper for us effectively to remove this part of the Sexual Offences Act from the statute book.
I hope that I have made it clear that the internal disciplinary arrangements of the police should make it plain that entrapment is wholly contrary to our principles of fairness and justice. Indeed, the Metropolitan police general orders and procedures make those points.
Those orders provide that a plain clothes operation relating to male importuning has to be authorised at area district assistant commissioner level—a very high level. Only experienced officers may take part, the officers involved must be specially instructed on the need for circumspection in carrying out their duties and their attention must be drawn to the requirement that, in general, no person is to be arrested for a section 32 offence solely on the ground of his behaviour towards the officers, though if the behaviour is flagrant arrest may be necessary to put a stop to it. In order to get corroborative evidence, persons importuned should be asked to give their names and addresses and to attend court. Should such assistance be refused, particulars are to be noted in the officer's pocket book and stated in evidence.
We have had discussions with the Metropolitan commissioner about whether the orders should be amended to give further emphasis to the need to avoid action, while on plain clothes duty, that could cause the commission of an offence. Indeed, the commissioner intends to make some amendments to the rules to point out even more clearly that officers deployed on plain clothes duty should never act as agents provocateurs.
I believe that the key to the new clause is to make a clear differentiation between the need for this section of the 1956 Act, the need not to hobble it with restrictions that would be counterproductive and against the public interest and the need to ensure that the law is enforced properly and fairly by a police force which we can all feel confident is acting in accordance with the best traditions and highest standards.
I hope that I make it clear that we deplore the use of agents provacateurs and entrapment as much as anybody else, and we are taking steps to ensure that the police rules state clearly, so that no one can be in any doubt, the dividing line between legitimate tactics to enforce the law and illegitimate ones. On that basis, I urge the House to reject the new clause.

Mr. Maclennan: I regret that the Parliamentary Under-Secretary has not more precisely sensed the mood of the House in this important debate. It is unfortunate that he has not recognised the virtual unanimity of opinion expressed in all the speeches made, with the exception of that made by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths), who spoke openly from a point of view that he has frequently declared to the House.
My hon. Friend the Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr. Wallace) opened the debate, and did so, as the House has acknowledged, with no exaggeration and with a great sensitivity and awareness of the genuine social problem. His speech was followed by those made by the hon. Members for Derbyshire, West (Mr. Parris), for Brigg and Cleethorpes (Mr. Brown), for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby), for Leicester, East (Mr. Bruinvels) and for Clwyd, North-West (Sir A. Meyer), all of whom support the new clause. The Minister has not begun to answer the points made by his hon. Friends.
From the Opposition side of the House, the hon. Members for Birmingham, Ladywood (Ms. Short), for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bell) and for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Smith) and the right hon. Member for Manchester, Ardwick (Mr. Kaufman) all made measured, moderate speeches describing a situation that is commonly acknowledged as unacceptable. It is remarkable that the Minister should seek to persuade the House that a problem acknowledged by every hon. Member who has spoken does not really exist.
The Minister is reflecting the Home Office complacency about the issue of entrapment and agents provocateurs. In his concluding remarks, he sought to persuade us that the Government were attempting to do something about the matter. However, this issue was raised with the Home Secretary, whose presence we finally welcome to the debate, by my right hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) as long ago as 18 October, in connection with a specific problem in a specific part of London—Earls court—where there were alleged cases of entrapment and agents provocateurs. The Home Secretary did not choose to reply to our general inquiries until February. He said what had already been said in a Committee sitting on the Bill, that guidance had been given on entrapment to the police. He did not answer the questions about the factual circumstances which had given rise to the complaints in Earls court, or say what the results of the consultations with the Metropolitan commissioner had been. Tonight we have heard nothing from the junior Minister about the possible changes in practice that might occur as a result of his discussions with the Metropolitan commissioner.
We have been told that the rules are to be changed, but we have not been told in what manner. These are the rules set out in paragraph 1.92 of the consolidated circular to the police on crime, or in the force general orders. I do not know whether the Minister knows in what manner the rules are to be changed, but the House and certainly those hon. Members who have spoken in the debate will take some persuading that it is a defect of the rules that is to blame. The problem is that the rules are not being observed. It is because of that that an amendment to the law is necessary.
The Bill seeks to codify police practice. The Minister's argument was designed to suggest that a new clause such as ours, which deals with a particular problem of police


practice that has given rise to considerable anxiety, and with clear evidence of misdirection of police resources, related to a matter more approriately dealt with in the context of a revision of the law on sexual offences. However, the new clause is not, strictly speaking an attempt to amend the Sexual Offences Act, but one to regulate police behaviour, and that is why it is appropriate to the Bill and why it is not appropriate to wait for the report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee or to postpone to the Greek calends acting upon something with which the Home Office must be familiar.
The Minister also suggested that he was giving us some encouragement and hope that some of our criticisms and concerns would be dealt with by the Government's proposals to establish an independent prosecution system. Has he consulted with the Secretary of State for Scotland to discover whether the existence of an independent prosecution system in Scotland has led to the elimination of all concerns about agents provacateurs and entrapment? That is not my impression. I do not believe the Minister's plea that we should not act on this matter tonight would stand up on that count.

Mr. Martin Stevens: The hon. Gentleman would have been taking me into the Lobby with him but for the requirement in his new clause that the police officers making the section 32 arrest should at all times be in uniform and not in plain clothes. That is an unrealistic proposition and that is why I shall support the Government.

Mr. Maclennan: I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman's support as far as it goes. I hope that he will find it appropriate to vote in favour of the new clause. I acknowledge that it is not necessarily possible for Opposition parties to draft amendments that are entirely apposite to deal with the admitted social evil about which the hon. Gentleman is concerned. The Bill has still to make progress in the other place, and it is possible for the Government to respond to the clear feeling expressed by the House and to amend the terms and the language of it to meet this point and others that have been made. Therefore, I hope that—

Mr. Dennis Skinner: There have been agents provacateurs in the miners' strike for weeks, but the House has not worried about that.

Mr. Maclennan: —the House will, in the absence of stronger arguments than those supplied by the Minister, take this opportunity to vote in favour of the new clause.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The House divided: Ayes 131, Noes 191.

Division No. 296]
[8.39 pm


AYES


Alton, David
Brown, M. (Brigg &amp; Cl'thpes)


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Brown, N. (N'c'tle-u-Tyne E)


Ashby, David
Bruinvels, Peter


Atkinson, N. (Tottenham)
Buchan, Norman


Banks, Tony (Newham NW)
Caborn, Richard


Barron, Kevin
Callaghan, Jim (Heyw'd &amp; M)


Beckett, Mrs Margaret
Campbell-Savours, Dale


Bell, Stuart
Clark, Dr David (S Shields)


Bennett, A. (Dent'n &amp; Red'sh)
Clarke, Thomas


Bermingham, Gerald
Cocks, Rt Hon M. (Bristol S.)


Bidwell, Sydney
Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.


Blair, Anthony
Corbett, Robin


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Cowans, Harry


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Craigen, J. M.





Crowther, Stan
Mackenzie, Rt Hon Gregor


Davies, Ronald (Caerphilly)
Maclennan, Robert


Davis, Terry (B ham, H'ge H'l)
McNamara, Kevin


Deakins, Eric
McTaggart, Robert


Dewar, Donald
Marek, Dr John


Dixon, Donald
Mason, Rt Hon Roy


Dormand, Jack
Maxton, John


Douglas, Dick
Maynard, Miss Joan


Dubs, Alfred
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Dunwoody, Hon Mrs G.
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce


Eadie, Alex
Montgomery, Fergus


Eastham, Ken
Morris, Rt Hon A. (W'shawe)


Evans, John (St. Helens N)
Nellist, David


Fatchett, Derek
Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon


Field, Frank (Birkenhead)
O'Brien, William


Fisher, Mark
O'Neill, Martin


Forrester, John
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley


Foster, Derek
Owen, Rt Hon Dr David


Foulkes, George
Park, George


Fraser, J. (Norwood)
Parris, Matthew


Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald
Parry, Robert


Garrett, W. E.
Patchett, Terry


Golding, John
Pavitt, Laurie


Gould, Bryan
Pike, Peter


Gourlay, Harry
Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)


Hamilton, James (M'well N)
Richardson, Ms Jo


Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)
Roberts, Allan (Bootle)


Hardy, Peter
Robertson, George


Harman, Ms Harriet
Ross, Ernest (Dundee W)


Harrison, Rt Hon Walter
Rowlands, Ted


Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith
Sheerman, Barry


Haynes, Frank
Short, Ms Clare (Ladywood)


Hogg, N. (C'nauld &amp; Kilsyth)
Short, Mrs R.(Whampt'n NE)


Howell, Rt Hon D. (S'heath)
Skinner, Dennis


Howells, Geraint
Smith, C,(Isl'ton S &amp; F'bury)


Hughes, Roy (Newport East)
Smith, Rt Hon J. (M'kl'ds E)


Hughes, Sean (Knowsley S)
Spearing, Nigel


Janner, Hon Greville
Stott, Roger


John, Brynmor
Strang, Gavin


Jones, Barry (Alyn &amp; Deeside)
Thomas, Dafydd (Merioneth)


Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Thomas, Dr R. (Carmarthen)


Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Thompson, J. (Wansbeck)


Kirkwood, Archibald
Torney, Tom


Knight, Gregory (Derby N)
Wainwright, R.


Lambie, David
Wardell, Gareth (Gower)


Lamond, James
Wareing, Robert


Leighton, Ronald
Welsh, Michael


Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Wigley, Dafydd


Lewis, Terence (Worsley)
Winnick, David


Litherland, Robert



Lloyd, Tony (Stretford)
Tellers for the Ayes:


Lofthouse, Geoffrey
Mr. James Wallace and


Loyden, Edward
Mr. Alex Carlile.


McKay, Allen (Penistone)





NOES


Alexander, Richard
Brinton, Tim


Amess, David
Brittan, Rt Hon Leon


Ancram, Michael
Brooke, Hon Peter


Arnold, Tom
Buchanan-Smith, Rt Hon A.


Aspinwall, Jack
Buck, Sir Antony


Atkins, Rt Hon Sir H.
Budgen, Nick


Atkins, Robert (South Ribble)
Burt, Alistair


Atkinson, David (B'm'th E)
Butterfill, John


Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)
Carlisle, John (N Luton)


Baldry, Anthony
Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)


Batiste, Spencer
Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (W'ton S)


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Cash, William


Bellingham, Henry
Chapman, Sydney


Bendall, Vivian
Chope, Christopher


Benyon, William
Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th S'n)


Berry, Sir Anthony
Clark, Dr Michael (Rochford)


Bevan, David Gilroy
Clarke, Rt Hon K. (Rushcliffe)


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Cockeram, Eric


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Colvin, Michael


Bottomley, Peter
Coombs, Simon


Bottomley, Mrs Virginia
Cope, John


Bowden, Gerald (Dulwich)
Cranborne, Viscount


Braine, Sir Bernard
Currie, Mrs Edwina


Brandon-Bravo, Martin
Dorrell, Stephen






Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.
Pollock, Alexander


Dover, Den
Powell, Rt Hon J. E. (S Down)


Durant, Tony
Powell, William (Corby)


Dykes, Hugh
Powley, John


Eggar, Tim
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg


Emery, Sir Peter
Price, Sir David


Eyre, Sir Reginald
Proctor, K. Harvey


Fairbairn, Nicholas
Pym, Rt Hon Francis


Favell, Anthony
Raff an, Keith


Fenner, Mrs Peggy
Renton, Tim


Forman, Nigel
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Freeman, Roger
Ridley, Rt Hon Nicholas


Gardiner, George (Reigate)
Ridsdale, Sir Julian


Garel-Jones, Tristan
Rifkind, Malcolm


Glyn, Dr Alan
Robinson, Mark (N'port W)


Goodlad, Alastair
Roe, Mrs Marion


Gower, Sir Raymond
Rossi, Sir Hugh


Griffiths, E. (B'y St Edm'ds)
Rowe, Andrew


Hamilton, Hon A. (Epsom)
Rumbold, Mrs Angela


Hargreaves, Kenneth
Ryder, Richard


Haselhurst, Alan
Sackville, Hon Thomas


Hind, Kenneth
Sayeed, Jonathan


Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)
Scott, Nicholas


Holland, Sir Philip (Gedling)
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Holt, Richard
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Hordern, Peter
Silvester, Fred


Howard, Michael
Sims, Roger


Howarth, Gerald (Cannock)
Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)


Hunt, David (Wirral)
Soames, Hon Nicholas


Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas
Speller, Tony


Jones, Robert (W Herts)
Spencer, Derek


Knowles, Michael
Stanbrook, Ivor


Lang, Ian
Stern, Michael


Lawrence, Ivan
Stevens, Lewis (Nuneaton)


Lester, Jim
Stevens, Martin (Fulham)


Lewis, Sir Kenneth (Stamf'd)
Stewart, Allan (Eastwood)


Lightbown, David
Stewart, Andrew (Sherwood)


Lilley, Peter
Stradling Thomas, J.


Lloyd, Peter, (Fareham)
Sumberg, David


Lord, Michael
Tapsell, Peter


Luce, Richard
Taylor, John (Solihull)


Lyell, Nicholas
Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)


McCurley, Mrs Anna
Temple-Morris, Peter


MacKay, Andrew (Berkshire)
Terlezki, Stefan


Maclean, David John
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter


Major, John
Thompson, Patrick (N'ich N)


Malone, Gerald
Thorne, Neil (Word S)


Marlow, Antony
Thornton, Malcolm


Marshall, Michael (Arundel)
Thurnham, Peter


Mates, Michael
Tracey, Richard


Mather, Carol
Trotter, Neville


Maude, Hon Francis
Twinn, Dr Ian


Mayhew, Sir Patrick
Vaughan, Sir Gerard


Mellor, David
Wakeham, Rt Hon John


Merchant, Piers
Waller, Gary


Mills, Sir Peter (West Devon)
Ward, John


Mitchell, David (NW Hants)
Wardle, C. (Bexhill)


Moate, Roger
Watson, John


Molyneaux, Rt Hon James
Watts, John


Morris, M. (N'hampton, S)
Wells, Bowen (Hertford)


Morrison, Hon P. (Chester)
Wheeler, John


Moynihan, Hon C.
Whitney, Raymond


Mudd, David
Wiggin, Jerry


Neale, Gerrard
Wolfson, Mark


Needham, Richard
Wood, Timothy


Newton, Tony
Woodcock, Michael


Nicholls, Patrick
Yeo, Tim


Norris, Steven
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Onslow, Cranley
Younger, Rt Hon George


Oppenheim, Philip



Osborn, Sir John
Tellers for the Noes:


Page, John (Harrow W)
Mr. Michael Neubert and


Page, Richard (Herts SW)
Mr. Tim Sainsbury.


Pawsey, James

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 10

EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OTHER THAN CONFESSIONS

'.—(1) If it is represented to the court in any proceedings that any evidence (other than by a confession) proposed to be given by the prosecution was or may have been obtained unlawfully, the court shall not allow the evidence to be given unless—
(a) the prosecution proves to the court beyond reasonable doubt that it was obtained lawfully; or
(b) the court is satisfied that anything unlawfully done in obtaining it was of no material significance in all the circumstances of the case and ought properly to be disregarded; or
(c) the court is satisfied that the overriding interests of justice require it to be given, notwithstanding that it was obtained unlawfully.

(2) For the purposes of this section, evidence shall be treated as having been obtained unlawfully if it was obtained—
(a) in breach of any provision of the Act or of any enactment or rule of law; or
(b) in excess of any power conferred by or obtained under this Act or any other enactment; or
(c) as a result of any material deception in obtaining any power under this Act or any other enactment:. — [Mr. Maclennan.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Maclennan: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Harold Walker): With this it will be convenient to take the following:

New Clause 12

EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN THE COURSE OF IMPROPER SEARCH

'. — (1) Documents or property (including contraband) found as a result of a search of a person or premises conducted by a constable or a person other than a constable who is charged with the duty of investigating offences or charging offenders shall not be given in evidence unless the prosecution prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the search and seizure were conducted under powers provided in this Act or elsewhere by statute which were properly authorised and properly executed.

(2) In deciding whether a power was properly authorised and properly executed the court shall consider the factual basis required for the authorisation or exercise of that power
(a) such consideration will be made de novo and without regard to the decision made by the person who authorised the serach,
(b) such consideration will be made only of the evidence that was available at the time of the authorisation.

(3) Where property or documents are seized by a person acting at the request of the police or other agency with a duty to investigate offences and charge offenders it shall be treated as seized by the police or by such agency, as appropriate.'.

New Clause 13

EXCLUSION OF CONFESSIONS OR ADMISSIONS

'.—(1) A confession or admission shall not be given in evidence except where the prosecution prove to the court beyond a reasonable doubt that
(a) it was made voluntarily and without oppression of the person who made it, and
(b)(i) that in regard to the person who made the confession or admission the rules regarding arrest, detention and interrogation established in this Act or in the codes of practice referred to in section 59 and 60 of this Act, or elsewhere established by law, have been adhered to, or
(ii) that in regard to a child or young person it was made in the presence of a solicitor or in the presence of a person entitled to be informed of the child's or young person's detention under section 51 of this Act.

(2) In any case it shall be lawful to interview a suspect with his written agreement and in the presence of his solicitor and the record of that interview may be given in evidence notwithstanding that it might otherwise be inadmissible under (1) (b) above.

(3) In any case where a confession or an admission has been ruled inadmissible:
(a) it shall not be admissible for any purpose whatsoever at any stage of the trial except for the defence of the person who made the confession or admission, and
(b) any evidence obtained as a result of that confession shall be similarly inadmissible.

(4) In this section "oppression" shall include torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and the use or threat of violence. '.

And the following amendments: No. 181, in clause 69,page 60, line 25, after 'section', insert
'or section (exclusion of confessions or admissions). '.

No. 182, in page 60 line 26 leave out subsections (2) to (7).

No. 183, in page 61, line 6, leave out from 'section' to 'any' in line 8 and insert
'shall render inadmissible evidence of'.

No. 184, in page 61, line 9, leave out lines 9 to 18.

Mr. Maclennan: New clause 10 is designed to give an accused person protection from the use of evidence that is obtained unlawfully—for example, as a result of an unlawful search or consequent upon an excluded confession. It puts on the prosecution the burden of proving that the evidence was obtained lawfully or that any breach of the law in obtaining it was of no material significance — for example, a minor breach in the practice of questioning. There is a residual category that would permit evidence being given, even if obtained unlawfully, if, in the words of new clause 10,
the overriding interests of justice require it to be given".
It is expected that the power would be used only rarely, and in extremely important cases, with a warning duly being given to the jury.
One of the main criticisms levelled against the Bill is that, while at last it provides a statutory code of police powers, it fails to provide any real sanctions against the breach of that code. In theory, three sanctions are available for such breaches—the prosecution of police officers for criminal offences, civil actions against them and disciplinary proceedings against them. In practice, however, none of them is of much avail, because they all need to be initiated by a complainant who is a victim of a breach or by another police officer. Launching such proceedings would involve great risk in terms of time, money and commitment, and possibly fear of victimisation regardless of the outcome.
A far more effective disincentive against infringement of the code would be risk of failure of the very end to which the infringement is made—the outcome of the prosecution. That is achieved in some other jurisdictions by an exclusionary rule. Evidence that is obtained unlawfully is simply excluded at the trial with the result hat the prosecution is likely to fail.
The Home Office has made it clear, in the notes that it has helpfully provided for hon. Members, that the experience of other countries with such exclusionary rules does not
unequivocally show that they are effective in deterring police misconduct.
Indeed, in some such countries experience is worse. An absolute exclusionary rule and the application of a

doctrine that might be described as the fruit of the poisoned tree often result in the acquittal of plainly guilty men. The entire judical system and the laws it tries to administer are therefore brought into disrepute. However, that is no argument against the discretionary exclusionary rule that new clause 10 proposes and under which a court might, but need not, exclude such evidence.
Paragraph 11(10) of the Home Office guide states:
It would be contrary to the interests of justice to exclude relevant evidence solely because it was obtained following a breach of the rules.
It is easy to think of hypothetical cases when that would be so—for example, the discovery of illegal firearms or explosives during a technically unlawful search. At the other end of the spectrum, on a warrant that was obtained by fraud, there might be a malicious and destructive search of premises, occupied by someone who has annoyed the police, which finally reveals only a few milligrarnmes of cannabis. Only the courts are competent to decide what the interests of justice are.
New clause 10 therefore confirms the power of the courts, which they might already enjoy in common law but would be reluctant to use if a new statutory code did not explicitly remind them of it, to allow or exclude evidence that has been obtained unlawfully. In either case, if that is what the interests of justice require, only the courts can be the ultimate judge.
New clause 10 is drawn so that the courts need investigate the matter only if the defence raises it following a similar provision in clause 69(2) on confessions. Unlike the case with confessions, new clause 10 will allow the courts to admit the evidence, notwithstanding the lawfulness of its provenance remaining in doubt, or even if there were proof that it was obtained unlawfully, provided that the unlawfulness was relatively unimportant or that it was overridden by the interests of justice.
The strategic objective of new clause 10 is to reinforce the efforts being undertaken in the police service to teach, encourage and support police compliance with the law by adding a clear disincentive for breaches in addition to the sanctions that I have already mentioned. That would do much to enhance public confidence and support, without which the police cannot, in the long run, perform any of their functions. New clause 10 has the support of, and its drafting was assisted by, Justice, the British branch of the International Commission of Jurists. It has considerable support outside the House, and I hope that it will enjoy a great deal of support inside.

9 pm

Ms. Clare Short: I wish to support this group of amendments and to make it clear to the House that the Opposition's purpose in tabling new clauses 12 and 13 is to tighten up the conditions in which evidence that is obtained from confessions or searches is admitted in court to ensure that all such evidence is properly obtained.
New clause 12 provides that documents or property that is found as a result of a search cannot be used in evidence unless the search was properly authorised. New clause 13 provides that, in any case including evidence of confession or admission, it is necessary to prove that the confession was properly obtained. Amendments Nos. 181 to 184 inclusive seek to amend clause 69 in a similar way and for


a similar purpose. The intention behind the amendments is to ensure that strict rules of what is admissible in court should be used to ensure that the police behave properly in obtaining such evidence.
When we discuss the Bill and the thrust behind it we must be conscious of how malpractice in the past has undermined our liberties. We started, for example, with the original concept that everyone was free and innocent unless clear evidence was brought against him. It was originally thought wrong in law to detain people and question them to obtain evidence. At present, a confession is admissible at common law as an exception to the rule against hearsay evidence because what a person says of his own free will against his own interests is likely to be true.
How far we have moved over the years from that. The police have gradually enlarged the amount of questioning that they undertake and the period for which suspects are detained. The Government are legalising the gradual process of enlargement of police power and malpractice that has continued over the years. They tell us at the same time that they are not enlarging police powers, because those powers already exist.
We hope to achieve, through the amendments, an end to a similar process, when the police break the rules and the code of conduct in the Bill and introduce evidence from confessions that has been wrongly obtained or obtained from searches that were wrongly undertaken.
The amendments are extremely important. They will ensure that the police do not breach the rules but behave properly when they are questioning people and always obtain proper authorisation for a search. If they do not behave properly, the evidence that they obtain will not be admissible in court and, therefore, will be of no use to them. For that reason, I commend the amendments to the House.

Mr. Alex Carlile: We are concerned in this group of amendments and new clauses with two matters: confessions, and evidence obtained as a result of confessions by suspects. I shall deal with both aspects.
Confessions are a very dangerous form of evidence. That has often been held to be the case in court and there are many cases in which confessions have been excluded. There have also been many cases in which confessions have been admitted in evidence, in circumstances that have given rise to great disquiet and that have eventually led to wrongful convictions.
I should like to remind the House of the words of Lord Cooper of Culross, who was Lord Justice-General of Scotland at the time, in the case of R. v. Chalmers, which was reported in the Scottish Law Times of 1954, page 184. He said, in a very pertinent passage that puts confessions into their proper context:
In the eyes of every ordinary citizen the venue … the police station … is a sinister one. When he stands alone in such a place confronted by several police officers, usually some of high rank, the dice are loaded against him, especially as he knows that there is no one to corroborate him as to what exactly occurred during the interrogation, how it was conducted and how long it lasted. If under such circumstances cross-examination is pursued with the result, though perhaps not with the deliberate object of causing him to break down and to condemn himself out of his own mouth, the impropriety of the proceedings cannot be cured by the giving of any number of formal cautions or by the introducution of some officer other than the questioner to record the ultimate statement. The matter may be put another way. The accused cannot be compelled to give evidence at his trial and to

submit to cross-examination. If it were competent for the police at their own hand to subject the accused to interrogation and cross-examination and to adduce evidence of what he said, the prosecution would in effect be making the accused a compellable witness, and laying before the jury at second-hand evidence which could not be adduced at first-hand, even subject to all the precautions which are available for the protection of the accused at a criminal trial.
The dangers that were so well stated by Lord Cooper of Culross in that passage have been shown to exist in numerous cases. Some of them are very well documented. There is the Confait case, which is so well known that I do not need to go into detail. There is the Errol Madden case, which has been well documented by the National Council for Civil Liberties. Apart from those celebrated cases, there are many cases that any lawyer of experience —there are many in the House—will know involved confessions obtained in doubtful circumstances. It is particularly worrying that those confessions are obtained not only in the most serious cases such as the Confait case but in the most minor of cases.
Any solicitor or member of the Bar practising in the criminal field will be able to cite cases from his or her recollection that involve confessions, even in shoplifting or minor offences of assault, that have been obtained in improper circumstances.
In clause 69(2) there are two circumstances in which the court shall not allow the confession to be given in evidence. I am speaking in the broadest terms without going into the fine detail of clause 69(2). The first is oppression and the second is
in consequence of anything said or done which was likely.… to render unreliable any confession".
With regard to oppression, a worrying aspect of the clause is contained in subsection (8). Although "oppression" is not defined exhaustively and exclusively, a definition is given of oppression as including
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or threat of violence (whether or not amounting to torture).
There is a risk—I suggest that it is a serious risk—that the courts will be restrictive in interpreting the meaning of oppression so that they will apply the ejusdem generis rule when they consider what oppression is. In other words, only the items and forms of conduct that fall within the general nature of the list in clause 69(8) will be regarded as oppression. Putting it at its simplest, it looks as if only rare examples of conduct will fall into the category of oppression. We should recognise that most police officers conduct inquiries with impeccable lack of oppression at the very least. Of its very nature, oppression involves deliberate misconduct by the police.
The other test—the test of reliability—is worrying because of its limited scope. It much reduces and dilutes the protection given to the suspect compared to the protection that he receives under the law as it now stands, which excludes any confession that is not voluntary as well as any confession obtained as a result of oppression. In many cases things may be said or done, often quite inadvertently and innocently, by the police officer, which may call the reliability of a confession into question, but which are not so serious as to render the confession unreliable. It is unacceptable for the police, whether acting deliberately or inadvertently, to employ conduct that renders a confession wholly or partly involuntary and be entitled to rely on that confession in whole or in part.
It is distinctly likely that if the test of reliability is introduced, it will have the perverse result that a modest breach of the code of practice of questioning will increase


the likelihood of a confession being admitted in evidence in a serious case because the court is bound to take a proportional view. If there is a modest breach in the code of practice in a minor case, it is likely that the court will exclude the confession, but if there is a modest breach of the code of practice in a serious case the court will not exclude the confession, no doubt employing the logic that a person is less likely to admit a serious case than a minor offence. That logic is false and unacceptable, and it illustrates how dangerous it is to remove the test of voluntariness from the law on admissibility.
Far more protection is needed than is in clause 69. It could be given by the inclusion—I do not understand why the Government will not include it—of the specific test of voluntariness in the Bill. One can think of many examples of the type of conduct involving a modest breach of the code. One might find the case in which the police officer says to the accused in an effort to speed things up, "Look, if you confess, you are in trouble, but you will not be prosecuted. You will get a formal caution". An example of greater misconduct would be the police officer who says to the accused, "Look, we were thinking of bringing your wife in and interviewing her about this, but let's get it over with. If you make a confession, we won't bother to do that". That is the type of case that may result in a confession being admitted, if the clause becomes law, which is not admitted at present.
I now move to the second aspect of the group of new clauses and amendments. New clause 10 deals with evidence which was obtained as a result of an excluded, or partly excluded, confession. Clause 69(5) provides that even if a confession is so badly tainted that it is excluded altogether, it will not mean that evidence obtained as a result of that confession is inadmissible. That means that if a police officer—I hasten to emphasise that it is rare, but it has happened—beats up a suspect in a cell, leaves him bleeding on the floor, but as a result obtains a confession that includes material evidence, either against the accused or the suspect, about where to find the weapon, or material information against others, the police will be allowed to rely on it, as will the prosecution. That forms one of the most ugly and threatening aspects of the Bill. Evidence which is so tainted as to be excluded by the court on the grounds of, for example,
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or threat of violence (whether or not amounting to torture)
will nevertheless be evidence which can be admitted in court.
I ask the House to take the view that new clause 10 represents a reasonable compromise between an absolute exclusionary rule—I agree with what my hon. Friend said about the difficulty of introducting that—and no exclusionary rule.

Mr. Bermingham: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that the only way to discipline the collection of evidence is to have an exclusion rule? If the police or the investigating authorities know that evidence wrongly obtained or collected will not be admitted, there is no point in their committing the wrong to collect it.

Mr. Carlile: I agree with the hon. Gentleman to some extent. My instinct—this will be apparent from some of the amendments I have put down—as a Liberal is to say that if the police misbehave to such an extent that the

evidence that they obtain is tainted, it should be excluded altogether. However, my instinct as a Liberal, and as an ally of my hon. Friend the Member for Caithness and Sutherland (Mr. Maclennan), is coloured by my instinct as a lawyer. The result of putting together my instincts as a Liberal and as a lawyer—so that I become a Liberal lawyer—leads me to the conclusion that it is probably going too far to have a completely exclusionary rule.
I am led to believe that new clause 10, which was drafted with the assistance of members of the International Commission of Jurists and of Justice, has considerable support not only in the House, but in the other place, among some distinguished lawyers, and among others outside the House. I invite the Home Secretary and his Ministers who are here tonight to consider the new clause carefully before rejecting it out of hand and to consider whether a Government amendment might be introduced in the other place to give effect to the spirit of the new clause.

Mr. Ivan Lawrence (Burton): I have considerable difficulty with this matter, and some sympathy with the mover of the new clause and with those who introduced the amendments. Britain has always had a rule that, with the exception of confessions obtained by pressure or trickery, or where prejudice outweighs the probative value of evidence, evidence unfairly obtained cannot be excluded. In other words, evidence is evidence, however it comes to light. The important question is always whether that evidence is true. The question now is whether the time has come to change that fundamental rule. Perhaps the discretionary way, which is a halfway house between what we now have and what is practised in the United States, should replace the existing rules.
I will say, for the benefit of advocates of the new clause, that the judges seem not too happy with the present position. The case of Sang, which my hon. Friend the Minister mentioned, reveals a lack of firmness about the judicial belief in the value of continuing this rule. Lord Scarman said that if three Lord Chief Justices did not seem to think that the rule was completely good, their views should not be rejected lightly. The three Lord Chief Justices were Lord Chief justice Goddard, followed by Lord Chief Justice Parker; followed in turn by Lord Chief Justice Widgery. One of Lord Chief Justice Widgery's utterances was frowned upon by the higher court, but it shows how some of the senior judges felt. The following is the frowned-upon quotation from the case of Jeffries v.Black in 1978, as reported in 66 Criminal Appeal Reports:
It was open to Justices to apply their discretion and to decline to allow evidence to be given if it had been obtained by police officers by trickery, oppressive conduct, unfairly or as a result of behaviour which was morally reprehensible.
The higher court said that that was not the law. However, Lord Chief Justice Widgery was merely repeating what had been said by two earlier Lord Chief Justices.
In the case of Sang, Lord Diplock and Lord Dilhorne took a very firm line on the exclusionary rule, hut Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, Lord Scarman and Lord Salmon appeared to be rather less firm in their commitment to it and struggled a little to find ways of reconciling conflict. However, the fact that senior judges are less happy than they may have been before with the whole concept of the exclusionary law does not, of course, mean that we must change the rules.
I shall outline why I believe that the time has not yet come to make such changes. First, the public interest in


finding out the truth in litigation or criminal matters is more important than how the evidence is obtained. I agree that if the important thing is to "play the game, old boy", there are often grounds for excluding evidence that would otherwise be admissible. The effect of making exclusionary rules more widespread than we already have them in their limited form would undoubtedly be to let more villains go than at present happens under the quite difficult procedures that I frequently use for support in court.

Mr. Alex Carlile: The hon. and learned Gentleman has spoken about the existing limited exclusionary rule, but is he really saying that he accepts the further limitation of the existing rule by what is contained in the clause? Does he accept that that is the reality of removing the concept of voluntariness from the law?

Mr. Lawrence: I do not accept that. No doubt my hon. Friend the Minister will answer the point that was made so eloquently by the hon. and learned Gentleman when he spoke before. I do not wholly accept that that is weakening the protection that the individual has under the existing law. However, I shall not be sidetracked. I shall leave it to my hon. Friend the Minister to reply rather more authoritatively and specifically to that point.
The public interest, as balanced between what is fair play, old boy or old girl, and finding out the truth of a man's innocence or guilt, comes down fairly and squarely on the side of truth.
Secondly, if we have yet another obstacle that the prosecution has to clamber over in a criminal trial, it will result in the acquittal of more guilty people than at present. I say that not just because in the odd case the only evidence admissible in court is that which would otherwise be excluded under even this discretionary rule, but because such obstacles delay the process of criminal trials.
There are trials within trials which delay the procedure. One of the objects of the latest reforms in criminal trial procedure is to try to reduce the incidence of trials within trials. To plug the same disc once again, I hope that we rapidly reach a situation in which tape-recorded interviews with suspects are the only acceptable way of introducing confessions in court.

Ms. Clare Short: Will the hon. and learned Gentleman give way?

Mr. Lawrence: If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I shall not give way as I do not wish to go beyond the time that has been broadly agreed for this debate. The delays and expense already involved should not be increased, because the end of delay is injustice.
Thirdly, if an exclusionary order is to be discretionary, it cannot be argued that it will act as a disciplinary element against the police. In this sphere, only if punishment is certain can one conclude that the police will be deterred. The Royal Commission's consideration of the American experience and the views of the Supreme Court about the effect even of a total exclusionary rule as a means of discouraging the police from breaking the rules show that there is even more merit in the argument than perhaps I have been able to adduce.
My fourth reason for resisting the proposal is that I believe that there is already sufficient protection against

abuse. There is the criminal law, by which a dishonest police officer may be deterred or eventually brought to book. There are disciplinary rules. There is also the civil law. Above all—I speak here with some experience in the courts — the jury provides protection against the unfair adducing of evidence. Even in my limited practice, there have been cases in which the only real explanation for the jury's verdict, when all the evidence suggested guilt, was that the jury did not want justice done in that way. The strongest justification for my contention that the present rule provides sufficient protection is the protection provided by the jury.
Fifthly, if the law is to be changed, even in this limited way, it would have to be proved that a great deal of good would result. I believe that the contrary is the case. Paragraph 4.125 of the Royal Commission report states:
Only a minority of those who are, for example, stopped and searched by the police are arrested, and a sizeable minority of those whose property is searched are not charged. Of persons arrested a significant proportion is not subsequently prosecuted. The overwhelming majority of those prosecuted plead guilty. And only a proportion of those who contest their cases challenge the legality of the police exercise of their powers.
In the view of the Royal Commission there is insufficient justification for any significant change, and in my view there is no justification even for the change now proposed.
Sixthly, the United States experience has not been particularly happy. The Supreme Court and judges lower down have complained for many years about the exclusionary principle, which was introduced and is maintained because there are two substantial defects in the United States criminal law system. First, the police are often biased, and admit it. Secondly, in many states judges are elected, so they are often ignorant of the law. Unless the individual is protected by some very strong rules, such as the exclusionary provisions, there will be precious little left of the liberty of the individual in some states of the USA. That is the general point made to us whenever we speak to very senior judges.
Those are six reasons why, although I have some hesitation, I still think that the time is not yet right for changes in even the modest way proposed. The case has not been made for such change. As a Conservative lawyer —and I pit myself against the Liberal lawyer, the hon. Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile)—I believe that before we make changes in fundamental principles of English law, a stronger case has to be made than has been presented to the House today.

Mr. Bermingham: It is for exactly the reasons that we have heard from the hon. and learned Members for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile) and for Burton (Mr. Lawrence) that we should take off our political hats and put on lawyers' caps when we talk about the value of evidence in the courts. For far too long there has been an almost laissez-faire approach in the court system. They say, "We know that it should not have happened. We know that the accused man should not have been hit. He should not have been kept at the police station for X number of hours. He should not have been told that his wife would be locked up. We know that that should not have happened, but we shall admit." We hear about the man who has been kept in the detention room for hour after hour. The police search his home. They get other evidence, which normally would not have been obtained if it had not been for the treatment that he received.
Regrettably it has often been the excuse of the faint-hearted that this is not the time. But there comes a time when someone has to say that, if we are to have a system of justice worth having, the evidence that comes before our courts, whether by way of confession, document discovered or item recovered, should be untainted. That is the only way that we can have a system of justice in which there is full confidence and for which there is respect.
It has a secondary effect. A police officer investigating a crime or interrogating a suspect knows that if he does not keep to the rules all his efforts will go for nought, and that is the finest incentive to keep the rules. It would sometimes pay civil servants and other who advise Governments and those who practise in the courts to speak to police officers 'doing the job at the "coal face" of investigations. Those police officers would admit that there was no mileage or credit in trying to break the rules.
If a police officer knows that the only credit for him is that of a conviction, that is the incentive that will drive him on. Unfortunately, in recent years that has been the incentive. Public opinion has said that we must get convictions. People are prepared to let standards drop because there is this great fear in society that one guilty man may get off unless we allow the rules to be broken. That is the wrong way of considering these matters. There was a time when we said that it was better for 10 to go scot free than for one innocent man to be convicted. It is about time that we began thinking again about the innocent man.
For those who have had the job of going into police stations night after night—and having done it so often in the past I ought to declare an interest, although it is probably well known—they are places of oppression and pressure. It is important that people who have been arrested are at least surrounded by some air of responsibility and some aura that the main aim is that all procedures will be carried out according to the book. That is all we ask.

Mr. Greg Knight: Is not it also the case that the danger is not just from the officer who acts unlawfully to the extent of using physical violence against the suspect but very often the officer who just wants to cut a few corners? In many instances pressure is applied in a much more subtle way. For example, an accused person might be told that if he signs a statement and makes a confession he can have bail and go home to his wife and family immediately. Is not that the sort of subtle pressure that can often render a confession unreliable?

Mr. Bermingham: I am grateful for that intervention, because what the hon. Gentleman says is so true. That is what I call covert pressure rather than overt pressure, which is the thump round the back of the earhole which, regrettably, we have all known to happen in police stations. The covert pressure is often the inducement that if there is no confession the wife will have to be brought in and then the kids will have to go into care. Indeed, one police officer was daft enough to say that in my presence, but a timely intervention on my part destroyed that threat. However, lawyers are often not there in the early hours of the morning.

Mr. Lawrence: What relevance does that have to the new clauses and amendments? Under the existing law if

any pressure has been applied it is a matter that is raised by the judge, and, in his discretion, he can exclude the evidence.

Mr. Bermingham: The hon. and learned Gentleman is technically right but he mentions the word that is at the heart of the problem—discretion. New clause 13 says that there should be total exclusion if there is any pressure. There is no discretion. That is the principle behind what we seek to do tonight. I hope that the hon. and learned Gentleman will do me the courtesy of listening to the answer to his question. He is well learned in these matters and he will no doubt have experience, as many in the courts have, of that sinking feeling that the confession which seeks to damn a client has been obtained by covert pressure, as described by the hon. Member for Derby, North (Mr. Knight) in his intervention. Because of the discretionary rule, the discretion often falls against one's client and the matter is admitted. In those circumstances, justice is not always served.
If new clause 13 became law there would be an absolute prohibition on the admission of evidence obtained in contravention of the rules. That would have two effects. It would cut down the problems in the courtrooms. Everybody would know that improperly obtained evidence was not admissible. It would also act as a disciplining factor upon those whose job it is to collate and collect the evidence. Above all else, at the end of the day, we would not have cases such as the Confait case and others of wrongful conviction that have bedevilled the country over the past 20 or 30 years.
One can ask simply why there seems to have been a correlation between the failure to enforce the judges' rules of old and the increasing weakness of the judiciary on the question of admissibility of evidence that has allowed an increasing amount of evidence which, in the past, would have been excluded to be included. At the same time it has resulted in a number of cases where there have clearly been miscarriages of justice. The old expression that it is better to let 10 guilty men go free than one innocent man rot in gaol had a lot of merit in it and it is the philosophy that lies behind the amendment standing in my name and those of my hon. Friends. Justice is too precious a creature to be tampered with. It is too precious a creature to be lazy with. It merits and demands absolute values and absolute values demand absolute propriety in the way we collect and collate our evidence. That is why I commend the new clauses to the House.

Mr. Mellor: I am glad to have the opportunity of replying to the debate. If I do so in fairly short order I hope that I may be forgiven. I admire the ingenuity of those who reworked fairly well-mined ground in bringing forward these new clauses but we properly spent a number of sittings in Committee on what are serious and important matters. I refer hon. Members who are interested in my views to the minutes of the Committee proceedings.
This has been a lively debate. I am particlarly glad to see the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery (Mr. Carlile) in his seat. I warmly congratulate him on his well-deserved honour of becoming one of Her Majesty's counsel. It was diverting to sit back and listen to the duel of the titans between the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Burton (Mr. Lawrence), proving, as if we needed proof, why lawyers are not always regarded as a wholly good thing in the House of Commons.
The hon. and learned Member for Montgomery spoke about the need to keep these matters under consideration. We certainly do that. This is not a matter on which anybody wishes to be dogmatic. It is a matter of severe practicality, and a matter in which opinions vary in the different jurisdictions of the world. It is one in which I think the debates in the House of Lords, in which senior judiciaries will have the chance to play a part, will be particularly interesting. Nothing has happened this evening to lead me to think that we have not drawn the line in the right place. The matter concerns us sufficiently to be very interested in what is said in the other place.
It has to be borne in mind that, with the exception of the law on confession evidence, it has always been a principle in English law that evidence is evidence, and that the question of the weight to be attached to the evidence is one for the jury. The judge's job, as Lord Diplock made only too clear in the case of Sang, is to determine what use the prosecution may make of the evidence, not whether the evidence should be before the jury. We must have regard to the fact that anyone in a case who takes exception to evidence, and who argues that the evidence was improperly obtained, or that weight should not thereby, or for some other reason, be given to it, has the perfect opportunity to put that case to the jury with the expectation that, if it is credible, the jury will not be satisfied to the standard of proof required. It is that that gives me pause in thinking that we need to have a compelling case before we widen the exclusionary rule from confession evidence to evidence generally. We shall be interested to see what happens in the debate in the other place.
I do not belittle new clause 10, because I know the pedigree that the hon. and learned Member for Montgomery asserts for it, even though, of course, it would have been more than adequate if he said that he had dreamt it up in his bath. However, the fact that it comes from Justice behoves one to make obeisance in that direction.
As to what has been said on confessions, the hon. and learned Gentleman may have been a little hard in what he said about clause 69. We are proud of clause 69. We believe that it represents a major simplification and improvement in the entangled law on confessions. The hon. and learned Gentleman was talking about his Liberal conscience. He is obviously a Conservative to the extent that he cleaves to long-established things. His affection and enthusiasm for the old rule on voluntariness is moving in the extreme. The fact is that it is because the law on the admissibility of confessions has been widely regarded as being so unsatisfactory, and because particular problems have attached to the concept of voluntariness, that the Criminal Law Revision Committee and others took the view that the law needed a thorough overhaul.
The Criminal Law Revision Committee, not a thurible vessel, like Home Office Ministers, determined that the appropriate concept to be introduced was the concept of unreliability. That is, as it were, the flag that we have run up, believing, I hope rightly, that we are doing so in accordance with the best judicial view of what is the appropriate test to be applied in what is one of the most difficult areas with which the courts have to deal. Confessions can be the best evidence. If somebody makes an admission, there is no stronger evidence, if it is a proper and valid admission, that anyone could want. It

conclusively settles the matter. However, if the admission is extracted by improper means, it becomes some of the most dangerous evidence of all. That is why we have always had in our law arrangements to take great care over confessions.
I believe that clause 69 is a major step forward in improving and clarifying the law and I am glad to have been given the opportunity to reassert my confidence in that clause. I do not believe that the new clauses would be an improvement; indeed, new clause 13 would reinsert some of the confusion that we have sought to purge.
We shall wait with interest to hear what is said in another place, but I believe that the Bill should leave this House in the form in which it emerged from Committee.

Question put and negatived.

New clause 14

ADDITIONAL RIGHTS FOR YOUNG PEOPLE DURING SEARCHING

'(1) The clothing of an arrested juvenile who is searched in accordance with section 48 of this Act may only be removed without the appropriate consent if an officer of at least the rank of superintendent authorises it.

(2) An officer may give an authorisation under subsection (1) above if he has grounds for believing that the arrested juvenile may have concealed on himself an article which:
(i) could be used to cause physical injury to himself or others; or
(ii) might be evidence of the offence for which he has been arrested.

(3) The clothing of an arrested juvenile may only be removed in the presence of a person required to be informed of his detention under section 51 of this Act, or in their absence another adult who is not a police officer, save where the arrested juvenile specifically requests that this be done in private.'. — [Mr. Corbett.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Corbett: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Speaker: With this we may take new clause 15—

ADDITIONAL RIGHTS FOR ARRESTED JUVENILES WHO MAY BE INTIMATELY SEARCHED

'(1) An intimate search of an arrested juvenile may only be carried out in accordance with section 49 of this Act and
(a) by way of examination by a registered medical practitioner; and
(b) in the presence of any person required to be informed of his detention under section 51 of this Act, or in their absence another adult who is not a police officer, save where the young person specifically requests that the intimate search be carried out in private.

(2) Nothing in this Act shall permit the intimate search of a young person who has not attained the age of 14 years.'.

Mr. Corbett: This is our first opportunity on Report to consider juveniles. As the report of the Royal Commission on criminal procedure in 1981 made clear, a fairly large percentage of children and young people of 16 or under are involved in criminal offences. The report said that 36 per cent. of those found guilty of, or cautioned for, indictable offences in 1978 were children of 16 or under.
The report recognised the special position of juveniles and said:
The Administrative Directions provide that juveniles should so far as practicable be interviewed only in the presence of an adult who should be one of their parents if possible.
It made some other important points and said:


a parent has a right to know where his child is and to be with his child during an interview.
It added
It is, in our view, essential that a juvenile should have an adult present other than the police, when he is interviewed and it is highly desirable that the adult should be someone in whom the juvenile has confidence, his parent or guardian, or someone else he knows, a social worker or school teacher.
It is particularly important to note that the report said that juveniles
may need the support of an adult presence; of someone to befriend, advise and assist them to make their decisions.
Clause 48, which the new clauses seek to amend, provides for the searches of juveniles in what I still regard as the curious category of detained persons —children and young people aged between 10 and 16. Clause 48(7) provides that where property is seized as a result of a search the person concerned should
be told the reason for the seizure unless he is incapable of understanding what is said to him".
That may apply to some juveniles because of their fear or apprehension about what is happening and the circumstances in which the search takes place.
The new clauses have been tabled against the background of a general attempt to underline and strengthen the role of parents in exercising responsibility for their children. The Children's Legal Centre kindly reminded us that during consideration of the Criminal Justice Bill in another place Lord Trefgarne said for the Government:
The family is the first and foremost influence for good or ill on a child's development. It is of the highest importance that parents exercise their influence for good. They must be supported in this by law. The responsibility which parents have is one of the weightiest of the citizen." —[Official Report, House of Lords, 28 June 1982; Vol. 432, c. 99.]
The House would be well advised to keep that in mind when considering these two clauses.
New clause 14 seeks to get the approval of a senior police officer before a juvenile is searched. We have made it clear that far too many juveniles are regrettably involved in criminal offences, but we do not want to do anything to make that situation any more terrifying than it often will be for a juvenile, or to assist in any way in so conducting searches that we make a contribution to criminalising what are, after all, children. Every effort should be made to divert and discourage juveniles caught up in this process from criminality and being involved in crime, often at the behest of adults, rather than to terrify them in a way likely to encourage them to go further down this slippery slope.
We are seeking to provide that, when it is decided that clothing should be removed, it will be done only in the presence of a parent or guardian or another adult if the parent or guardian is not available—we must provide for that circumstance—and the other adult must not be a police officer. This must make sense for juveniles because in any circumstances—this is true for adults as well—the process of being stripped in a police station must of necessity be a humiliating experience except for the most hardened and persistent criminals. The Bill should not go out of its way to add to that feeling and to top it up with a sense of shame, because that is not a proper way to go through the process of ascertaining whether somebody should be charged, or, if charged, whether that charge should be proceeded with.
New clause 15 concerns body searches, which are what the Royal Commission on criminal procedure called
very serious intrusions upon the person".

That might rate as the understatement of the decade. The same point applies in favour of this new clause As those of us who were able to serve on the Committee know, this matter was of particular concern to the National Association of Probation Officers, which has some experience of these matters, although it was not alone in raising this subject.
New clause 15 seeks to provide that, when initmate searches are carried out, it should not be done unless there is present a parent or guardian, or if they are not available another person who is not a police officer. We are talking here about circumstances that are distasteful—this view must be shared by all hon. Members. It will be possible in certain circumstances for the most intimate body searches to be carried out on children of 10 or 11, both boys and girls. Those of us who have some respect far the commonly held view that we are a civilised society, are proud of that, and like it to be known should be cautious about even considering these intimate searches to be carried out in the first place, but if they have to be done the arguments about straight searches are reinforced and underlined by the circumstances, in which, as the Royal Commission said, the support of a parent or guardian or of an adult known to the juvenile is all the more important.
We are trying in the new clauses to do two things. The first is, in difficult circumstances, to deal as sensitively as possible with people who are still children and who are, at that stage of the process, entitled to be regarded as innocent children, because they have not yet appeared before the court. It behoves us to be doubly careful and cautious about the way in which innocent children are dealt with when they have to be searched or when intimate body searches have to be carried out.

Mr. Hurd: The hon. Gentleman is quite right to say that when the Bill deals with the question of the treatment of juveniles and younger children we must tread very carefully. I share his concern that adequate protection should be given to juveniles in police custody. I believe that, in various ways, the Bill and the codes of practice will achieve that aim.
I am not happy about either new clause 14 or new clause 15. After our discussions in Committee, the hon. Gentleman will not be surprised to hear that. New clause 14 is not practicable. It would require the authority of a superintendent before clothing could be removed. A superintendent would have to be permanently on hand at each police station to endorse the custody officer's decision to get a 16-year-old to take his jacket off. Whether or not a search is necessary and, if so, how thorough it should be, are bread-and-butter decisions for the custody officer. They are his responsibility. It is only when the question of an intimate search arises that a superintendent needs to be consulted. The Bill draws the line there, for obvious reasons.
I wonder whether, on reflection, the hon. Gentleman would believe it to be right or practicable to require that a search involving the removal of clothing should take place only in the presence of a parent or other responsible adult, unless the juvenile concerned agrees to the contrary. Under clause 51 of the Bill and paragraph 3.6 of the latest draft of the code of practice for the detention of persons, it is required that the parent or guardian of a juvenile who is arrested should be informed of the fact as soon as possible and asked to go to the police station. However, that may take some time. In the real world, parents may


be at work, or perhaps they cannot be bothered to go. The police then have to get in touch with the social services department or some other responsible adult. That is right, but it takes time. Is it reasonable to expect the police to refrain from searching a juvenile who has a record of violence and may be known to have the habit of carrying a knife, until an independent adult can be found?

Mr. Corbett: I hope that the Minister has made a slip of the tongue. At the stage of the process that we are considering the juvenile is entitled to be presumed innocent with regard to the matter on which he is being held, whatever the record may show.

Mr. Hurd: Exactly, but that is not a reason why he should not be searched for a knife. I have not assumed that the juvenile is guilty or could be deemed to be guilty. That is not in question.
The new clause does not distinguish between strip searches and searches involving only the removal of outer clothing. That is a real distinction which is catered for in annex A of the latest draft of the detention code, which says:
A strip search—a search involving the removal of more than outer clothing—may take place only if this is thought by the custody officer to be necessary to remove an article which the detained person would not be allowed to keep".
That is a general provision — it does not apply specifically to juveniles. Paragraph 7 requires a record to be made. That latest provision of the draft code strengthens the safeguards of earlier ones and provides a reasonable distinction between outer clothing and what is called strip seaching. That is helpful to the hon. Gentleman, with his anxiety for juveniles.
I agree with the hon. Gentleman's choice of words in new clause 15—

It being Ten o'clock, the debate stood adjourned.

BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Ordered,
That, at this day's sitting, the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill may be proceeded with, though opposed, until any hour. —[Mr. Major.]

Police and Criminal Evidence Bill

As amended (in the Standing Committee), again considered.

Question again proposed,-That the clause be read a Second time.

Mr. Hurd: It is right to be doubly careful and cautious when dealing with intimate body searches. When dealing with the subject, however, the House should be reminded of what we propose for intimate body search. We propose — it is controversial on the Government side of the House—that an officer may give authorisation only if he has reasonable grounds for believing that the person to be searched might have concealed on him an article which could be used to cause physical injury to himself or others and which might be so used while he is in police detention or in the custody of the court and that cannot be found

without an intimate search. We have narrowed down the possibility of an intimate body search to cases when it is necessary to avert tragedy in a police station. We must remember the extremely narrow scope of the proposed power.
New clause 15 would require any intimate search of juveniles to be carried out by doctors. We have repeatedly made it clear that we hope that all intimate searches, whatever the age of the person concerned, will be carried out by a doctor. There are occasions, however, when such searches must be carried out. If no one else can or will undertake it and a doctor is not present, cannot be found or is unwilling to undertake it, it must still be done. I am afraid that that remains the case whatever the age of the person concerned. If we imposed a rigid rule that required all searches of juveniles to be performed by a doctor and thus drew a distinction between juveniles and others, there would be an incentive to use juveniles for precisely the purpose that we are trying to avoid.
The second element of new clause 15 is a requirement that intimate searches of juveniles should take place in the presence of a parent or other responsible adult. I refer the hon. Gentleman who, like the rest of us, is trying to think his way carefully and conscientiously through the problem, to paragraph 3 of annexe A of the draft code on detention which provides that:
An intimate search of an arrested juvenile may take place only in the presence of the appropriate adult of the same sex".
We believe that that is right and that the code is the right place to state such a requirement. Indeed, it goes rather further than the provision which the hon. Gentleman has in mind, which gives the juvenile a veto.
New clause 15 also forbids in all circumstances the intimate search of a child under 14. We discussed the matter in Committee. The hon. Gentleman obviously feels strongly about it and has brought the matter up again today. That is his right. I hope that it will never be necessary to undertake an intimate body search of a child under 14. I cannot think of a case of it being necessary.
The hon. Gentleman asked whether we lived in a civilised society. Some of us hope that we do, but, whether or not it is civilised, our society is besieged and undermined by terrorism. Unfortunately, there can be no guarantee that wicked men such as terrorists will not use children, precisely because of the greater protection and consideration that children rightly receive. It would not be sensible to recommend to the House a provision saying that under no circumstances should there be an intimate search of a child, even of those years, bearing in mind that we are referring only to intimate searches that are absolutely necessary to avert some terrible tragedy in a police station.
For those reasons, while I sympathise very much with the motives that led the hon. Gentleman to table the new clauses, I must draw his attention to the Bill's provisions and to the limits, particularly in clause 49 and in annexe A of the draft code of detention. Taken together, those measures provide reasonable protection. They go as far as we can in the very imperfect and sometimes tragic world in which we live.

Question put and negatived.

New Clause 16

ABOLITION OF COMMON LAW POWERS WHEN STATUTORY POWERS COME INTO FORCE

'(1) Any rule of common law which authorises a police constable to exercise a power in circumstances which are in substance the same as circumstances in which a particular power is given to a constable by this Act shall be abolished.

(2) Any such common law rule shall cease to apply on the date when the section of this Act creating a power applicable in the same circumstances as the rule comes into force.'.—[Mr. Bell.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Bell: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I am grateful for the opportunity to move the new clause, especially as we have had stimulating debates in Committee on the common law and statutory powers. I refer the Minister, if he needs to be reminded of it, to the 23rd sitting of Standing Committee E, when we discussed the powers of citizen's arrest and whether that was being abrogated by the Bill or whether we could abrogate the citizen's power of arrest. I do not want to repeat our interesting and stimulating discussion in its entirety, but it was indicative of our difficulties when dealing with the common law in relation to statute.
The Government, during our 59 sittings in Committee, consistently said that they were simply codifying the common law. The Opposition said, and I repeat, that, if that were so, why could we not codify the common law in the Bill by accepting new clause 16? If the Government believe that we are putting on to the statute book laws that have existed for many years as part of the common law, it is right and proper for them to say so. New clause 16 would then go to the heart of the matter.
The Government introduced new clause 6, which tackled a small area of police powers. They propose to abolish the statutory or common law powers relating to personal or intimate body searches at a police station. That is a rather limited approach, which arose specifically from our challenges in Committee during debates on clauses 48 and 49. We believe that the common law, if we are referring to it in relation to the Bill, should be generalised and put on the statute book.
New clause 16 is intended to deal with powers that exist in common law and to make clear that, where there is an overlap, the Bill should prevail. The areas that we believe would be affected include the circumstances of an arrest, with the requirement that a person must be told that he is being arrested and the reason for it, the extent to which he can be searched when arrested and the extent to which premises where he is or where he lives can be searched.
The codification of the common law in the statute would cover the seizure of property belonging to innocent third parties or where no arrest is made, as well as the power to stop a vehicle—that is, the power to set up road checks. We discussed the relevant clause earlier this evening.
Clause 4 sets out for the first time the circumstances in which the police may stop vehicles by means of a road check. We believe that the common law power to stop vehicles at a road check is limited to when the police are

looking for a person who is unlawfully at large. The Minister referred to the public order aspects of the common law, but that common law right has been extended to cover a variety of other reasons why a road check should be set up—notably a search for a witness or for those who might commit a crime, and a search in areas that might be subject to a crime wave at a certain time. In such circumstances. the setting up of a road check would be sensible. That shows the extension of the common law rather than its codification.
The aim of our amendment is clearly to set and define the limits under which the statute and the common law will be abrogated and substituted. We felt that the criteria under which we have been operating, certainly in relation to clause 4, were too wide. We have criticised the random setting up of road blocks in most inner city areas at any time.
The new clause, which seeks to abolish common law powers, imposes a restriction on the powers of the police. We seek to redefine them in the law, so that there are no difficulties in interpretation. There was a difficulty in interpretation when we dealt with road checks. It was said that the road blocks set up by the police in the Dartford tunnel episode had been set up not in relation to the common law powers as they might relate to the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill but in relation to the Public Order Act. The Minister nods. That must be the right approach by the Government to this matter and the right interpretation. When those road blocks were set up, we were not fully aware of the legal situation.
Earlier in the debate I quoted the Attorney-General, who gave rulings on the common law relating to the setting up of road blocks by the police. I also quoted from the appeal court, which was slightly different. That quotation highlighted the difficulties in which we find ourselves with a Bill which seeks to clarify and define the law, but which, in the end, simply confuses it.
Therefore, the clause is important for the citizen, so that he knows exactly what his rights are and how they are to be defined. I referred to the report of the Royal Commission on criminal procedure. The Government took as their starting point in their Green Paper the need to safeguard fundamental human rights. We are still discussing the safeguarding of human rights today. We believe that through our new clause we are assisting in the safeguarding of those fundamental human rights. If the Government believe that these clauses are related to the common law, I cannot see why they would not wish to accept new clause 16.

Mr. Lofthouse: As my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Middlesbrough (Mr. Bell) said, clause 4, for the first time, sets out the circumstances in which the police may stop vehicles by means of a road check. It remains clear that the criteria are far too wide and could enable the setting up of random road blocks in most inner city areas at any time.
The new clause, which seeks to abolish common law powers, would impose a restriction on the power to set up road blocks. Therefore, it would affect police practice during the current miners' dispute. They would be able 10 set up road blocks under powers within clause 4. It provides for a road check if a person who is suspected of a serious arrestable offence is in the area, or the pattern of crime in the area is such that a serious arrestable offence is likely to be committed.
10.15 pm
I was tempted to speak in the debate because of the road blocks that the police have set up during the past nine or 10 weeks to deal with the miners' dispute. We need clarification on the criminal and civil laws. The police should be strictly confined to what is properly defined by statute. They should no longer be able to use common law, which is sometimes many years old, to cover circumstances that are not met by statute. The miners' strike highlighted that problem. Some police officers have referred to grey areas. All hon. Members know about the problems relating to the incident at the Dartford tunnel. It caused arguments, and the Attorney-General gave his views on the matter. At the court hearing the judge found against the miners' case, but he did not pass judgment on several aspects of the union's case.
The interpretation of a law appears to be a senior police officer's interpretation of it at a particular time. The miners have therefore been unable to understand why they were stopped, arrested and questioned. They heard the opinions of the Attorney-General, but then they switched on their televisions and saw the chief constable of Greater Manchester telling them that, had he been the officer in charge, he would not have stopped them at the Dartford tunnel, which confused them. They are law-abiding men and most of them have never been in trouble before. The Government are responsible for putting an end to this uncertainty, and they have an opportunity to do so. New clause 16 goes a long way to assisting with that.
Other chief constables are also greatly anxious about the present position in relation to the law. In today's Yorkshire Post it states:
Road blocks could be illegal, say police.
The use of police roadblocks to stop miners reaching picket lines could be illegal, a police federation spokesman admitted yesterday. Insp. Bob Lax, spokesman for South Yorkshire Police Federation, said it would like the law tried and tested in court. Police say they have a legal right to stop and turn back cars if they fear the occupants might cause a breach of the peace if they were allowed through to picket lines. But Insp. Lax said: 'The difficulty is that you have to try to prove someone's state of mind in advance, and anticipate their intentions'".
He is yet another senior police officer who questions the instructions of senior officers to young police officers, who must carry out the duties.
The Times today quoted police officers and the Police Federation expressing some anxiety about police activity on the picket lines and in stopping miners from reaching picket lines. Martin Kettle, the home affairs editor of The Times, states:
Activists in the 115,000-strong Police Federation, which represents officers below the rank of superintendent, believe that chief constables have been pushing officers into 'a legal no-man's land' in ordering them to cordon off the coalfields and prevent pickets from travelling to working colliery areas. 'We are really stretching the law', one official said last week.
Can one imagine the confusion, anxiety and annoyance of many law-abiding miners?
The Government have a responsibility to define the difference between civil and criminal law not only so that those who are not well-versed in the law can understand it, but so that the police authorities and senior policemen can understand it. If they cannot understand it it is hard lines for the people on the receiving end.
The article in The Times states:
The chief constable of Leicestershire, Alan Goodson, whose area contains nine pits that are still working, said: 'There are new dimensions to these disorders. I think there is an obligation on chief constables to sit down and see what measures if any, are

appropriate and to put those ideas up to the government.' The chief officers' association is stressing, however, that it has not been receiving complaints that police powers are inadequate to deal with the mass pickets.
Of course, the powers have been adequate because they have succeeded, but have they succeeded by the police acting lawfully? The law must be simplified and rectified. The position might have lasted for many years, but it has been highlighted by the miners' dispute.
The article continues:
The proforma statement, issued by Nottinghamshire Constabulary, is described by the federation in its monthly magazine as 'highly politicised verbiage'. Some officers have refused to use it when making arrests.
It might be for the convenience of the House, since some hon. Members might not yet have read it, to quote the article in the Police Federation magazine. It states:
Who is the organising genius in Notts who dreamed up the idea of a standard witness statement to be signed by arresting officers in cases of breach of the peace and suchlike during the mining dispute? It states: 'I keep myself fairly conversant with current affairs by daily reference to local and national newspapers. Whenever possible, I also listen to local and national radio and watch television news broadcasts. I am well aware that for some weeks now there has been a dispute between the NUM and the NCB. During this particular dispute I have witnessed on the television scenes where large numbers of pickets and demonstrators have congregated outside Nottinghamshire coal mines in an effort to prevent local miners getting to work. Some of the scenes on television or information gleamed from the media has portrayed large crowds acting in an abusive, threatening or disorderly manner. The mere fact of large numbers acting in such a manner must, I believe, have a frightening effect upon people wishing to go about their ordinary course of business.
I know from briefings whilst performing my duties in connection with the NUM dispute, unlawful demonstrations have occurred at local collieries and it is my belief, that to allow persons to visit local collieries to unlawfully picket, or demonstrate in large numbers would intimidate local workers. I consider this conduct is likely to cause a breach of the peace.'
I understand that that is meant to be signed. The magazine goes on to say:
The officer then completes the form by giving details of the particular incident which has led to the arrest and charge. Just what the courts might make of a succession of such identical statements, all giving the sworn views of picketing of the testifying officer, is best left to the imagination of the lawyers who, instructed by the NUM, would have a field day.
Fortunately, some members of visiting PSUs have refused to go along with this highly politicised verbiage, and have insisted on making their witness statements in their own way. After all they are professional police officers, are they not?
Those involved are thus told beforehand what form to fill in. It is reported that 20,000 arrests have been made of those on the miners' picket lines and of those travelling to them. The vast majority of those men are law-abiding and have never been in trouble in their lives. They are never likely to be in trouble again. The Government have a great responsibility to put matters right. Given all that has been said by senior police officers and by the Police Federation, one can conclude only that many of the men have been wrongfully arrested. Through the new clause, the Government have a chance to put the matter right.

Mr. Barron: Does my hon. Friend agree that a considerable number of people have been charged using that pro forma? Furthermore, does he agree that to say that people who are miles away can be charged and found guilty tends to cloud the issue?

Mr. Lofthouse: I certainly agree. We are concerned with the protection of innocent people, including miners, but I am sure that young policemen would also welcome


clarification of the law, as they have to administer it. That should certainly be welcomed by senior police officers, who have admitted, in the quotations that I have given, that they are confused about the situation. I hope that the Government will, therefore, accept the new clause.

Mr. Eldon Griffiths: The main thrust of the new clause is virtually to get rid of the common law powers of the police, but presumably not those of the citizen. I do not know whether the intention behind the new clause, in putting an end to the common law in respect of police officers, is to include all citizens, but if it is, I hope that that will be made clear. I cannot believe that the Opposition intend that the ordinary common law rights, powers, and responsibilities of the citizen should be washed out by a new clause that has been introduced on Report. It would be a massive upheaval in the whole philosophy of law and practice in this country if we did that. Therefore, I must assume that the new clause is intended to apply solely to the police.

Mr. Lofthouse: It does not apply solely to the police. It seeks to clarify the situation that has developed during the past few months in the mining industry.

Mr. Griffiths: I am grateful for that explanation, but the House has to deal with what appears on the Order Paper rather than what the hon. Gentleman divines it to mean. As it stands, the new clause would certainly mean that any rule of common law authorising a police officer to exercise a power would be at an end in respect of the new powers provided in the Bill. I asked the question and I think that I have the answer. I believe that this is intended to apply to the police and to the police alone, not to ordinary citizens. As it stands, the police henceforth would be unable to exercise any common law power in substance the same as the powers conferred on them by the Bill. That is what the new clause says.
I therefore return to my question. Is it intended that only the police will lose those common law powers, or will all citizens lose them? The latter would be a radical change without any consultation and with the gravest possible consequences. If, however, the Opposition intend that the police and the police alone shall be thus inhibited, the strange situation will arise in which an ordinary citizen who is not a police officer can carry out certain powers under the common law whereas police officers cannot. To put it mildly, it is a practical absurdity and a logical nonsense for Parliament to inhibit a police officer from doing that which a citizen may do, so on that ground alone the new clause is technically defective.
I appreciate, however, that the new clause is designed to permit discussion of a matter of far greater concern to the House—the common law powers used by the police in the miners' dispute—and there is no reason why we should not debate on Report a matter that I believe has been insufficiently debated in the House. I believe that I carry the hon. Member for Rother Valley (Mr. Barron) with me on that.
On the specific matter of Inspector Lax and the speech so effectively made by the hon. Member for Pontefract and Castleford (Mr. Lofthouse), I should point out that I had already quoted the passage that the hon. Gentleman read from the Police Federation magazine during an earlier debate in which he did not take part. I make no complaint

about that. Indeed, I suspect that it will be picked up by the editor of the magazine as one of the few publications ever to be quoted twice from opposite sides of the House on the same occasion. That is a matter of credit.
I remind the House that I associated myself entirely with the Police Federation view of the pro forma. So far as I am aware—I am subject to correction here—that pro forma has not yet been used in any case that so far has been brought and I hope that it never will be used. In my view, it would be improper for the police to base themselves on such a rigid, formalised document. I believe, too, that it is an insult to their intelligence. If a professional police officer is incapable of putting forward the evidence and the case that he is making on his own recognisance, he should not be in the police service at all. To put it in plain English, whoever dreamed up that formula needs to have his head examined. I hope that members of PSUs who go up into the coal mining areas will have nothing to do with such forms but will make their own judgments as professionals in their own way. If the form has emerged from the Nottinghamshire force, that force should drop it forthwith. I hope that that is clear enough for the hon. Member for Pontefract and Castleford.
I turn to the position as the new clause would have it. At the moment, in respect of the miners' strike or any other incidents that may threaten the public peace, the police are using powers that arise for the most part under the common law. There is a web of other laws, including the Public Order Act and the Road Traffic Acts, but at the moment we are talking about the common law powers.
I suggest that if any person — whether he be a member of the NUM, or any citizen or any Member of the House — believes that the police have exceeded the proper powers that the common law provides to them, he should act in two ways. First, he should found a complaint against the individual police officer concerned. Under the existing law, let alone this Bill which greatly extends the complaints procedure, that complaint will be investigated thoroughly. I believe that it is right to bring such complaints if there is evidence to sustain them. But when some trade union leaders or certain political members of police authorities allege that the police have exceeded their powers and are asked either by the federation or by chief officers to bring complaints so that they can be investigated, either they refuse to do so or they are unable to provide any evidence to sustain them.
The real test of those who wish to complain is that they should come forward and put before the relevant authority the evidence that they have.

Mr. Terry Patchett: I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is aware that that requires the police officer's number and name. If he wears no number and gives his name as that of Mr. Policeman, how can a miner or anyone else pursue a complaint against him? What is more, the complainant is frightened to press the police officer in case he makes further charges. I am sure that these incidents have occurred. How can the complaints procedure be followed in those circumstances?

Mr. Griffiths: I deal quite explicitly with the challenge that the hon. Gentleman has thrown down across the Floor. If he provides the evidence of when he says or his informant tells him that a police officer stopped him on the motorway or anywhere else when not wearing uniform—

Mr. Patchett: They wear uniforms, but they carry no numbers.

Mr. Griffiths: If the hon. Gentleman is saying that some police officers are wearing improper uniform, he makes an even more serious allegation. Let him give chapter and verse. Let him give the time, the place and the circumstances, and I can assure him that the matter of which he complains will be taken with the utmost seriousness because it is not only the allegation that the police have usurped their powers that he makes; he is saying that police officers are going about in uniform improperly dressed, that they are refusing to give their names and refusing to have their numbers examined. That is a serious disciplinary offence. If he makes that allegation in the House, he ought to be prepared to sustain it. I challenge him to do so.
That is only the first remedy. That is the proper procedure of making a complaint if any miner or any Member of the House believes that a police officer has behaved improperly. But, secondly, if there is a charge against the police along these lines, almost certainly it will amount to a breach of the law, and the police are accountable to the law as well as to their own discipline codes. Hon. Members may disagree with that view, but that is the formal position. If there is evidence that the police have broken the law, it is up to every Member of the House, which is more concerned for the rule of law than any other place, to bring that evidence before a court of law.
The hon. Member for Pontefract and Castleford referred to the Dartford tunnel episode. When that was reported in the press I too was surprised. I have been involved with the police service for far longer than I like to remember, certainly for all of 14 years. I was genuinely surprised. I took note of the rather, if I may say so, foolish remark of the chief constable of Greater Manchester, who, on a television programme, offered an opinion about a matter of which he knew nothing. To that extent —I choose my words carefully—he stabbed a fellow police officer, the chief constable of Kent, in the back without bothering first to do his homework. That is not the proper thing for the chief constable of Greater Manchester to do.

Mr. Bell: I saw that particular programme. Is it not the case that the chief constable of Greater Manchester was following the view of the Court of Appeal that where there was an imminent likelihood of a breach of the peace it was right for police to act in the way that they did? Therefore, is it not a fact that the chief constable was simply following a rule laid down by the Court of Appeal?

Mr. Griffiths: I am sure that we have all from time to time been on radio and television programmes. We have all been confronted by difficult questions. When Mr. Anderson replied to that question he was in a difficult position. As the hon. Gentleman says, he was making reference to a previous judgment of the Court of Appeal. But he then went further to offer his opinion that if he had been handling the situation he would not have done what the chief constable of Kent did in those circumstances. That was unwise for any chief officer because it is a fairly good rule of the road that individual chief officers cannot tell other chief officers what to do in their areas.

Mr. Barron: Perhaps the hon. Gentleman will pass comment not on the chief constable of Greater Manchester

but on Inspector Lax, an official of the South Yorkshire Police Federation, who also questioned about whether it was within the law to stop and in some instances charge people at police road blocks in the current dispute.

Mr. Griffiths: I was getting to Inspector Lax after having made my way to him by way of the chief constable of Greater Manchester.
I simply say on this central issue that if any mining picket, NUM official, Member of the House or anybody else has a complaint to make they owe it to the police and to themselves to bring that complaint and the evidence so that it can be examined. Secondly, if there is sufficient evidence they need as well to bring an action before the courts so that the courts can determine whether the police have exceeded their powers. That is the proper way to proceed.
There has been a great deal of unsustained allegation, but as yet there has been no proof. With great respect to hon. Members, it is being hopelessly unfair upon the police service to make a series of undocumented allegations and not to be able to come forward in any case that I am aware of with proof, or at least a demonstration to a court of law, which would sustain the charges that have been made. None of us wants to scatter around allegations without charge.

Mr. Barron: How long would it take?

Mr. Griffiths: That is a matter not for the police but for the courts. On any issue at all, be it the powers of the police or anything else, what happens in the courts of law is entirely separate from the police. The proper remedy is the one I have described.

Mr. Bell: I trust that the hon. Gentleman will not be provocative at this time of night in relation to picketing in the miners' dispute. Is it not a fact that the failure of the Kent miners to get an injunction against the police to stop them interfering with the movement of pickets did not mean that the action of the police was found to have been lawful?

Mr. Griffiths: This is a matter, I believe, for the courts. It is important to bring it before the courts. So far, I repeat, there has been a whole series of wild allegations. As yet, there has been no proof. If there is proof, let us have it, and the sooner the better.
10.45 pm
I have to refer to some of the allegations. It has been said, for example, that the police are engaged in political policing and that it is justified by the common law with which we are dealing in the new clause. The truth is that the police are not engaged in political action. The police have nothing to do with the Government's trade union legislation. They are in no way involved in that, because that is a civil matter. As all hon. Members know, the Coal Board—and, indeed, most other such bodies—has shied away from the civil legislation, for reasons to which no doubt the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) will wish to refer. But the police are not involved in any sense in this legislation. To allege against them that they are engaged in political policing, and are enforcing the Government's trade union laws, is simply untrue, and it ought not to be alleged against them.
The second allegation is that the police are using the common law to introduce into the country paramilitary policing. On behalf of the large number of men and


women in the Police Federation I want to say that they very much resent the suggestion that they are acting like the police of South Africa or of Poland. They are doing no such thing. In the policing that we have seen so far in this dispute—and some of it has had to be fairly hard—there has been none of the apparatus of paramilitary policing with which we have become all too familiar in other countries. In most countries, paramilitary policing means the use of water cannon, the use of the baton charge, the use of the gun, and the many other actions that are strictly paramilitary. Our police have involved themselves in none of those powers. To allege that they have done so under the common law powers that the House is now debating is a travesty of the facts.

Mr. Lofthouse: Could the hon. Gentleman inform the House which hon. Members have made the allegation in the debate to which he refers?

Mr. Griffiths: I have with me—but I think that the House would prefer that I draw my remarks to a conclusion —allegations that have been made of the police tapping telephones. No evidence has been provided. I have allegations of paramilitary policing. There is no such evidence. I have allegations of political policing. There is no such evidence. Hon. Gentlemen ought not to put their names to allegations for which they are unable to provide any proof.

Mr. Maxton: The hon. Gentleman has been accusing other hon. Members of making allegations and accusations for which there is no proof. He is now making the same allegations without being prepared to name people. If he is now prepared to do that, fair enough.

Mr. Eddie Loyden: rose—

Mr. Griffiths: It is important that other hon. Members should be able to speak. I have given way something like eight times, and I had better not give way any more. The police service is at the receiving end of allegations of the worst possible kind of policing—paramilitary policing, a national police state and so on. There is no truth in those allegations.
I promised that I would say a word about Inspector Lax. I had the pleasure of sitting next to him at a dinner. I listened to his descriptions of the difficulties of policing on the motorways with massive convoys of cars creating considerable difficulty for the riders, among others. Mr. Lax is a chairman of a joint branch board. What he says is, of course, his responsibility. The manner in which Mr. Lax's comments have been presented to the House bears no resemblance to his judgment in this matter.
The Police Federation is not a trade union; it is a statutory association of officers who are under discipline. the inspector has to be responsible for what he says. Like many other Police Federation officers, he offered an opinion of the difficulties that they face when doing a very onerous job. They are caught between the need to implement the law and uphold the Queen's peace and their understanding of the feelings of many people in the communities where they live. A remarkable feature of the policing of the dispute has been the good relationships that have been created between many police officers and members of mining communities. But that does not get into the press.
The new clause would destroy the flexibility that the police need to deal with the many diverse situations that

they face. Labour Members may not like it, but the new clause would do harm to the maintenance of the Queen's peace and, much more important, to the upholding of the civil liberties of all the people of this country, including those in the mining communities.

Mr. Skinner: The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) said that we should not be debating new clause 16, presumably because we are in the middle of a miners' strike. However, one of the results of having Bills stretched out through Committee and Report stages is that, if something happens outside the House during the passage of a Bill, that can become part of a debate that changes the nature of the Bill.
This Bill started on its way long before the miners' strike began, and we now have a perfect opportunity to discuss the Bill against a background not of theory but of the fact that the police are carrying out measures that are far in excess of anything included in the Bill. The House should be pleased that new clause 16 is before us, because it gives us the chance to look at the Bill against the background of what is happening in the coalfields.
On Friday, there was a police block to stop people moving about in north Derbyshire. At midday, Mrs. Kelwick, a warden who looks after about 20 old people in my constituency, was stopped from returning home to look after those old people, some of them disabled. If an old person had been found lying dead in a bungalow, there would have been an outcry in the local press; but the police got away with keeping that 'warden on the motorway near Barlborough for two or three hours and preventing leer from reaching her home. That is one good reason for this debate.
A similar thing happened the previous Friday. My hon. Friend the Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Ashton) and I decided to tour the Derbyshire and north Nottinghamshire coalfields in a bus with many members of the press to test the law. We wanted to see whether we could go about our business in our constituencies. My hon. Friend had not got very far when he was told by a chief inspector that he was not allowed to go to Welbeck colliery in his constituency, to the picket line or anywhere else. The representatives of the Press were able to see at first hand an interference with the civil liberties not only of my hon. Friend but of all the people who were on the bus.
We have come across examples in the past 10 weeks in which the police have, without exception, been acting like the Prime Minister's army to stop the miners fighting for the right to work. I remember, when the mining dispute began, the Home Secretary gave instructions from the Dispatch Box to every police force in the country to get stuck in. That was roughly what he said. That was followed by answers from other Ministers, giving precise details of how the police could carry out the wishes of the Tory Government, who want to try to smash the miners. They are not content with forcing their laws down the miners' throats, as they have done in many other disputes through which they are trying to smash the trade union movement at various levels. They are taking on industries in salami fashion. On this occasion, because it is the miners, the Prime Minister and the Government knew that they would have to get some assistance, so they turned to the police force to carry out their anti-trade union policy. That is one of the reasons why it is important that we debate this matter today.
We often hear Tory Members talking about paramilitary forces. There is no doubt for anyone who lives in a mining area that the police force is acting like a private army to try to stop the miners from winning what will be an historic victory against this Government.

Mr. Greg Knight: An historic defeat.

Mr. Skinner: It will be a victory, do not worry about that.
Tory Members talk of defeat. Perhaps that is why the Government are refusing to give precise figures for coal stocks — something that has not happened in the 14 years that I have been a Member. They ask why the people do not complain. although a small number of people do complain, the miners do not complain because they do not trust the system of investigation, with the police themselves carrying out the investigation.

Mr. Ashby: rose—

Mr. Skinner: No, I shall not give way.

Mr. Ashby: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Ernest Armstrong): The hon. Member for Leicestershire, North-West (Mr. Ashby) knows that if the hon. Member who is speaking does not give way he must not remain standing.

Mr. Skinner: We are also concerned about the cost of policing. It is now costing millions of pounds for the policing of the dispute. I have a novel suggestion—

Mr. Marlow: What about intimidation?

Mr. Skinner: The hon. Gentleman should deal with the Libyans first.
I have a novel suggestion for the cost. I call on all our friends in the local authorities in the areas with police committees not to pay a penny of the extra policing bill, but to send the account to the Government.
The hon. Member for Northampton, North (Mr. Marlow), who sometimes speaks for the Libyans in this House, ought to support new clause 16. Only a few weeks ago, another group of people, in two buses, were travelling to take part in a demonstration. They were not stopped 150 miles away. They were allowed to come from Manchester with their hoods and masks, and were escorted to the Libyan picket line to hold what was supposed to be a peaceful demonstration.

11 pm

Mr. Marlow: rose—

Mr. Skinner: I hope that the hon. Gentleman appreciates the double standards of the Government with regard to the policing of demonstrations. The Government are attacking the miners and kicking lumps out of them, yet those anti-Gaddafi demonstrators were allowed to go straight to the picket line, with the result that a young police woman was shot.
I am pleased that we have been able to have this debate today on the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill. It has given us an opportunity to speak at first hand about the way in which the police have been carrying out the Tory Government's policy of trying to smash the trade union movement. The new clause should be supported by all Opposition Members for that reason alone.
The strike has made one thing plain. Many miners have been in the front line against the police in the past 10 weeks, but I and my hon. Friends have received scores of letters from people not involved in the strike or connected with the industry in any way. They have been affronted by the number of times they have been stopped by the police at road blocks. Millions of people now understand that the best thing would be for this House to get rid of the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill.

Mr. Hurd: The nature of the debate has been changed, and I am not sad about that. Half an hour ago or so, the hon. Member for Pontefract and Castleford (Mr. Lofthouse) raised the matter of the common law powers of the police. The hon. Member for Rother Valley (Mr. Barron) had referred to the same matter earlier, in an emptier Chamber.
Everyone who has followed the matter knows that what the police are doing to prevent breaches of the peace in the coalfield is governed by the common law. It is not governed by statute, and certainly not by the Bill. My right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General gave his views on the legal aspect of the matter on 16 March, and there is no need for me either to repeat or to justify them.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Griffiths) is perfectly right on the guts of the matter. It is not the police, the Government or the House that decides whether individuals are innocent or guilty of an offence; it is the courts. Equally, it is the courts that decide, if the question is put before them, whether the use of common law powers, or any other powers, by the police has been stretched beyond what the law can stand.
What those hon. Gentlemen who have come fresh to the discussion of the Bill propose to do is to clarify the power of the police under the common law by simply abolishing it. They propose to get rid of the confusion by getting rid of the crucial protection of the liberty of the individual which is provided by the police.
What the police are doing, although to listen to the hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Skinner) one would not think it, is enabling the constituents of the hon. Gentleman and other hon. Members to work—despite the intimidation to which they are exposed—if they wish to do so. If the Opposition believe that the police should do nothing to deter and prevent the accumulation of pickets at pits, so allowing possible violence and disorder. I hope that they will say so from the Front Bench.

Mr. Lofthouse: Does not the Minister think that it is sensible that the police should be clear about their powers? It is obvious from the events of the past two months that they are not. Indeed, senior police officers have admitted it.

Mr. Hurd: I do not agree. I think that the police have conducted this difficult and complicated operation with a great deal of skill and success. I do not see the evidence of confusion that the hon. Gentleman mentions. The Bill is concerned not with all of the powers and duties of the police but with the enforcement of law in regard to criminal offences and the treatment of detained people.
The powers that the police possess at common law in pursuance of their duty to maintain the Queen's peace and to prevent public disorder are not within the scope of the Bill. Those who support new clause 16 are asking us to be much more ambitious and to sweep within the scope of the Bill something that has always been outside it, as those


who have sat through the 59 sittings of the Standing Committee know. Moreover, the Royal Commission said that the police's public order powers should remain outside the Bill.
Even if it would be effective to do so, we are not asking hon. Members to be silent. We are not denying them their opinions on public order legislation. We are reviewing and will shortly announce the results of the review of public order law. There will be plenty of opportunities to discuss the matter thereafter. This is not the right place to try to clarify what Opposition Members see as confusion. New clause 16 would simply complicate matters, and I therefore have no hesitation in inviting the House to reject it.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The House divided: Ayes, 113, Noes 188.

Division No. 297]
[11.06 pm


AYES


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Hughes, Simon (Southwark)


Atkinson, N. (Tottenham)
Janner, Hon Greville


Banks, Tony (Newham NW)
Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald


Barron, Kevin
Kennedy, Charles


Beckett, Mrs Margaret
Kilroy-Silk, Robert


Beith, A. J.
Kirkwood, Archibald


Bell, Stuart
Lambie, David


Bennett, A. (Dent'n &amp; Red'sh)
Lamond, James


Bermingham, Gerald
Leadbitter, Ted


Bidwell, Sydney
Leighton, Ronald


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Lewis, Terence (Worsley)


Brown, N. (N'c'tle-u-Tyne E)
Litherland, Robert


Bruce, Malcolm
Lloyd, Tony (Stretford)


Caborn, Richard
Lofthouse, Geoffrey


Callaghan, Jim (Heyw'd &amp; M)
Loyden, Edward


Campbell-Savours, Dale
McDonald, Dr Oonagh


Carlile, Alexander (Montg'y)
McKay, Allen (Penistone)


Clark, Dr David (S Shields)
MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor


Cocks, Rt Hon M. (Bristol S.)
McNamara, Kevin


Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.
McTaggart, Robert


Cook, Robin F. (Livingston)
Marek, Dr John


Corbett, Robin
Maxton, John


Cowans, Harry
Maynard, Miss Joan


Craigen, J. M.
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce


Crowther, Stan
Nellist, David


Davies, Ronald (Caerphilly)
Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon


Davis, Terry (B'ham, H'ge H'l)
O'Brien, William


Deakins, Eric
O'Neill, Martin


Dewar, Donald
Park, George


Dixon, Donald
Parry, Robert


Dormand, Jack
Patchett, Terry


Dubs, Alfred
Pike, Peter


Dunwoody, Hon Mrs G.
Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)


Eadie, Alex
Prescott, John


Eastham, Ken
Redmond, M.


Evans, John (St. Helens N)
Roberts, Allan (Bootle)


Fatchett, Derek
Robertson, George


Fisher, Mark
Ross, Ernest (Dundee W)


Forrester, John
Rowlands, Ted


Foster, Derek
Sheerman, Barry


Foulkes, George
Short, Ms Clare (Ladywood)


George, Bruce
Short, Mrs R.(W'hampt'n NE)


Golding, John
Skinner, Dennis


Gould, Bryan
Smith, C.(Isl'ton S &amp; F'bury)


Hamilton, James (M'well N)
Smith, Rt Hon J. (M'kl'ds E)


Hardy, Peter
Spearing, Nigel


Harman, Ms Harriet
Steel, Rt Hon David


Harrison, Rt Hon Walter
Stott, Roger


Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith
Strang, Gavin


Hogg, N. (C'nauld &amp; Kilsyth)
Thompson, J. (Wansbeck)


Holland, Stuart (Vauxhall)
Torney, Tom


Howell, Rt Hon D. (S'heath)
Wallace, James


Howells, Geraint
Wardell, Gareth (Gower)


Hughes, Roy (Newport East)
Wareing, Robert


Hughes, Sean (Knowsley S)
Welsh, Michael





Winnick, David
Mr. James Hamilton and



Mr. Frank Haynes.


Tellers for the Ayes:





NOES


Alexander, Richard
Lang, Ian


Amess, David
Lawrence, Ivan


Ancram, Michael
Lester, Jim


Arnold, Tom
Lewis, Sir Kenneth (Stamf'd)


Ashby, David
Lightbown, David


Aspinwall, Jack
Lilley, Peter


Atkins, Rt Hon Sir H.
Lloyd, Peter, (Fareham)


Atkins, Robert (South Ribble)
Lord, Michael


Atkinson, David (B'm'th E)
Luce, Richard


Baker, Nicholas (N Dorset)
Lyell, Nicholas


Baldry, Anthony
McCurley, Mrs Anna


Batiste, Spencer
MacKay, Andrew (Berkshire)


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Maclean, David John


Bellingham, Henry
Major, John


Benyon, William
Malone, Gerald


Berry, Sir Anthony
Marlow, Antony


Bevan, David Gilroy
Marshall, Michael (Arundel)


Biggs-Davison, Sir John
Mates, Michael


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Mather, Carol


Bottomley, Peter
Maude, Hon Francis


Bottomley, Mrs Virginia
Mayhew, Sir Patrick


Bowden, Gerald (Dulwich)
Mellor, David


Braine, Sir Bernard
Merchant, Piers


Brandon-Bravo, Martin
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Brinton, Tim
Miller, Hal (B'grove)


Brittan, Rt Hon Leon
Mitchell, David (NW Hants)


Brooke, Hon Peter
Moate, Roger


Brown, M. (Brigg &amp; Cl'thpes)
Montgomery, Fergus


Bruinvels, Peter
Morris, M. (N'hampton, S)


Buck, Sir Antony
Morrison, Hon P. (Chester)


Budgen, Nick
Moynihan, Hon C.


Burt, Alistair
Mudd, David


Butterfill, John
Neale, Gerrard


Carlisle, John (N Luton)
Needham, Richard


Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Newton, Tony


Carlisle, Rt Hon M. (W'ton S)
Nicholls, Patrick


Cash, William
Norris, Steven


Chapman, Sydney
Onslow, Cranley


Chope, Christopher
Oppenheim, Philip


Clark, Hon A. (Plym'th S'n)
Osborn, Sir John


Clark, Dr Michael (Rochford)
Page, John (Harrow W)


Clark, Sir W. (Croydon S)
Page, Richard (Herts SW)


Clarke, Rt Hon K. (Rushcliffe)
Parris, Matthew


Cockeram, Eric
Pawsey, James


Colvin, Michael
Pollock, Alexander


Coombs, Simon
Powell, William (Corby)


Cope, John
Powley, John


Cranborne, Viscount
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg


Currie, Mrs Edwina
Proctor, K. Harvey


Dorrell, Stephen
Raffan, Keith


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord J.
Renton, Tim


Dover, Den
Rhodes James, Robert


Durant, Tony
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Dykes, Hugh
Ridley, Rt Hon Nicholas


Eggar, Tim
Ridsdale, Sir Julian


Eyre, Sir Reginald
Rifkind, Malcolm


Favell, Anthony
Robinson, Mark (N'port W)


Forman, Nigel
Roe, Mrs Marion


Freeman, Roger
Rossi, Sir Hugh


Garel-Jones, Tristan
Rowe, Andrew


Glyn, Dr Alan
Rumbold, Mrs Angela


Good lad, Alastair
Ryder, Richard


Griffiths, E. (B'y St Edm'ds)
Sackville, Hon Thomas


Hargreaves, Kenneth
Sainsbury, Hon Timothy


Hogg, Hon Douglas (Gr'th'm)
Sayeed, Jonathan


Holland, Sir Philip (Gedling)
Scott, Nicholas


Holt, Richard
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Hordern, Peter
Shelton, William (Streatham)


Howard, Michael
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Howarth, Gerald (Cannock)
Sims, Roger


Hunt, David (Wirral)
Smith, Tim (Beaconsfield)


Hurd, Rt Hon Douglas
Soames, Hon Nicholas


Jones, Robert (W Herts)
Speller, Tony


Knight, Gregory (Derby N)
Spencer, Derek


Knowles, Michael
Stanbrook, Ivor






Stern, Michael
Viggers, Peter


Stevens, Lewis (Nuneaton)
Wakeham, Rt Hon John


Stevens, Martin (Fulham)
Walden, George


Stewart, Allan (Eastwood)
Waller, Gary


Stewart, Andrew (Sherwood)
Ward, John


Stradling Thomas, J.
Wardle, C. (Bexhill)


Sumberg, David
Watson, John


Taylor, John (Solihull)
Watts, John


Taylor, Teddy (S'end E)
Wells, Bowen (Hertford)


Temple-Morris, Peter
Wheeler, John


Terlezki, Stefan
Whitney, Raymond


Thomas, Rt Hon Peter
Wiggin, Jerry


Thompson, Donald (Calder V)
Wolfson, Mark


Thompson, Patrick (N'ich N)
Wood, Timothy


Thorne, Neil (Ilford S)
Woodcock, Michael


Thornton, Malcolm
Yeo, Tim


Thurnham, Peter
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Tracey, Richard



Trotter, Neville
Tellers for the Noes:


Twinn, Dr Ian
Mr. Archie Hamilton and


Vaughan, Sir Gerard
Mr. Michael Neubert.

Question accordingly negatived.

Further consideration of the Bill adjourned.—[Mr. Major.]

Bill, as amended (in the Standing Committee), to be further considered tomorrow.

Mr. Ashley Doubtfire

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Major.]

Mr. Richard Needham: This debate follows the death of Mr. Doubtfire and would not have been necessary had it not been for the fact that he became involved with the extraordinarily unpleasant organisation called the Exegesis Programme. It would not be wrong to call it a cult. It is run by a Mr. Robert D'Aubigny—although that is not the name that appears on his birth certificate.
Mr. D'Aubigny set out his aims in a statement which says that:
His concepts were first tested early in 1977 when 19 friends and family members gathered at a house in Surrey to talk about how their lives could be fundamentally changed. After 5 days of the most intensive kind of discussions and activities, those 19 men and women emerged from their experience with a totally new view of life. Little by little he began introducing other techniques and training methods to enhance the experience as well as the impact of his gathering. It was also not long afterwards that D'Aubigny decided to constitute the Exegesis Programme to offer training on a regular and formal basis to the general public".
A year later, those poignant words led to the death of my constituent.
What are the training techniques that the programme uses on its so-called students? For £240 one can be effectively locked up for two days; windows are blacked out, one's watch is removed and, except for the needs of nature, one cannot leave. The cult uses techniques of deprivation. It induces a sense of fear, and then one is abused and frightened.
A journalist from the Sunday Telegraph attended one of these courses. He wrote:
Jeff marched up to one of the students and flung a pair of shoes on the floor in front of him. 'Your integrity stinks', he screamed, staring the hapless and now nervous student in the eye. 'You broke an agreement not to leave things in the room during a break. You can't even cope with little things in life, let alone the big ones. Time is running out for you. Do you want to remake the agreement'?
Now began a familiar aspect of many such psychological seminars—the public confessional. Individually, students sat on a stool in front of the group and described their life and problems, losing all reticence as they were provoked by Kim's sneering abuse. There was a moment of extreme tension when an accountant, so nervous he could only whisper, was made to stand against a wall with his arms outstretched while Kim ordered three assistants to 'push, push, push'.
This so-called course is designed to attract people who lack self-confidence and want to find leadership, confidence or the ability to do better than they have done previously. Naturally, it attracts the very people who lack self-confidence and do not have strong characters, which is why they attend such a course. They hope that, as a result, their characters will become stronger. Because of the nature of the cult's techniques, they are most likely to be at risk from having to suffer the abuse that I have described.
One person who went on such a course was my late constituent, Mr. Ashley Doubtfire. It is true that he had a psychiatric problem when he was 18. It is also true that he seemed to be over it, that he had built a successful career as a hang glider and a manufacturer of hang gliders, that he was recently married to a nurse, and that both of them decided to attend a course. However, having followed this course in this darkened room, Mr. Doubtfire


became a complete schizophrenic, and for the following 18 months he was in and out of mental hospitals, until finally, at the beginning of last year, he died at the age of 34.
Another student who came to my notice as a result of the publicity surrounding the case was a young lady who, returning from a course, spent two weeks in the home of one of my constituents curled up in the foetal position, gibbering like an animal. Although she recovered for a time, she is now back in a mental institution. I have further evidence of others, mostly youngsters, who have been on those courses and whose happy family lives, especially their relationships with their parents, have been ruined as the children turn on their parents, using language and abuse similar to that heaped upon them during the seminars.
If one could say that the Exegesis Programme was designed to build character, to foster responsibility, and to improve people's chances of getting on in a competitive world, one would have reason to believe that the programme organisers would be more careful about the candidates whom they choose, and that they would at least ascertain whether prospective students were capable of understanding the sort of pressure to which they would be subjected.
I must tell the House that last July I committed a slight misdemeanour in telephoning the Exegesis Programme and asking one of its contacts to come to talk to me. I suggested that, being the chairman of a company, I had a sales director whom I thought might undertake a course that would be character-building and would restore his confidence. One of its represenatives—I use the word "representatives" with some caution, since he was careful to tell me that he was not paid by the organisation and, therefore, not employed by it—came to discuss what the seminars were and how they operated.
I gave him details of this mythical sales director—I should say that notes were taken of our conversation—as a possible contender for the programme. I explained that my sales director was outwardly confident, but inwardly not, that he had suffered a nervous breakdown and had been divorced. I was told that that description met the pattern common to many of those attending. I said that I had heard that the programme imposed shock, and that this had worried me because I did not want my sales director to come out of the programme worse than when he went in. I was told that that was very unlikely. It was admitted that people were shouted at, but that this did not usually break anyone. I was told that people were very strong, resilient and tough, and that they would go much further after this sort of self-examination. He said that the seminar did not teach limitations but provided an environment for about 60 peole to discover themselves.
I said again that I was worried about the suitability of my example. I was told that I could be given the examples of any number of people who had come out successfully. I was also told that in certain circumstances people had been asked to leave, but that no one who had gone deeply into the seminar had left it. I was informed that no one had "freaked out", that many salesmen had improved dramatically after the course, that people discovered their weaknesses as well as their strengths, and that people discovered a call — whatever that might be — an incorruptible absolute call.
It is clear from that that no attempt has been made by the Exegesis Programme even to consider the effects of its

seminars on those who attend them. After Mr. Doubtfire's death, Mr. d'Aubigny publicly stated that he was instituting means by which those joining the courses were checked for any mental history, but that is clearly not happening. At present, that cult is running a company called Programmes Limited, which is manned by former Exegesis students. It is equally clear from the information that I have that the pay is low and that the holidays are minimal. However, the exception to that is probably Mr. d'Aubigny, who flaunts a very large Rolls-Royce.
I hope that the House will agree that it is quite intolerable that members of the public, many of whom are anyway at some risk, should be treated in that way. In asking my hon. Friend the Minister to reply, I realise that he may not represent the only Department involved. I also realise that there are many other unpleasant cults around, but that will not stop me from raising the matter of this cult. I therefore ask my hon. Friend to authorise the Home Office to investigate the way in which that organisation and any other such organisations operate. Is he prepared to set up, or to help promote the setting up of an interdepartmental committee to bring home to the public the danger that such cults pose, and to ensure that any attempts to use such interrogation techniques are properly controlled?
I can understand that there are those who might benefit from such techniques, who may find some sense of purpose and who may find that determination to succeed that they previously lacked. However, there are others —and I suspect a considerable number of young men and women, including people such as Mr. Doubtfire—who, after attending such a course, may have entered the dark and terrible world of schizophrenia and paranoia, from which they may never return, as in the case of Ashley Doubtfire. They are my concern and I hope that the Minister can find some way of assisting them.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. David Mellor): My hon. Friend the Member for Wiltshire, North (Mr. Needham) has chosen to raise a very sad and tragic subject which is nevertheless important. The whole House will be grateful to him for having done so, and it is a sign of the concern felt by so many that several of my hon. Friends are present. I see my hon. Friends the Members for Sevenoaks (Mr. Wolfson), for Dulwich (Mr. Bowden), for Swindon (Mr. Coombs) and for Teignbridge (Mr. Nicholls) in their places. Many of us, as constituency Members of Parliament, have come face to face with the very real personal tragedy that this growing number of cults that now operate in Britain has brought to bear. I see this as a Member of Parliament and as the Minister responsible to the Home Secretary for the work of charities I receive a full postbag of letters about the activities of groups of the sort that my hon. Friend has described, most of them from distressed friends and relatives who are unable to grasp how intelligent young people with everything to live for and a real future, if directed in the right way, can become involved in, and ultimately dominated and sometimes destroyed by, such cults. I know that many hon. Members will have received similar letters. I should be surprised if there is a Member who has not.
Nearly all the letters that I receive ask for the Government to do something. The difficulty is to know what that something should be. The course so often


proposed is the sort of direct intervention that, on mature reflection, might be thought to constitute too fundamental an attack on civil liberties, having regard to the fact that it is the very essence of a free society that people may often in their free time choose to pursue activities that, on the whole, may not be in their best interests and that many of us may not think desirable.
To say that the Government should stay their hand on some of the firmer action that some correspondents ask to be taken does not mean that we believe that nothing can or should be done. On the contrary, I am firmly convinced that the sinister activities of some of the groups must be exposed by every means possible and most vigorously discouraged. However, given the restraints of the free society, a society which the Government are determined to uphold, there must be a limit to what the Government can do directly.
Let no one be in any doubt about our views on this matter, the importance we attach to it or the extent to which we applaud the work which so many have rightly carried out in exposing to public view the activities of some of these entirely undesirable groups.
I shall take first the specific case of the Exegesis Programme about which my hon. Friend the Member for Wiltshire, North has spoken with such eloquence and contempt. I set on the record my personal view that on the basis of what my hon. Friend has said, on the correspondence that we have had and on the contents of the excellent investigation that was carried out by Mr. Andrew Duncan in a thorough piece of journalism, which was written up in his article in the Sunday Telegraph Sunday magazine, the contents of the Exegesis Programme seem to be puerile, dangerous and profoundly wrong.
It may interest the House to know that we have been keeping the programme's activities under careful scrutiny for some time. We have asked the Metropolitan police and the Avon and Somerset police, in whose area the Exegesis Programme has also been active, to let us know of any evidence that criminal offences have been committed by the organisation, its offshoots or its members. The police have recently updated their reports and they confirm that there is no such evidence. We shall continue to keep a close eye on what it is doing.
This is the nub of the problem. However much we sympathise with the anguish of those who are affected, we owe it not least to them to make them recognise that, and while we are deeply disturbed about the way in which cults alienate members of families and clearly exercise an unhealthy impact on many vulnerable and impressionable people, their known activities do not appear, more often than not, to be unlawful. I emphasise that I have used the term "known activities" and I urge any member of the public who has evidence that the organisations involved, or their members, are breaking the law to inform the police immediately, who will give the matter their closest attention. They should not be afraid to raise their voices if they know that something discreditable and unlawful has taken place. That applies to any evidence that my hon. Friend or any other hon. Member may have.
My hon. Friend will appreciate that for the Government to consider taking action against organisations on grounds other than that they have broken the law—for example, because their activities may be socially undesirable—

would raise major issues of the sort that I raised at the outset of my reply because the principle of civil liberty would be at stake.
As I have said, some organisations and views are deeply repugnant to most sensible people and profoundly wrong-headed and damaging to those drawn into the web of their activities. Nevertheless, unless and until those involved actually break the law, it is difficult for the Government to set their hand against them.
I wish to draw particular attention to the problems of charity law in this respect. The status of bodies such as the Unification Church—the "Moonies"— has rightly been raised on many occasions. When I enjoyed the freedom of the Back Benches I took the strong view, which I still hold, that it was inappropriate that such groups should enjoy charitable status and thus bring the entire concept of charitable giving into some disrepute.
That is not a relevant consideration in the case of Exegesis as that organisation is not a registered charity. Indeed, many of the most sinister cults are not charities. They make too much money out of what turns out to be an extremely attractive business ever to seek to qualify as charities.

Mr. Needham: If my hon. Friend asks the Department to look into the matter, I think he will find that one of the organisations associated with Exegesis is in fact registered as a charity.

Mr. Mellor: I did not know that, but I will certainly look into it.
Broadening the discussion somewhat, the House will be glad to know that my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General is persisting in his desire to institute proceedings in the High Court to remove from the register the two charities connected with the Unification Church.
The greatest weapon in the hands of the Government and of individuals such as my hon. Friend who are deeply troubled by the activities of these pernicious groups is to ensure that the truth about them is fully and properly exposed. All too many of those who become involved in cults do so naively and in appalling ignorance of the nature and activities of the organisations concerned. The more that the media and Members of Parliament can expose the dangers, the less potent they will be.
In that context, I congratulate the Daily Mail on its courage in exposing the truth about the Unification Church and taking on appalling financial responsibilities in one of the longest-running actions in the history of the British High Court. The Daily Mail did its public duty in exposing the truth about that group, and after such a long trial it took the jury only a few hours to find the essential truth of what it had asserted.
Other publications, too, might be mentioned. Private Eye exposed the dubious activities of the Emins group which, I am sad to say, has its headquarters in my constituency where its presence is greatly resented by me and by many other local residents.
The families of those who have become or risk becoming attracted to such cults particularly need advice and support as they are most likely to be able to warn against and, if necessary, resist the influence of those organisations. For that reason, I pay particular tribute to the valuable work of FAIR—Family Action Information and Rescue— a voluntary organisation which aims to help families whose children become enmeshed in cults


and which has recently come to prominence as a sure sign of how wide and deep the concern about these matters runs throughout the community. I am sure that the House will welcome the fact that officials from the Home Office, the Department of Health and Social Security and the Department of Education and Science have met representatives of that body, and we intend to keep in close touch with them.
I should also mention the long-running work of the Deo Gloria trust in informing the public about the activities of these sinister groups.
I am sure that much can be achieved by this kind of public discussion and debate, especially if the media are prepared to take on board, as so many have successfully done in the past, the duty to expose with clarity and vigour the reality of what goes on in some of these groups. It is surely no coincidence but, indeed, a most hopeful sign that membership of the Unification Church in this country is said to have diminished dramatically in the past two years during which an unflattering spotlight of public attention has been focused on it.
Moreover, hon. Members will have heard of new initiatives in the European Parliament connected with a report from a committee on youth culture, education, information and sport. We shall await with interest the outcome of the Parliament's debate on the report. It shows

once again that groups of the kind with which we are dealing are not limited to one country; many of them are unwelcome imports from the United States of America. Many other countries on the continent of Europe are equally concerned about the problem, and it is appropriate that the European Parliament should take an interest. We welcome its decision to do so.
In a free society those who abuse that freedom, but do so within the law, have to be tolerated. Clearly the implications of deciding whether an organisation of an ostensibly religious kind should be banned by law goes to the very heart of the arguments about personal freedom. The Government are in no sense complacent. We are very concerned that vulnerable people, such as poor Mr. Doubtfire, are not put at risk from irresponsible groups. We intend to keep the activities of these cults under the closest scrutiny. I assure the House that we share to the full the deep worry expressed by my hon. Friend, which I know is widely felt outside the House.
While Ministers will not shirk the tasks that properly fall to them, I am convinced that the answer has to be found through publicity and persuasion, not through proscription.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at fourteen minutes to Twelve o' clock.